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SECURITIES ARBITRATION: A CLINICAL
EXPERIMENT
Constantine N. Katsoris*
Introduction
Disputes between the securities industry and its customers are
generally resolved in arbitration, which is designed to be simpler,
cheaper, and faster than courtroom litigation.' Such arbitrations
between brokers and customers have been held at the New York
Stock Exchange since 1872.2 Thereafter, other securities industry
self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") have also provided a forum
for the arbitration of such disputes. However, before 1978, the var-
ious SROs had differing rules governing such arbitrations.
In 1977, the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration
("SICA") was created to develop a Uniform Code of Arbitration
("Uniform Code") to be used by all the SROs.4 The Uniform
Code was largely in place at all the participating SROs by 1980. 5
After the adoption of the Uniform Code, SRO arbitrations grew
* Wilkinson Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Public Mem-
ber of Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration since its inception, 1977-1997.
Public Member of National Arbitration Committee of the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) 1975-1981; Public Arbitrator at New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE) since 1971; Public Arbitrator at NASD since 1968; Arbitrator for First
Judicial Department in New York since 1972; Private Judge, Duke Law School's Pri-
vate Adjudication Center since 1989; Arbitrator at the American Arbitration Associa-
tion (AAA) since 1992; Instructor, Arbitrator and Chair Training Programs at NYSE
and NASD since 1994: Mediator at NASD since 1997. The author would like to
thank: John D. Feerick, Dean of Fordham Law School; Professors James A. Cohen,
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1. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
419, 421 (1989).
2. See PHILIP J. HOBLIN, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES,
CASES 1-2 (2d ed. 1992).
3. See Katsoris, supra note 1, at 427.
4. See id. at 427-28.
5. See id. at 429.
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steadily from 830 in 19806 to 7271 in 1995.7 Moreover, before 1987,
these arbitrations were largely voluntary on the part of the public.
Yet after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,8 they generally became
mandatory.9
In 1988, the first full year after McMahon, SRO arbitrations
more than doubled from the year preceding McMahon. In addi-
tion to the increase in the number of SRO arbitrations, McMahon
brought into arbitration more difficult cases, such as those involv-
ing violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tion Act, 10 the Securities Act of 1933,11 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,12 as well as employment and discrimination
cases. 13 At that point, arbitration began to look more like the
courtroom through the introduction of expanded discovery re-
quests, more frequent prehearing conferences, and other proce-
dures intended to provide safeguards to ensure a fair and complete
hearing.' 4 Understandably, these additional safeguards raised the
costs of arbitration with the result that investors with small claims
often found it difficult to obtain counsel to represent them. This
often resulted either in the hiring of persons who were not attor-
neys, or the claimants simply representing themselves, pro se.' 5
This Article discusses the use of non-attorneys in representing
such clients, as well as pro se representation by such claimants. It
then describes the efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ("SEC") to ensure that such claimants have access to ade-
quate and effective representation through the use of law school
clinics. Finally, this Article raises numerous issues that must be
considered before establishing such clinics, and concludes that
6. See NINTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRA-
TION 30 (June 1996) [hereinafter NINTH REPORT] (on file with the Fordham Urban
Law Journal).
7. See id.
8. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
9. See Katsoris, supra note 1, at 426.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(c); see generally, DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF CIVIL
RICO (1991).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1982).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
13. See Katsoris, supra note 1, at 429-31.
14. See id.
15. See Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration on Representa-
tion of Parties in Arbitration by Non-Attorneys, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 511
(1995) (hereinafter NARs Report); see also SAC Award Survey: How Fares the Pro Se
Investor in Arbitration?, 8 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1, 1 (1997) [hereinafter SAC
Survey]; infra note 36 and accompanying text.
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proper planning and adjustment is necessary for a successful
clinical program.
I. Representation by Non-attorneys
The general issue of the representation of clients in legal or
quasi-legal proceedings by non-attorneys has been a troubling one.
Not only has such representation by non-attorneys taken the form
of transactional services, i.e., advising, drafting deeds and docu-
ments, etc., but it has also spread to actual representation of parties
before administrative agencies. Moreover, as more and more dis-
putes are being resolved through alternative dispute mechanisms,
such as arbitration, non-attorneys are also representing clients in
such proceedings as civil litigation-often involving complex issues
and significant sums of money-against litigants who are usually
represented by skilled attorneys. Such has been the case with the
arbitration of securities disputes.
In 1991, SICA began to receive complaints, particularly in Flor-
ida and California, that claimants were increasingly being repre-
sented in SRO arbitrations, not by their friends, accountants,
business associates, or relatives, but by professional groups who
were not attorneys ("Non-Attorney Representatives" or "NARs").
One of the principal arguments the NARs used-in touting the
need for their services to public customers in disputes with their
brokers/dealers-was that it was often difficult to retain the serv-
ices of an attorney, especially in small claims.16
SICA's initial view was that the subject should be handled at the
state level, because attorneys general and bar associations have the
responsibility for dealing with questions relating to standards and
qualifications to practice law.17 The complaints persisted, however,
16. See NARs Report, supra note 15, at 516-17.
17. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Foreword to NARs Report, 22 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 503, 505 [hereinafter Foreword]. The Foreword contains the following discussion:
The ABA Draft discusses not only pro se representation and legal services
delivery by traditional paralegals, but also by so-called legal technicians, who
are identified as someone who: is not a lawyer, is not functioning as a tradi-
tional paralegal or a document preparer, and is not working with supervision
by or accountability of a lawyer.
As to the competence of the legal technicians, or their supervision in ren-
dering their services to the public, the Draft points out that in certain areas
of legal technician practice, such as proceedings before some administrative
agencies, there are mechanisms to ensure their competency and accountabil-
ity. In other areas, oversight mechanisms may arise from statutes and rules
unrelated to a tribunal; for example, in many jurisdictions, real estate bro-
kers are permitted to assist consumers in completing standardized residential
sales contracts under a scheme of regulation related to brokerage functions.
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and they raised questions as to whether customers were adequately
represented in SRO arbitrations. Accordingly, in 1993, SICA de-
cided it had to address this thorny issue to protect the overall inter-
est of the thousands of claimants using SRO forums annually. 8
Because of the enormous stakes and widely divergent opinions be-
ing expressed, SICA decided, for the first time in its existence, to
solicit public comment-much like the SEC and other regulatory
agencies do prior to adopting a rule-in order to elicit the views of
the public and affected parties. 19 SICA held two special meetings,
one in California and one in Florida, at which numerous individu-
als and organizations appeared-including organizations of non-at-
torney representatives.2 °
Initially, SICA received some unfavorable publicity, because
some in the press instinctively came down on the side of consumer-
ism, arguing that NARs provide greater access to the arbitration
system.2 ' There were even suggestions that SICA was controlled
by lawyers, and therefore its inquiry sought to protect its own.2
Those innuendoes, however, were unwarranted, and the media
would surely have reacted quite differently if a destitute person
with a justifiable claim lost all of his or her savings and recovered
nothing because of incompetent or unethical representation. Un-
daunted, SICA forged ahead, listened carefully to all parties, ex-
amined all of the issues honestly and constructively, and issued its
The Draft goes on to point out, however, that in other situations-such as
insurance adjusting and debt counseling-there may be little or no oversight
to assure competence. The Draft notes that some legal technicians have
been found to be in violation of prohibitions against the unauthorized prac-
tice of law, but the enforcement of such prohibitions varies widely across the
country. The ABA Draft further notes, however, that "[n]owhere is unau-
thorized practice of law . . . enforcement given the attention or resources
that it received as recently as twenty years ago."
Foreword, at 503-04 (describing a Discussion Draft for Comment entitled Non-Lawyer
Practice in the United States: Summary of the Factual Record before the American Bar
Association Commission on Non-Lawyer Practice issued in April, 1994) (citations
omitted) [hereinafter ABA Draft or Draft].
18. See id. at 504. The SICA inquiry was prompted by complaints concerning the
quality of such representation; it raised questions as to whether the activities of NARs
constituted the unauthorized practice of law, and whether the interests of investors
might be jeopardized or compromised by such representation. In addition, there were
concerns raised regarding the fact that some NARs employ misleading and inaccurate
advertising, and that some NARs had been barred from working in the securities
industry by one or more regulatory bodies for violation of the securities law, rules and
regulations. See id. at 505.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 506.
21. See id.
22. See id.
1998] CLINICAL EXPERIMENT 197
report on NARs representation in securities arbitration ("NARs
Report" or "Report").23 This Report was widely disseminated to
many, including state attorneys general and bar associations
throughout the country.24
The NARs Report, after thoroughly discussing the pros and cons
of non-attorney representation, arrived at numerous conclusions 25
23. See NARs Report, supra note 15, at 507. The Report states:
NARs are not required to meet the ethical standards imposed on attor-
neys nor are communications with NARs protected by the attorney-client
privilege. Attorneys in each state are bound by ethical rules. These rules
are enforced either by state bar associations or special commissions ap-
pointed to monitor the activities of attorneys. These ethical rules generally
prohibit attorneys from:
" Disclosing client confidences;
" Accepting cases for which they are not qualified unless they associate
with an attorney who has expertise in the particular field;
" Acting except in the client's best interest;
" Concealing a settlement offer from the clients;
" Making claims which have no basis in law or fact;
" Misrepresenting the law to a forum;
" Charging unreasonable fees;
" Refusing to follow a client's instructions unless the client demands an
illegal or unethical activity;
" Knowingly allowing a client to lie to a forum; and
" Charging a non-refundable retainer.
NARs are not bound by any of these strictures. Many of the NARs how-
ever, suggested that some form of regulation of their activities was
appropriate.
Furthermore, attorneys cannot usually shield themselves from malpractice
claims by a corporate structure. In almost every state, attorneys may incor-
porate but they are held personally liable for acts of malpractice. Many
NARs are incorporated and do not appear to hold extensive assets in their
corporations. Any recovery against a NAR for negligence would generally
be limited to the assets of the corporation.
Id. at 518-19.
24. See id. at 524.
25. The NARs Report concluded:
Based on its review of the complaints and the information received at the
Special SICA Meetings and in written submissions, SICA arrived at the fol-
lowing conclusions about the role of NARs in arbitration:
1. NAR advertising and public relations programs increase awareness of
arbitration as a means of resolving or adjudicating a potential claim
that a customer may have;
2. solicitation of clients for representation in arbitration, advising them
with respect to legal rights, preparing claims in arbitration, and appear-
ing on behalf of a party at a hearing, among other matters constitute the
practice of law. The performance of these functions by NARs for com-
pensation as a part of their regular business may constitute the unau-
thorized practice of law;
3. fees charged by NARs are generally comparable to those charged by
attorneys for representation in arbitration;
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and issued several recommendations.26 One of SICA's conclusions
was that the representation of clients by NARs for compensation
constituted the practice of law. 27 Indeed, the Supreme Court of
Florida28 agreed when it subsequently ruled that compensated non-
lawyer representation in securities arbitration constituted the un-
authorized practice of law, holding that "the protection of the pub-
lic requires us to step in where there is no such legislation or
regulation. Accordingly, we enjoin non-lawyers from representing
investors in securities arbitration proceedings for compensation
",29
4. a small number of NARs limit their function to assisting parties in eval-
uating whether clients have been damaged as a result of wrongdoing
and to aiding them in negotiating settlements. In those cases where
settlements are reached, it appeared that the cost to the customer gen-
erally may be less than the cost of engaging an attorney. NARs who
operate in this fashion generally refer customers to attorneys .for repre-
sentation in arbitration if they are unable to reach a settlement;
5. some NARs advertising is inaccurate and misleading;
6. some NARs retain outside attorneys or hire attorneys as employees to
appear at a hearing. This practice raises a serious question as to
whether the attorney represents the NAR or the party;
7. some NARs are, or are controlled by, former brokers or other securi-
ties industry personnel who have been barred or disciplined by the SEC
or an SRO, or are lawyers who have been disbarred, suspended or per-
mitted to resign their license as the result of a disciplinary proceeding;
8. benefits of the attorney-client relationship, such as privilege, adherence
to state bar prescribed ethical standards, regulation and malpractice in-
surance may not be available when using a NAR in arbitration; and
9. NARs do not limit the size of claims they accept and have represented
customers who have substantial claims.
Id. at 522-23 (emphasis added).
26. One of the recommendations of the SICA Report was:
1. that the SROs adopt a rule which would:
(a) prohibit any person, or entity controlled by such person, from repre-
senting a party in arbitration, directly or indirectly, for a fee or other
compensation, if that person is,
(i) prohibited from representing a party by the law of the state in
which the arbitration will take place,
(ii) subject to a bar or suspension from the securities or commodities
industry, or a denial of a state securities license, or
(iii) an attorney who is disbarred or suspended or has been permitted
to resign from the bar as a result of disciplinary action, and has
not been readmitted ....
Id. at 523.
27. Id. at 522.
28. The Florida Bar Re: Advisory Opinion on Nonlawyer Representation in Securi-
ties Arbitration, 696 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1997). The Supreme Court's decision approved
the position taken by the Florida Bar Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Prac-
tice of Law in October 1996. See id. at 1181.
29. Id. at 1184. It should be noted, however, that the court's decision does not
seem to apply to persons who: (i) are licensed to practice law in any jurisdiction, even
[Vol. XXV
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Moreover, the Supreme Court of California recently held that a
New York law firm, which was not licensed to practice in Califor-
nia, was not entitled to recover fees under a fee agreement for
work done within California, 30 and, to the extent it practiced law in
California, was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.3 1 The
Court further noted that such prohibition extended to arbitration. 32
Furthermore, a lower court in California enjoined a non-attorney
firm from serving as an advocate in securities arbitration, ruling
that such representation constituted the illegal practice of law with-
out a license.33 Interestingly, the injunction issued in the California
case was shortly thereafter introduced against the same NAR in an
NASD arbitration in New York, prompting that firm's client "to
settle his case rather than see it through. 34
II. Pro Se Representation
Restricting the extent of NARs representation in securities arbi-
tration proceedings, however, does not alleviate the persistent
problem investors with small claims experience in obtaining coun-
sel to represent them as they seek to recoup their damages. In fact,
limiting the use of NARs representation can only exacerbate the
problem. The result is that investors with small claims often either
abandon them in frustration, or decide to represent themselves pro
se. In this regard, two inquiries were conducted, the General Ac-
counting Office ("GAO") Study35 and the Securities Administra-
tion Commentator ("SAC") Survey,36 with somewhat similar
results.
A. GAO Study
Several years ago, in response to Congressional inquiry into
whether a pro-industry bias existed within the securities/commodi-
ties arbitration process, the United States General Accounting Of-
if they are not licensed to practice in Florida; (ii) represent parties to securities arbi-
trations other than investors; and (iii) represent investors but are not compensated for
doing so. See id. at 1180, n.1.
30. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court of Santa
Clara County, 949 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1998).
31. See id.
32. See id. at 8-9. The Court of Appeal, however, let stand the firm's right to
pursue a claim in quantum meruit. Id. at 12.
33. See Court Bars Non-Attorney Reps from Arbitration Proceedings, COMPLI-
ANCE REP., Nov. 24, 1997, at 3.
34. Id.
35. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
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fice ("GAO") launched a two-year study resulting in a 110-page
report entitled "Securities Arbitration: How Arbitration Fares"
("GAO Study"). 37 After examining statistical results of decisions
in arbitration cases at both industry-sponsored and independent fo-
rums, the GAO Study found no indication of a pro-industry bias in
decisions at industry-sponsored forums.38 In the course of its
study, the GAO also focused on the issue of whether attorney rep-
resentation had any effect on the success of the claimants.39
The GAO Study found that investors were represented about
ninety percent of the time when the amount claimed was $20,000
or more, and that such investors with counsel settled about 1.7
times more frequently than investors without counsel. 40 More im-
portantly, however, the GAO study found that, although repre-
sented investors did not necessarily win more frequently than pro
se claimants, represented investors' recoveries were 1.6 times more
likely to exceed the average recovery rate when they did win.4' In
short, the study confirmed that attorney representation "provides
'value added,' both in terms of negotiating a resolution with bro-
kerage Respondents and in terms of identifying all of the damages
to which the truly aggrieved investor is entitled. 42
B. SAC Survey
Some five years after the GAO Study, a somewhat similar survey
was conducted by the Securities Arbitration Commentator ("SAC
Survey").43 The SAC Survey divided its findings into two groups:
the first involved awards of $10,000 or less ("Small Claim" or
"Small Claim Awards"), and the second involved awards of more
than $10,000 ("Larger Claim" or "Larger Claim Awards"). 44
1. Small Claim Awards
More than 75% of the Small Claim Awards (2961) surveyed in-
volved pro se investors, 45 and the "win-rate" for those pro se inves-
37. See GAO Study: How Arbitration Fares, 5 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1, 1
(1992) [hereinafter GAO Study].
38. See id.
39. See id. at 3.
40. See SAC Survey, supra note 15, at 1. The SAC survey covered the five-year
period from July 1991 to June 1996, whereas the GAO Study covered an 18-month
period from January 1989 to June 1990. See id.
41. See id.
42. GAO Study, supra note 37, at 3.
43. See SAC Survey, supra note 15, at 1.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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tors was 44.87%. This compares to an overall "win-rate" of 49%
for investors in Small Claim matters.46 Moreover, besides a lower
"win-rate" than the average, pro se investors in Small Claim mat-
ters recovered less, as a percentage of what they sought when they
did win.47 Furthermore, of the pro se Small Claim investors who
submitted their disputes on the papers (without a hearing), 45.9%
won a monetary award, whereas 51% of the represented investors
were victorious.48 Similarly, represented investors with Small
Claims had a 55.4% win-rate where live hearings were conducted,
compared to pro se investors who achieved a win-rate of only
41.7% where live hearings were held.4 9
2. Larger Claim Awards
Regarding Larger Claim Awards, the SAC Survey found, as the
GAO Study had previously found, that only a small percentage of
investors chose the pro se route. ° In fact, the SAC Survey found
that "investors increasingly turn to counsel as the amount of the
compensatory claim rises."'" In addition, as the compensatory
claim amounts increased, the pro se investors win-rate declined. 2
Moreover, for those in the Larger Claim Awards category (over
$10,000), the pro se investors had an overall win-rate of 43.6%, but
their win-rate declined as the amount in controversy increased-
exactly the opposite of the experience of represented investors.53
3. Summary of SAC Survey
The SAC Survey concluded that "investors win more frequently
when represented by counsel in every dollar category" tested.54
Moreover, the Survey found that represented investors who win
46. Id. at 1-2. The SAC Survey identified a 70.2% recovery rate for pro se inves-
tors in Small Claims Awards versus a 77% recovery rate for Small Claims Awards
generally. Id. at 2.
47. See id. at 2. Interestingly, represented investors in Small Claims Awards re-
ceived a recovery rate that slightly exceeded 100% of the amount sought. See id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. Id. For example, of the Large Claims Awards category, 18% involved pro se
investors overall, whereas as to compensatory claims exceeding $50,000, the pro se
investor claimants' participation precipitously drops to 9%. Id.
52. See id.
53. Id. For example, for pro se investors involved in Large Claims Awards, where
the amount in controversy was between $50,000 and $100,000, the win-rate dropped
to 40.2%, and when the amount sought exceeded $100,000, a win-rate of only 36.8%
was achieved. Id. at 2-3.
54. Id. at 3.
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achieve a "significantly higher recovery rate than pro se" inves-
tors.5 5 Furthermore, the SAC Survey found the "win-rate dispari-
ties between the represented and the pro se investors tend to grow
as the size of the compensatory claims grow." 56
III. SEC Initiative
In view of the NARs57 and pro sell experiences, it is not surpris-
ing that when SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt attended a series of
town meetings around the country last year, complaints kept sur-
facing about the difficulty or inability of small investors to obtain
adequate and affordable representation in securities disputes.
Chairman Levitt, justifiably troubled by such complaints, sought a
solution to the dilemma. He suggested that the void could be filled
by clinical programs at various law schools throughout the country.
Since more SRO arbitrations are held in New York than any other
locale in the country, Chairman Levitt sought to launch his pilot
program with law schools located in New York City.59
Pursuant to this initiative, several meetings were held in New
York between representatives of the SEC and several local law
schools. At these meetings numerous concerns surfaced, such as:
what type of cases would qualify for such clinical representation;
should fees be charged; would practice orders under which the clin-
ics operated have to be amended; and how would the students be
supervised?
It was made clear at the outset, however, that cases should not
be referred to clinics where the local bar association could provide
adequate coverage. To address the problem, discussions were held
with the Association of the Bar of the City of New York ("Bar
Association"), which consented to help screen eligible cases for
clinical representation. Cases under $15,000 would be referred to
the clinics without screening. For cases above that amount, the Bar
Association would seek private counsel to accept the case, and, if it
was not successful in its search, the case would be referred to one
of the participating clinics.6 °
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See supra notes 16-34 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 35-56 and accompanying text.
59. See SEC Announces Pilot Securities Arbitration Clinic To Help Small Investors,
SEC REL. 97-101 (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.),
Nov. 12, 1997.
60. See id.
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IV. Planning the Clinic
Clinical education is first and foremost a method of teaching.6'
In fact, it provides to its students the optional means of integrating
theoretical, analytical, and ethical skills and goals by combining
"the extraordinarily varied and dramatic context of real cases and
problems with the opportunity for intensive teaching, supervision,
growth and reflection. '' 62 Indeed, the ABA's Report of the Task
Force On Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap63
" Washington, D.C. November 12, 1997 Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion Chairman Arthur Levitt announced today the start of pilot securities
arbitration clinics at two New York law school - Pace University and Ford-
ham University - to help small investors who have difficulty obtaining legal
representation.
The clinics were started in response to concerns expressed to Chairman
Levitt by small investors at several SEC town meetings. Because their claims
are often not large enough, it is difficult for small investors to obtain counsel
to represent them in arbitration. To help solve this problem, the Commission
is working with law schools in the New York City area to set up pilot arbitra-
tion clinics. Students in the pilot programs will, under supervision of a law-
yer, assist small investors in the securities arbitration process.
In announcing this pilot program, Chairman Levitt stated. 'These clinics
will help small investors who have nowhere else to turn by providing them
with high legal representation. It's a win-win proposition: small investors get
much-needed legal assistance and students gain valuable learning
experience.'
Several other New York law schools are considering joining the pilot pro-
gram, and the Commission seeks to expand the program to other school
across the country.
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York which has a panel of
highly experienced securities lawyers, supports this program and has agreed
to screen and refer cases to the clinics. Under guidelines established by the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, it will refer cases directly to
the clinics that are for claims of $15,000 or less. For larger claims, the Associ-
ation of the Bar of the City of New York will attempt to secure an attorney
for the investor and, if unsuccessful, it will then refer appropriate matters to
the clinic.
Also, the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers, Inc. will provide speakers to help educate participating law
students on various arbitration topics."
Id.
61. See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, SECTION ON CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION, Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinics, 42 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 511 (1992) (hereinafter AALS Clinic Report).
62. Id. at 517; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Should Law Schools Include an Ap-
prenticeship?, NAT'L L.J., March 23, 1998, at A17.
63. Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational Continuum:
Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992
A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO BAR [hereinafter the MacCrate Re-
port]. But see John J. Costonis, The MacCrate Report: Of Loaves, Fishes, and the
Future of American Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1993).
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("MacCrate Report") stressed that the curricula which most Amer-
ican law schools offer do not adequately prepare students for the
practice of law.
Much has been written regarding the size, shape, and operation
of a clinic, and reasonable people can differ in this regard. Regard-
less of these differences, however, much thought and planning must
go on before a new clinic opens its doors to students and clients.
Three of the main areas of concern are:
a) the basic structure and operation of the clinic; 64
b) the implementation of systems for handling the cases;65 and,
c) the classroom component of the clinic. 66
64. See Philip Schrag, Constructing a Clinic, 3 CLINICAL L. REV 175, 177 (1996).
Schrag states:
First, I address some basic structural questions that the clinic's supervisor or
supervisors might think about when beginning to design or renovate a pro-
gram. These include the goals of the proposed clinic; the number and quali-
fications of its teaching and support staff; the desired relationships among
staff members; the subject matter of the clinic's cases; the duration of the
clinic; the amount of course credit that the students should receive for taking
it, and the caseload per student; the grading system; the relationship be-
tween the students and the tribunals or other fora in which they will be prac-
ticing; how the clinic will deal with client needs during summer and other
academic vacations; the clinic's relationships with non-clinical faculty; and
systems for recruiting and selecting clinic students.
Id.
65. See id. at 178. Schrag states:
The second section pertains to systems for case handling. In it, I focus on
decisions about how the teachers and students in a clinic will acquire knowl-
edge of the doctrine and practice in the areas of law in which the clinic will
work; what methods teachers will use for supervising students; whether stu-
dents will work individually or collaboratively; why a clinic might need to
generate its own practice and administrative manuals, and what such manu-
als might contain; and how to think about acquiring a specialized physical
and virtual library. This section also discusses planning for a clinic's physical
space, equipment, and support services; locating and using experts; generat-
ing forms; building systems through which the clinic will acquire institutional
memory; developing a standardized filing system; establishing intake
sources, guidelines, forms, and systems; building institutional relationships
with judges and court administrators; developing systems for closing cases
and for the inter-semester transfer of cases from some students to others,
when necessary; and creating systems for referring cases and appeals that the
law school clinic cannot handle.
Id.
66. See id. The author states:
Planning does not end, however, when the clinic opens for business. Clinics
evolve in response to constantly changing circumstances in the law school
and in the community. Clinic supervisors, like all other bureaucrats, get com-
fortable with standard operating procedures and may not notice the need to
change caseloads or other aspects of clinic administration until adverse con-
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It is not the purpose of this Article to set rigid guidelines for estab-
lishing new clinics or expanding old ones. The intent, rather, is
merely to point out that much planning is necessary. Accordingly,
it has been suggested that "to the extent that deans and others are
willing to give clinicians at least half a year for planning a new
clinic before opening its doors to students and clients, the quality
both of teaching and of representation is likely to improve."67 This
is especially true for securities disputes, where significant substan-
tive and procedural issues are involved and often are quite fact-
intensive.6 S
V. The Fordham Clinic
The Fordham Clinic presently has nine faculty members who
spend much of their time supervising students who represent cli-
ents in five areas: Battered Women's Rights, Civil Employment
and Disability Rights, Community Lawyering, Criminal Defense,
and Disability (Social Security Act). In each clinic, the faculty-stu-
dent ratio deliberately is kept low. The current ratio of no more
than ten students for every supervising faculty member permits-
and the program's pedagogical design requires-intense supervi-
sion of students' research and writing and other lawyering skills.
Fordham intended that its new securities arbitration/mediation
clinic's role not be limited solely to investors' representation in ar-
bitration. In other words, once a case is accepted, the full panoply
of ADR procedures should be available, as with private represen-
tation.69 For example, the clinic should be free to enter into settle-
ment negotiations before issue is joined. Moreover, if mediation is
practical, it should also be available to the clinic. Similarly, if an
award has to be confirmed or vacated, the clinic should be able to
sequences (such as declining student enrollment, or the increasing difficulty
of locating appropriate clients) are already upon them.
Id. at 242.
67. Id. at 241-42.
68. The teaching component of securities arbitration can be quite extensive and
include claims as diverse as RICO claims, common law fraud, violations of the securi-
ties acts, punitive damages, and employment discrimination. Moreover, one cannot
assume all cases will be simple merely because the amount of the claim is small.
69. To handle the new securities cases required an expansion of the Fordham Clin-
ics' practice order. In its application, permission was sought to arbitrate before the
SROs, the AAA and other appropriate bodies, including representation in court
where no arbitration agreement was present; and, in addition, permission was sought
to mediate such disputes, where appropriate.
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do so. In addition, if the Eligibility Rule70 results in transferring
the case into court, the clinic should be free to pursue the claim in
court. Accordingly, once representation is accepted, the clinic
should be free to act, as any other retained private attorney, to
pursue whatever remedy is adequate. This would include bringing
an arbitration before the American Arbitration Association
("AAA"), if that were the appropriate forum.7'
Fordham's securities arbitration/mediation clinic will be run by a
clinical professor who will have direct responsibility for the cases
and supervision of the students. In addition, students will be re-
quired to have taken a basic securities law course, a foundations
skills course, Evidence (although the rules of evidence are not
strictly applied in arbitration, the course is a prerequisite for trial
advocacy and an essential course for any litigation), and Trial
Advocacy.
Like other live client courses, the program would offer a class-
room component and a fieldwork component. The classroom com-
ponent would frontload substance, procedure, and particular skills
and issues posed by these cases with an intensive weekend work-
shop early in the semester, and a continuation of that focus during
the first weeks of classes. During this phase of the course, the
clinic would draw on experienced lawyers, from both the private
bar, the public sector, and the SROs. As the semester progresses,
the focus of the classroom component would shift to the live client
cases and the preparation of those cases.
The fieldwork component of the class would involve students
working on one or two different cases, in teams of two. Students
would handle all phases of the case, from interviewing to discovery
to conducting the hearing under the guidance of the clinical
supervisor.
VI. Should Fees Be Charged?
The ABA's MacCrate Report72 emphasized the serious gap that
exists between the theory taught in law schools and the real-world
representation of clients. Unfortunately, the Report offers no sug-
70. The Eligibility Rule stems from section 4 of the SICA Uniform Code of Arbi-
tration, which provides that no dispute, claim or controversy shall be eligible for sub-
mission to arbitration under this Code if six years have elapsed from the occurrence
or event giving rise to the act or the dispute, claim or controversy. See Constantine N.
Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483, 493 (1996).
71. See id. at 525.
72. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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gestions for funding the expensive training it mandates. Should,
therefore, clinics charge to help defray the significant costs of run-
ning a clinic?
Those in favor of fee generation argue that, considering the high
costs involved, it is the only manner in which an intensive clinical
experience can be offered to a large number of law students.73 On
the other hand, opponents contend that fee-generating clinics: "(1)
undermine the educational goals of clinical education; (2) compro-
mise clinical education's traditional commitment to public-interest
lawyering; and (3) lower the academic standing of the individual
clinician. '74
Of particular concern is any program that requires that the clini-
cians generate their own salaries from such fees. 75 Although such a
structure ensures the financial stability and solvency of the clinic,
this author must agree with critics that such a direct arrangement
taints the educational goals of clinical education and its traditional
commitment to public interest lawyering. However, this does not
mean that a client seeking money damages from his broker should
not bear some of the cost of the endeavor if a recovery is
achieved.76
The costs associated with securities arbitration are numerous,
aside from salaries and fixed costs. Filing fees and forum fees are
not insignificant.77 From time to time, expert witnesses must be
employed. Why should a successful claimant escape these costs at
73. See Patricia Pierce & Kathleen Ridolfi, The Santa Clara Experiment: A New
Fee Generating Model for Clinical Legal Education, 3 CLINICAL L. REv. 439, 440-41
(1997).
74. Id. at 441.
Additional criticism includes concerns that case demands and pressures min-
imize the ability of clinicians to pursue scholarship, pose a risk that client
billing will become unwielding and unprecise, force clinicians to select cases
from a profit rather than pedagogical perspective, raise ethical issues by "us-
ing unpaid student labor to raise money," and alienate the private bar si-
phoning off clients.
Id.
75. See id. Such a program was developed at the Chicago-Kent School of Law and
the clinic covered such areas as employment discrimination, civil litigation, domestic
and international commercial litigation, federal tax litigation, real estate transactions,
criminal defense litigation, immigration, and health law. See id.
76. The form and extent of fee recovery can vary from clinic to clinic.
77. See, e.g., NINTH REPORT, supra note 6, at 24. The Schedule of Fees for Cus-
tomer Claimants is:
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the expense of a clinic?78 If some clinicians have a philosophical
objection to the imposition of fees upon a successful recovery of
money damages in a securities dispute by a solvent investor, neces-
sary fire-walls can be established to preserve academic integrity.
For example, the fees could subsidize other cases where similar ex-
penses will be incurred and no recovery realized.
Conclusion
Adequate and affordable representation of claimants in securi-
ties arbitrations has been difficult to obtain in small cases.79 Yet,
such representation makes a difference in the success of such
claimants. 80
This Article attempts to explain the history behind the Levitt ini-
tiative and raises some issues that should be explored by those
wishing to join in the clinical experiment. To be effective, however,
careful planning must take place before the clinic opens, and must
continue long after. As experience is gained, adjustments should
be made. "Clinics evolve in response to constantly changing cir-
cumstances in the law school and in the community." 81 Indeed,
"[l]aws and institutions are constantly tending to gravitate. Like
clocks, they must be occasionally cleaned and wound up, and set to
true time."82
Hearing Session Deposit
Amount in Dispute Filing Fee Paper 1 Arbitrator/3 Arbs.
$.01-$1,000 $ 15 $15 $ 15/N/A
$1,000.01-$2,500 $ 25 $25 $ 25/N/A
$2,500.01-$5,000 $ 50 $75 $100/N/A
$5,000.01-$10,000 $ 75 $75 $200/N/A
$10,000.01-$30,000 $100 N/A $300/$400
$30,000.01-$50,000 $120 N/A $300/$400
$50,000.01-$100,000 $150 N/A $300/$500
$100,000.01-$500,000 $200 N/A $300/$750
$500,000.01-$5,000,000 $250 N/A $300/$1,000
Over $5,000,000 $300 N/A $300/$1,500
Id. at 24.
78. Moreover, in this area of securities disputes, it is usually not the case that the
investor is impoverished, but rather they have difficulty in finding an attorney to han-
dle their small claim.
79. See supra notes 16-56 and accompanying text.
80. See id.
81. Schrag, supra note 64, at 242.
82. HENRY W. BEECHER, LIFE THOUGHTS 129 (1858).
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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO
INVESTIGATE CITIZEN COMPLAINTS
AGAINST POLICE
Hazel Glenn Beh*
Formalism is often the last refuge of scoundrels; history teaches
us that the most tyrannical regimes, from Pinochet's Chile to
Stalin's Soviet Union, are theoretically those with the most de-
veloped legal procedures. The point is obviously not to tar the
Police Department's good name with disreputable associations,
but only to illustrate that we cannot look to the mere existence
of superficial grievance procedures as a guarantee that citizens'
constitutional liberties are secure. Protection of citizens' rights
and liberties depends upon the substance of the [citizen com-
plaint] investigatory procedures.'
I. Introduction
In City of Canton v. Harris,2 the United States Supreme Court
announced that a municipality could be liable under Chapter 42,
Section 1983 of the United States Code3 for the misconduct of an
employee if deficiencies in a municipal training program were the
moving force behind plaintiff's injury and the alleged municipal de-
ficiencies were the result of a deliberate indifference to training
police officers. In adopting the deliberate indifference standard,
the Court explained that "a lesser standard of fault would result in
* Assistant Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University
of Hawaii at Manoa. The author thanks G. Richard Morry, Esq. and Michael Tanoue,
Esq. and Professor Randall Roth, Esq. for their thoughtful comments.
1. Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 974 (3d Cir. 1996) (reversing summary
judgment in favor of city, evidence creates a jury question), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1086 (1997).
2. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), originally enacted as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.
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de facto respondeat superior liability"5 and would cause federal
courts to engage in an endless exercise of second-guessing munici-
pal-employee training programs."'6 The Court warned that the fed-
eral courts were "ill suited to undertake" such a review and to do
so "would implicate serious questions of federalism."'7 In her con-
curring and dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor warned litigants
that § 1983 is not intended to serve as a "'federal good government
act' for municipalities. '"8 Nevertheless, lower courts instantly ex-
panded liability under Canton to include, not just the failure-to-
train, but also the failure of other municipal programs which cause
constitutional injury to citizens.
The Court, in Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County
v. Brown,9 recently reaffirmed its willingness to permit federal in-
quiry into the deficiencies of municipal programs which result in
constitutional injuries. The deeply divided Court again warned,
however, that the federal courts should not micromanage munici-
pal programs and decisionmaking through the hammer of civil
rights liability. 10
Following Canton, the method in which a municipality addresses
citizen complaints against police officers has become the frequent
focus of civil rights litigation." Federal courts have signaled that a
municipality must systematically address citizen complaints as a
part of its responsibility to manage and supervise its police of-
ficers.2 A municipality's failure to institute adequate procedures
to air citizen complaints may demonstrate deliberate indifference
which gives rise to civil rights liability. 13 Federal judicial decisions
reveal the type of response to civilian complaints of police miscon-
duct the courts expect from municipalities. Adverse decisions pro-
vide municipalities with notice of a judicial willingness to evaluate
procedures for reviewing police misconduct complaints. These
5. Id. at 392; see also Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658 (1978) (holding that there is no municipal respondeat superior liability in civil
rights claims).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 396 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9. 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997).
10. See id. at 1394.
11. One of the first cases was Fiacco v. Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987), cited with approval in Canton for employing a delib-
erate indifference standard. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 387 n.6, 389 n.7.
12. See infra part IV.
13. Of course, municipal liability first turns on establishing that plaintiff suffered a
constitutional injury at the hands of a government official. See City of Los Angeles v.
Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986).
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procedures fall within the limits of judicial oversight prescribed by
Canton and Brown.14
A claim that the citizen complaint process shows deliberate in-
difference is different than a claim that the amount of complaints
lodged or incidences of misconduct indicate a custom or policy
under Monell v. New York Department of Social Services.15 Similar
14. Liability or potential liability found: Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966 (3d
Cir. 1996) .(judgment as a matter of law reversed; question of fact whether Pitts-
burgh's investigatory procedures against officers were adequate), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1086 (1997); Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040 (2d Cir. 1995) (summary
judgment reversed; question of fact whether police system showed deliberate indiffer-
ence in monitoring complaints); Parrish v. Luckie, 963 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1992) (jury
verdict against North Little Rock, Arkansas affirmed); Gentile v. County of Suffolk,
926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991) (verdict against county affirmed); Bordanaro v. McLeod,
871 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1989) (verdict affirmed, City of Everett, Massachusetts, liable),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989); Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.
1986) (verdict against Rensselaer, New York, affirmed), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922
(1987); Gonsalves v. City of New Bedford, 939 F. Supp. 915 (D. Mass. 1996) (imposing
municipal liability on City Council and Mayor); Hogan v. Franco, 896 F. Supp. 1313
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (summary judgment in favor of Utica, New York, denied); Illiano v.
Clay Township, 892 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (Clay Township's motion to dismiss
denied); Carney v. White, 843 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (Village of Darien's sum-
mary judgment denied), affd, 60 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir. 1995); Cox v. District of Colum-
bia, 821 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993) (verdict against Washington, D.C.), affd, 40 F.3d
475 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Brown v. City of Margate, 842 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
(Margate, Florida's summary judgment denied), affd, 56 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1995);
Bosley v. Foster, No. Civ. A. 90-2409-L, 1992 WL 40696, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 5, 1992)
(summary judgment in favor of Kansas City); Curran v. City of Boston, 777 F. Supp.
116 (D. Mass. 1991) (Boston's motion to dismiss denied); Vasquez v. Reid, No. 90 C.
1585, 1990 WL 207456, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 1990) (Chicago's motion to dismiss
denied); Sango v. City of New York, No. 83 CV 5177, 1989 WL 86995, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
July 25, 1989) (New York's summary judgment denied).
No liability or potential for liability: Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 1996)
(summary judgment in favor of North Sioux City, South Dakota affirmed); Searcy v.
City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 1994) (affirming summary judgment, no evidence
that failure to investigate past misconduct caused injury); Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6
F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993) (no municipal liability for inadequate investigation of mis-
conduct although investigations inadequate, no deliberate indifference); Vukadi-
novich v. Zentz, 995 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming jury verdict in favor of City of
Valparaiso, no evidence investigation of police misconduct was inadequate); Brooks v.
D.R. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir. 1987) (verdict against Atlanta reversed, lack of
citizen participation in review of misconduct does not show deliberate indifference);
Sarus v. Rotundo, 831 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1987); Evans v. Avery, No. Civ. A. 94-10194-
WGY, 1995 WL 170056, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 14, 1995), affd 100 F.3d 1033 (1st Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1693 (1997); Schuurman v. Town of Nor Reading, No.
Civ. A. 90-10692-MLW, 1995 WL 464915, at *1 (D. Mass. June 15, 1995) (North Read-
ing's motion for summary judgment granted); Chudzik v. City of Wilmington, 809 F.
Supp. 1142 (D. Del. 1992) (summary judgment granted); Taylor v. Canton, Ohio Po-
lice Dep't, 544 F. Supp. 783 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (no city liability).
15. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell holds that a municipality may be liable for its
unconstitutional policies and customs. Id. at 690-91.
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to an allegation that the number of past complaints evidences a
policy or custom of abusive conduct, a deliberate indifference claim
also relies upon evidence of past citizen complaints. In a deliberate
indifference case, however, plaintiffs allege that the failure to de-
velop a comprehensive system to review citizen complaints
amounts to deliberate indifference to a municipality's obligation to
supervise employees. This allegation exposes municipalities to civil
rights liability without regard to the number of citizen complaints
received. With such an allegation, courts do not ask whether the
number of complaints evidences a custom or policy of abuse. In-
stead, courts ask whether the municipality's complaint procedure is
so deficient as to amount to deliberate indifference to the need to
supervise officers.
Parts II and III briefly describe the emerging professionalism of
law enforcement and, within this context, discuss the risks and ben-
efits associated with current models for receiving and reviewing cit-
izen complaints against police officers. Part IV discusses courts'
The claim that the existence of past complaints of police misconduct alone proves a
municipal custom or policy of misconduct is difficult to prove based upon the mere
numbers of complaints received. See, e.g., Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d
116, 126, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the number of complaints alone is insuffi-
cient to prove a custom or policy of abuse); Sarus v. Rotundo, 831 F.2d 397, 401-02
(2d Cir. 1987) (holding that past complaints are insufficient to prove custom or pol-
icy). Understandably, courts generally recognize that police officers are vulnerable to
unfounded claims of abuse. See Brooks v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191, 1194 (11th Cir. 1987)
(holding that officers working in high crime areas are likely subject to higher numbers
of complaints). The need to balance competing interests has led the Court to adopt
qualified immunity for individual officers. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229
(1991) (holding that qualified immunity "gives ample room for mistaken judgments")
(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986)); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 638 (1987) (stating that it is undesirable to "inhibit officials in the discharge of
their duties" and qualified immunity "accommodate[s] these conflicting concerns").
Police departments are unique para-military organizations and their employees neces-
sarily confront and legitimately employ violence with split-second judgment. See
THOMAS J. DEAKIN, POLICE PROFESSIONALISM: THE RENAISSANCE OF AMERICAN
LAw ENFORCEMENT 214 (1988); DOUGLAS PEREZ, COMMON SENSE ABOUT POLICE
REVIEW 43-44 (1994). In this atmosphere, even some well-grounded complaints will
be lodged against most police departments. The Supreme Court has cautioned that
some misconduct by employees will not tarnish the municipal employer serving an
important public function by providing law enforcement. See Pembaur v. Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986) (finding that a single incident by a decisionmaker with final
authority constitutes a policy); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 814 (1985) (plu-
rality opinion) (single incident is not sufficient to impose municipal liability); see also
Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1392-93, (questioning but not deciding whether proof of a "single
incident" is ever sufficient to establish municipal liability where the constitutional tort
is not based upon direct municipal action by a policy maker). A plaintiff asserting
municipal liability by alleging a policy or custom based upon the mere numerosity of
past complaints without more will likely fail.
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application of the deliberate indifference standard to claims that a
citizen complaint procedure is inadequate and summarizes litiga-
tion in several small and large communities employing the various
models for complaint review. Additionally, Part IV examines the
issues of proof raised in Canton and reinforced in Brown. The Ar-
ticle divides the cases by the models employed; however, the po-
tential deficiencies in any model and the issues of proof suggested
by the Court in Brown find substantial commonality regardless of
the model a municipality adopts. Part V summarizes some of the
judicially-dictated minimum standards by which towns and cities
should assess their own complaint review procedure.
II. Municipal Police Forces Move Toward Professionalism
The modern police force is vastly different than its counterpart
of just twenty years ago.16 Recruits in major municipalities typi-
cally undergo substantial assessment and training prior to serving
on a police force. This screening and training includes psychologi-
cal screening prior to selection to ensure suitability and stability,
17
complete full-time basic training in police science,18 and general
education requirements. 19 Experienced officers undertake special-
16. See DEAKIN, supra note 15, at 255-300.
17. See THEODORE BLAU, PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
69-162 (1994). The typical major police department employs psychologists to evaluate
both recruits and officers. Psychologists screen and assess recruits, determine fitness
for duty, and assess suitability for special unit assignment. See id.; Thomas H. Wright,
Pre-Employment Background Investigations, 60 FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 16
(1991) (discussing the evolution to a more complex pre-employment background
check including polygraph, education, previous employers, spousal interviews, credit
checks, criminal history checks, military history, and driving records among others).
18. While the training time and subjects vary, municipal and state governments
invest considerable resources in initial training. "[A] number of states have imple-
mented mandatory state-wide selection standards while others have not; some states
mandate an [sic] minimum of three weeks of recruit basic training, while others man-
date a 16-week recruit basic training period .... " Albert A. Apa & Thomas J.
Jurkanin, Police Officer Standards & Training Commissions: Three Decades of
Growth, 57 THE POLICE CHIEF 27, 30 (1990); DEAKIN, supra note 15, at 272.
19. Today, 65% of police officers have some college credit and 25% are college
graduates. See Larry Armstrong & Clinton Longenecker, Police Management Train-
ing: A National Survey, 61 FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 22, 22, 26 n.2 (1992);
David L. Carter & Allen D. Sapp, College Education and Policing: Coming of Age, 61
FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 8 (1992). In comparison, in 1970, only 14.6 % of
American police officers had completed two years of college; by 1994, approximately
44.7% have two or more years of college. Increased education appears to correlate
with decreased complaint rates and 95% of police departments now require at least a
high school diploma. See Alan Vodicka, Educational Requirements for Police Re-
cruits, 42 LAw & ORDER 91, 93 (1994). See generally, DEAKIN, supra note 15, at 272,
283 (stating that in the past 30 years, "a 23% advance in the collegiate educational
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ized and/or refresher training periodically,2" receive substantial
training for supervisory positions 2 and perform under chain of
command and supervision models which attempt to ensure order
within departments.22 Furthermore, many major municipal police
academies are accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for
Law Enforcement Agencies ("CALEA")23 and must meet mini-
mum national standards in multiple areas of law enforcement.2 4
Studies suggest that higher educational levels among police officers
result in lower numbers of citizen complaints. 25 Large municipal
police departments continuously employ innovative new policing
programs in an effort to improve their community responsiveness
and community relations while reducing both complaints against
officers and crime against citizens. Community policing and diver-
sity training programs are recent examples of efforts by modern
police departments to respond to citizen concerns.26
level of America's police" and less than 1% of officers have not completed high
school).
20. See Apa & Jurkanin, supra note 18, at 28; IACP Addresses Police Brutality
Concerns: "Project Response" Underway, 58 THE POLICE CHIEF 10 (1991) (describ-
ing the "Training Keys" series, a model in-service training program in use for over 25
years throughout most police departments); DEAKIN, supra note 15, at 197-208, 271-
83 (tracing trends in training throughout nation).
21. See Deakin, supra note 15, at 271-84; Armstrong & Longenecker, supra note
19, at 23-27. Armstrong and Longnecker reported that:
[t]he results indicated that 97% of the police agencies surveyed [144 police
departments including the two largest in each state] provide in-house super-
visory training to newly promoted officers and that 78% of these agencies
make the training mandatory .... Eighty three percent of the department
require 25 hours, 37% require at least 40 hours, and 23% require over 65
hours [for officers promoted to first line supervisor] .... [S]urvey results
showed that 81% of the departments provide an opportunity for managerial
training.
Armstrong & Longnecker, supra note 19, at 23-27.
22. Cf BLAU, supra note 17, at 36.
23. See Deakin, supra note 15, at 313-15 (describing movement toward accredita-
tion); Raymond E. Arthurs, Jr., Accreditation: A Small Department's Experience, 59
FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1, 1, 5 n.1 (1990). CALEA brought together four
influential police organizations: International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP),
National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), the Na-
tional Sheriffs' Association (NSA), and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)
to formulate standards for administration, operations, and organization among others.
See id. Over 300 law enforcement agencies have been accredited. See BLAU, supra
note 17, at 2.
24. See Apa & Jurkanin, supra note 18, at 28. Nearly every state has established
commissions empowered to set mandatory minimum requirements of Police Officer
Standards and Training (POST commissions). See id.
25. See Vodicka, supra note 19, at 92.
26. See, e.g., John E. Eck, Alternative Futures for Policing, in POLICE INNOVATION
AND CONTROL OF THE POLICE 59-80 (David Weisburd & Craig Uchida, eds., 1993)
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
When modern police forces train officers to set standards of
27 2competency, screen recruits for suitability,28 provide additional
training for supervisors, 29 develop innovative new police operation
programs,30 and effectively employ either an internal or external
review of citizen complaints,31 local taxpayers should not be liable
for the misdeeds of its police officers under MonelP2 or Canton
33
theories of liability. A municipality is not liable for the misconduct
of its employees under section 1983 based upon respondeat supe-
rior tort principles, and, without evidence that it failed its munici-
pal duties, mere misconduct by its employees will not be sufficient
to establish municipal liability. 34 Failure to develop an effective
[hereinafter POLICE INNOVATION); see also DENNIS ROSENBAUM, THE CHALLENGE
OF COMMUNITY POLICING (1994) (evaluating effectiveness of new community policing
programs); Stephen M. Hennessey, Achieving Cultural Competence, 60 THE POLICE
CHIEF 46 (1993) (discussing recruit training in cultural diversity); Debra Livingston,
Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and
the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 565-591 (1997); R. Morrison, Problem-
Oriented Policing, 41 LAW & ORDER 84 (1993) (discussing proactive policing tech-
niques); Max Raterman, Police Supervision at a Crossroads, 42 LAW & ORDER 79
(1994) (discusssing modern management styles); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can
the Violence Be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 496 (1992) (community
policing model built on premise of "mutual respect" and hope is that it will curb
abuse).
27. See Signorile v. City of New York, 887 F. Supp. 403, 422-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(stating in a summary judgment in favor of municipality: "sworn affidavit of a NYPD
deputy commissioner of training describing the training police .officers receive. More-
over, the affidavit indicates that training is supplemented and updated 'on a continual
basis'); Fulwood v. Porter, 639 A.2d 594, 600 (D.C. App. 1994) ("officers trained
adequately and receive refresher courses ... are instructed, on a continuing basis ...
approximately 24 weeks of training received by new officers... refresher training ...
consigis of 120 hours of instruction and is offered a minimum of 12 times a year").
28. See Longin v. Kelly, 875 F. Supp. 196, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding no liability
for deliberate indifference in hiring officers with violent propensity when a psycholo-
gist screened recruits and certain scored individuals receive heightened scrutiny
before recommendations for acceptance as officers were made).
29. Cf Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1161 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding munici-
pal liability where officers were affirmatively discouraged from seeking further
training).
30. See Signorile, 887 F. Supp. at 423 (finding no municipal liability where police
and Housing Authority met to plan better coordination and identify areas where
training could be improved).
31. Cf Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1162 (criticizing a municipality which "chose to
take no disciplinary actions against officers until they had been indicted").
32. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
33. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
34. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 663-64 n.7. The Court stated: "the doctrine of respon-
deat superior is not a basis for rendering municipalities liable under § 1983 for the
constitutional torts of their employees." Id. Despite language favorable to munici-
palities, Monell actually marked an expansion of municipal liability, overruling
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which had insulated municipalities from civil
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program to handle citizen grievances of police misconduct is, how-
ever, a municipal deficiency. Developing a grievance procedure
which satisfies Canton3 5 has proven a difficult challenge to both
small and large communities.
HI. Complaint Review Procedures
In the wake of shocking police scandals, high profile ad hoc com-
missions are sometimes convened in major cities to review police
misconduct.3 6 While these commissions often result in calls for ma-
jor reform and focus attention on problems of misconduct, these
after-the-fact inquiries do not satisfy a department's on-going re-
sponsibility to receive and address citizen complaints of police mis-
conduct on a regular basis.37 The typical metropolitan police force
no longer awaits the results of ad hoc investigations of misconduct
to reveal problem officers. Instead, it has procedures to receive
and investigate citizen complaints and to discipline misbehaving of-
ficers to the extent permissible under union contracts and public
employment law. 8
rights liability by concluding municipal corporations were not persons within the
meaning of the Civil Rights Act. See generally Michael Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy:
Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62
S. CAL. L. REV. 539 (1989) (tracing Supreme Court decisions following the line of
Monell); Douglas Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Mo-
nell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 518-21 (1993) (discussing legisla-
tive history of Civil Rights Act, Monroe and Monell decisions).
35. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
36. These well-publicized 'blue ribbon' commissions typically form in response to
a particular scandal and make recommendations for change; some became permanent
bodies. See John Dombrink, The Touchables: Vice and Police Corruption in the 1980s,
in POLICE DEVIANCE 61-98 (Thomas Barker & David L. Carter, eds., 1991) [hereinaf-
ter DEVIANCE]; PEREZ, supra note 15, at 19-34; Samuel Walker, Historical Roots of
the Legal Control of Police Behavior, in POLICE INNOVATION, supra note 26, at 32-52;
DEAKIN, supra note 15, at 105-08.
37. See Rudovsky, supra note 26, at 497 (recommending that review of citizen
complaints is a necessary component of accountability).
38. There is little acknowledgment in case law for the conflict between the need to
discipline and the need to afford officers employment rights and protections. See
Click v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 609 F. Supp. 1199, 1205 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding
that police officer has right to notice and opportunity to be heard before suspension
without pay); see also Werner E. Petterson, Police Accountability and Civilian Over-
sight of Policing: An American Perspective, in COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE:
THE TREND TO EXTERNAL REVIEW 259, 270 (Andrew J. Goldsmith ed., 1991) [here-
inafter COMPLAINTS]; Jan TenBruggencate, Police Rehire Officer Fired In Exotic
Dancer Case, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, April 8, 1997, at B-1 (labor arbitrator
orders police officer who was dismissed for tampering with evidence and sexual mis-
conduct with arrestee to be rehired); Richard J. Terrill, Civilian Oversight of the Police
Complaints Process in the United States: Concerns, Developments, and More Con-
cerns, in COMPLAINTS 291; Mitchell Tyre & Susan Braunstein, Building Better Civilian
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The systematic collection, review, and disposition of citizen com-
plaints against police officers follows many models.39 The simplest
model, still employed in small towns, involves informal investiga-
tion and discipline of officers by supervisory officers.4 0 Large and
mid-size police departments ordinarily employ "internal affairs"
units' to investigate complaints of misconduct independently. n
Review Boards, 63 FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 10, 14 n.3 (1994), citing Judith
Secher, Legal Considerations Involving Civilian Review of Police Conduct, THE PO-
LICE CHIEF 11 (March 1993) ("Framers [of civilian review boards] need to consider
potential legal conflicts with applicable police officer bills of rights and collective bar-
gaining agreements. In addition, jeopardy to criminal cases might arise through
granting immunity for subpoenaed testimony."); Paul West, Investigation and Review
of Complaints Against Police Officers: An Overview of Issues and Philosophies, in
DEVIANCE, supra note 36, at 373-99.
39. D. Carter, Police Disciplinary Procedures: A Review of Selected Police Depart-
ments, in DEVIANCE, supra note 36, at 351 (descriptive survey of 20 major United
States police departments); PEREZ, supra note 15, at 230-49 (comparative evaluation
of internal, civilian, and hybrid forms of police review systems); Richard Jones,
Processing Civilian Complaints: A Study of the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commis-
sion, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 505, 508-509 (1994) (citing Samuel Walker & Vic Bumphus,
Civilian Review of The Police: A National Survey of the Fifty Largest Cities (1991);
West, supra note 38, at 373-99 (describing external and internal complaint review
models). Large cities typically utilize both internal review and civilian, independent
complaint review. See Lee P. Brown, The Civilian Review Board: Setting a Goal for
Future Obsolescence, 58 THE POLICE CHIEF 6 (1991) (sixty per cent of fifty largest
cities have civilian review in addition to internal complaint review).
Utilizing both internal and external review may be beneficial. On one hand, inter-
nal affairs systems may be more effective:
Numerous studies support the conclusion that civilian review boards are less
likely to sustain charges against police officers than chiefs acting on the re-
sults of police internal affairs investigations and that, furthermore, civilian
boards are more lenient in disciplinary recommendations when officers are
found guilty.
Tyre & Braunstein, supra note 38, at 10, 14 n.3. Thus, a purely civilian review system
without internal review may not achieve desired results. On the other hand, civilian
review fulfills two valuable functions, first, it provides an independent receptacle for
complaints and second, provides for public participation and confidence in system.
See Sa'id Wekili & Hyacinth E. Leus, Police Brutality: Problems of Excessive Force
Litigation, 25 PAC. L.J. 171, 192-96 (1993) (stating that the purpose of civilian review
is to conduct independent investigations and restore public confidence). However,
there is skepticism that multiple complaint procedures are necessary or effective. See
id.; see also Edward J. Littlejohn, The Civilian Police Commission: A Deterrent of
Police Misconduct, 59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 5, 10 (1981); Rudovsky, supra note 26, at 497
("civilian review is a necessary component of a system of accountability").
40. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 87.
41. Id. at 88. "This model represents the overwhelming majority of review system
types; 83.9 percent of all police review systems are exclusively internal, completely
police-operated systems." Id. at 82 (citation omitted). Typically, internal affairs units
address both internally and externally generated complaints. See id. at 91.
Internal Affairs units are not uniformly structured. One model operates wholly
independently, one shares an investigatory role with the officer's supervisory officers,
and one allocates primary investigatory responsibility with supervisors and oversight
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Larger municipalities have moved toward external review by citi-
zen boards.42 Usually, these boards do not replace internal investi-
gation of misconduct. The citizen boards do, however, provide an
independent receptacle for, and an independent review of, com-
plaints.43 Several cities employ an integrated, hybrid system with
both civilian and police roles in receiving and disposing of citizen
complaints. 4
Each model of citizen complaint review has potential advantages
and disadvantages;4 5 no system is ideal.46 Informal systems vest in-
ordinate discretion in supervisory personnel, and their success de-
and review to the internal affairs. See West, supra note 38, at 395, citing H. Beral &
M. Sisk, The Administration of Complaints by Civilians Against the Police, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 499 (1964).
42. See generally COMPLAINTS, supra note 38; PEREZ, supra note 15, at 88; Brown,
supra note 39.
43. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 82-83; Petterson, supra note 38, at 279.
44. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 164-95. Perez believes that a hybrid system,
which has roles for both civilian and police in the complaint review process, combines
the best of internal investigation with the best of civilian review. See id.
Other studies describe external review as following one of three models: civilian
review, civilian input, and civilian monitor. Citizen involvement is greatest in the ci-
vilian review model (civilians investigate, adjudicate, and recommend punishment to
chief); less so in civilian input (receive and investigate); and least involvement in the
civilian monitor system (internal process with civilian review of procedure for fairness
and adequacy). See West, supra note 38 at 395.
45. Douglas Perez conducted a comparative study of police review systems over
seventeen years. Three kinds of systems, internal, external, and hybrid were identi-
fied. He tested each for 1) the integrity (thorough, fair, objective) of the system; 2)
the legitimacy (public confidence) in the system; and 3) the learning (impact on future
conduct) occurring as a result of the system. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 72-81.
Perez concludes that complaints should be received through multiple receptacles, lo-
cated both within the department and outside the department. He also prefers a hy-
brid investigatory system with either internal investigation coupled with a civilian
monitor role or a shared investigation system where non-police question complain-
ants. Perez concludes that not all complaints merit hearings, but when hearings are
necessary, a multidisciplinary hearing board is preferred. See id. at 250-66. He also
concludes that the final decision to discipline be retained by the police executive, as is
typical. See id. at 239, 268; see also Goldsmith, External Review and Self Regulation,
in COMPLAINTS, at 33-38 (identifying drawbacks of civilian review: police resistence to
a civilian role, procedural deficiencies, nonprofessional investigations); Jones, supra
note 39, at 517 (explaining that Milwaukee uniquely vests disciplinary authority in
Commission); Bill Ong Hing, Border Patrol Abuse: Evaluating Complaint Procedures
Available to Victims, 9 GEO. IMMIOR. L.J. 757, 798 (1995) (describing and evaluating
INS's newest complaint procedures by an independent office within the Department
of Justice; noting labor opposition to review); West, supra note 38, at 395.
46. See West, supra note 38, at 399 ("There is obviously not 'one best model' that
can be placed within a police organization. Rather, factors such as community atti-
tude and support for the police, the presence of police malpractice problems, allega-
tions of police department cover-ups, and the sociopolitical environment of the
community must all be considered in a complaint review program.")
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pends upon the integrity and effectiveness of supervisors and the
chief of police. An informal system also lacks accountability and
oversight.47 While an informal system may function well under an
effective leader, it just as easily permits cover up and neglect to
flourish under an ineffective leader.
Internal affairs systems provide safeguards absent in an informal
system. In the internal affairs model, formalized policies and pro-
cedures are promulgated to guide the initiation and conduct of in-
vestigations. Additionally, professional investigators, following
standard investigatory procedures, staff the internal affairs unit.
Thus, complaints against officers, in theory, are investigated with
the same diligence as the department's other criminal investiga-
tions. Furthermore, the devotion of full-time manpower to an in-
ternal affairs unit demonstrates a municipality's sincere
commitment to uncovering abuse, unlike an informal system where
such investigations are merely an incidental supervisory task. Most
notably, as compared to civilian review, the internal affairs system
appears to have a superior record of sustaining complaints and rec-
ommending discipline. 41 Police investigators apparently hold of-
ficers accountable for their conduct more often than civilians
investigating and judging misconduct. Advantages of an internal
affairs systems include efficiency, as well as the professionalism of
investigators and their ability to understand law enforcement is-
sues.4 9 Finally, the location of an internal affairs unit within the
department helps to ensure communication between the investiga-
tory unit and those making personnel decisions. Disadvantages of
internal affairs systems include, most significantly, profound public
distrust and the potential for biased, self-serving and superficial in-
vestigations." Public distrust manifests itself as public fear or re-
luctance to report misconduct to the police or a lack of confidence
in the results. Failure to report abuse or a systematic disregard of
reported complaints undermines the effectiveness of the whole
47. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 104 (informal systems permit cover-ups, regard-
less of whether abuses occur or not, and discourage complainants from filing
complaints).
48. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
49. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 104 ("primary strength of the internalized review
process is the competence and professionalism of its investigators").
50. See Goldsmith, supra note 38, at 24-28.
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complaint system.51 In addition, the public's distrust undermines
its belief in the legitimacy of the police. 2
Civilian review boards cure the real or perceived bias and intimi-
dation problems inherent in internal civilian complaint models.53
Advantages of citizen review boards include increased public ac-
cess because the process appears less threatening,54 a public per-
ception of the independence of the investigatory process, and an
increased public confidence in the evaluative process.5 5 Civilian re-
view is typically, though not always, more open to public scrutiny.56
A citizen review system, however, also has disadvantages. 7 Chief
among those disadvantages is the apparent tendency of civilians to
judge police officers less harshly, to recommend lighter discipline,
and the lack of professionalism of civilian investigators. 58 Most
51. See Goldsmith, supra note 38, at 21-24.
52. See generally PEREZ, supra note 15, at 102-22; Sean Hecker, Race and Pretex-
tual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian Review Board, 28 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 551, 603 (1997); Rudovsky, supra note 26, at 497. Ironically, internal
affairs departments noted for their rigor and unrestricted investigatory powers lead
police officers to view some internal systems as tyrannical and unfair. See generally
PEREZ, supra note 15, at 102-22; Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An
Expanded Role for Civilian Review Board, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551, 603
(1997); Rudovsky, supra note 26, at 497.
53. See Livingston, supra note 26, at 665-66.
54. The United States Civil Rights Commission recommends external locations to
file complaints, and surveys of complainants indicate the same. See PEREZ, supra
note 15, at 102-03; Petterson, supra note 38, at 277 (commenting that fear of retalia-
tion discourages complaints).
55. PEREZ, supra note 15, at 148-49 (revealing that complainants surveyed "are
impressed with the civilian system; they are comfortable talking to civilians about
their grievances; and they have more faith in civilian investigators"); Livingston, supra
note 26, at 663-65 (civilian review increases integrity of process and public
confidence).
56. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 132.
57. The efficacy of civilian review is not yet known. However, public confidence is
a laudable goal in and of itself.
The actual effectiveness of civilian review in ... law enforcement is unclear.
Some studies show that determinations made by civilians do not differ sub-
stantially from those made by the police department; others show that civil-
ian review procedures sustain citizen complaints at rates not significantly
higher than those reported by internal affairs units. But the vigor of investi-
gations seems to be greater in cities with civilian review, and citizens seem to
have more confidence in civilian versus strictly internal review systems.
Hing, supra note 45, at 798 (footnotes omitted).
58. See Tyre & Braunstein, supra note 38; see also PEREZ, supra note 15, at 139. In
1991, Berkeley, California's review board logged "the first instance of a higher rate of
findings of misconduct from the civilian review process tha[n] this study has found in
seventeen years of research. In other words, not at any time in the history of civilian
review had a civilian system found the police guilty more often than had an internal
system until Berkeley did so in 1991." PEREZ, supra note 15, at 139 (emphasis
omitted).
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problematic, these civilian boards may become weighed down by
their own procedures and operate so inefficiently as to fail in their
primary purpose. 59 Finally, the externality and independence of
the review board, a valued characteristic when receiving and inves-
tigating complaints, may result in an institutional failure at the res-
olution stage of the process. Unless there is a process by which the
status and disposition of complaints are reported to and considered
by internal departments making personnel decisions, the impact of
the process is diminished.6"
In sum, there is no clearly superior method to receive and re-
solve police misconduct complaints. Adopting any model poses
challenges and pitfalls to municipal policymakers. 61 While identify-
ing the advantages and disadvantages of each model (informal, in-
ternal, or civilian) is useful, a municipality is also well-served by
considering desirable goals for its complaint process.
A community's evaluation of its procedures for handling civilian
complaints should recognize that receiving and resolving citizen
complaints is integral to many law enforcement functions, and that
the complaint process must serve those multiple purposes.62 First,
the complaint process must deliver a fair and satisfactory result in
an individual case. Obviously, this justice requirement is equally
important to both the officer and the complainant. Second, receiv-
ing, investigating, and adjudicating complaints from citizens against
officers are key aspects of departmental supervision of its officers.
Often, the public has unique knowledge about the performance of
officers in the field away from supervisory officers. Thus, in addi-
tion to providing a procedure that is fair to both aggrieved citizens
and accused officers, receiving and adjudicating complaints is a
component of personnel management and supervision of errant of-
ficers. The process provides an important mechanism to identify
59. See Cox v. District of Columbia, 821 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993), affd 40 F.3d
475 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also PEREZ, supra note 15, at 134 (discussing the delays in
hearing and resolving complaints by civilian review board in Berkeley, California,
noting the "negative impact on the effectiveness"; often the police chief has meted out
punishment before the civilian process is concluded); Petterson, supra note 38, at 279-
280.
60. See infra notes 208, 214-222 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 46.
62. See Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need For an Effective
Federal Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453,
1481 (1993). The Christopher and Kolt reports, investigating abuses within the Los
Angeles Police Department, demonstrated that despite a system to review and receive
civilian complaints, the several dozen "bad" officers remained on the force and were
even promoted: "the system was stacked against civilian complainants suggest[ing]
department-wide indifference". Id.
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officers who should be disciplined, transferred, retrained, demoted,
or dismissed for misconduct. Third, the responsiveness of the de-
partment to citizen complaints gives civilians confidence that the
department polices itself and does not hold itself above the law.
This accountability function is important for the department in or-
der to achieve and preserve the public confidence and legitimacy
necessary to operate effectively as a police department. Finally,
the receipt of citizen complaints, contextually, serves the depart-
ment as an indicator of larger problems, such as problem officers,
problem areas of training, and problem geographic areas with defi-
cient supervisors. To that extent, complaints may reveal an organi-
zational need for restructuring, reassessing, and changing.
Civil rights decisions against municipalities generally reflect a ju-
dicial expectation that civilian complaint procedures serve these
important goals.63 While courts have not weighed in on which
model best achieves the important functions of a complaint review
procedure, courts have articulated certain expectations regarding
complaint procedures. Most importantly, decisions indicate that
courts have embraced the basic premise that adequate complaint
review is vital to a police department's supervisory responsibilities.
IV. Failure to Investigate Civilian Complaints of Police
Misconduct as a Basis for Municipal Liability
A. Deliberate Indifference Claims
In City of Canton v. Harris,64 the United States Supreme Court
decided, in a failure-to-train case, that municipal liability could
arise for a constitutional tort by an employee when an omission,
such as the failure-to-properly-train an employee, amounted to de-
liberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police
come in contact.65 In Canton, plaintiff alleged that following her
arrest, officers offered her no medical assistance despite severe
emotional ailments that later required hospitalization and outpa-
tient treatment.66 She alleged that the City of Canton was culpable
because it vested the discretion to determine the medical needs of
detainees in the hands of supervisors who did not receive adequate
training to assess those medical needs.67 The Court was asked to
determine both whether an otherwise constitutional policy (the
63. See generally infra Parts IV & V.
64. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
65. See id. at 390-92.
66. See id. at 381.
67. See id. at 381-82.
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city's policy of providing medical care for detainees) 6 8 could give
rise to liability where the training to implement that policy was in-
adequate, and by what standard such inadequacy should be
judged.69
The Canton Court established that, in addition to liability for af-
firmative customs or policies under Monell, municipalities demon-
strating deliberate indifference to training police officers could also
be liable to citizens for constitutional deprivations caused by an
otherwise constitutional policy.70 The Court acknowledged that
the City of Canton's policy that every jailor, with permission of the
supervisor, could secure medical treatment for detainees, was un-
deniably a constitutional policy.71 Yet, the plaintiff claimed that if
that policy was unconstitutionally applied by a municipal em-
ployee, the city could be liable.72 The Court agreed. In explaining
the contours of this liability, however, the Court cautioned that
"adequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes" and that
no municipal liability would be imposed for such occasional mis-
takes.73 In fact, the Court noted that such mistakes "say little
about the training program or the legal basis for holding the city
liable. '7 a Therefore, the Court next asked, by what standard
should municipal liability be judged to ensure that courts did not
impose mere respondeat superior liability.75
The first inquiry under Canton requires the court to examine the
"adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks the par-
ticular officers must perform." 76 The municipality must train its of-
ficers to "respond properly to the usual and recurring situations
68. See id. at 387; see also Cox v. District of Columbia, 821 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.C.
1993) ("[i]n addition to concluding that a policy of failing to take action could amount
to a policy or custom, City of Canton v. Harris held for the first time that constitu-
tional policies as well as unconstitutional policies could result in municipal liabil-
ity... ."), affid, 40 F.3d 475 (1994).
69. Canton, 489 U.S. at 385.
70. See Michael T. Burke & Patricia A. Burton, Defining the Contours of Munici-
pal Liability Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983: Monell Through City of Canton v. Harris, 18
STETSON L. REv. 511 (1989) (explaining that municipal liability is fault-based);
Anthony D. Schroeder, Note, City of Canton v. Harris: The Deliberate Indifference
Standard in 42 U.S. C. § 1983 Municipal Liability Failure to Train Cases, 22 U. TOL. L.
REv. 107, 111 n.31 (1990).
71. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 386.
72. See id. at 387.
73. Id. at 391.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 391-92.
76. Id. at 390.
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with which they must deal."77 The Court made clear that munici-
palities would not be liable for failing to anticipate extraordinary
events requiring special training. The Court also expressed toler-
ance for some failures in police training: "[t]hat a particular officer
may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten lia-
bility on the city, for the officer's shortcomings may have resulted
from factors other than a faulty training program. '78 In summing
up the claimant's burden to prove the inadequacy, the Court ex-
plained that a municipality would be liable only where the inade-
quacy was "likely to result in the violation of constitutional
rights. ' '7 9
Second, the claimant must demonstrate the municipality's culpa-
ble deliberateness. Determining deliberate indifference demands
exploring policymakers' deliberative, decision-making process8°
when developing training programs. The Court explained that
policymakers demonstrate "deliberate indifference," a standard
which the Court characterized as higher than either negligence or
gross negligence, to the civil rights of claimants when they make a
"'conscious" or "deliberate choice to follow a course of action...
from among various alternatives."'81 As to the deliberative process,
the Court framed the inquiry as whether:
[I]n light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees
the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional
rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said
to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.82
The Court also required proof that the municipality's inadequate
training actually caused the injury.13 The Court explained that "the
identified deficiency in a city's training program must be closely
related to the ultimate injury. '84 Canton calls upon the jury to an-
77. Id. at 391.
78. Id. at 390.
79. Id. at 390.
80. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 129 (1988) (holding that pol-
icy must be furthered by those with final policymaking authority); see also Schroeder,
supra note 70, at 127.
81. Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84
(1986) (plurality) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
82. Id. at 390.
83. See id. at 391.
84. Id.; accord Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that plaintiff must prove policymaker "knows to a moral certainty" that officers will
confront such a situation and that lack of training will frequently lead officers to make
the wrong choice); see also Schroeder, supra note 70, at 128.
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swer the question, "[w]ould the injury have been avoided... [if]
the program ... was not deficient in the identified respect."85 This
close causal relationship necessitates proof that adequately trained
officers would have responded differently to the situation.
Canton, therefore, requires a precisely drawn accusation of the
deliberate indifference of a municipality.86 It is not enough under
Canton that the department's training program is inadequate. The
plaintiff must demonstrate that the inadequacy actually caused a
constitutional violation, that the inadequacy was the result of a de-
liberate choice by a policymaker, and that the likelihood the choice
would lead to injury was obvious in light of the usual and recurring
tasks to which an officer is assigned.8 7 The narrowly-crafted allega-
tion requirement generally assures municipalities that police forces
with recruitment, training, and supervision practices reflecting pol-
icy choices consistent with national standards should be fairly insu-
lated from claims except for very specific weaknesses.
88
Lower courts instantly extended Canton beyond failure-to-train
claims to claims based upon a municipality's inadequate system of
hiring, supervising, or reviewing police misconduct.8 9 When chal-
lenging the adequacy of citizen complaint procedures, plaintiffs
typically allege that the failure to institute an adequate system to
receive, investigate, and resolve citizen complaints against police
85. Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.
86. See id. at 388-89.
87. See, e.g., Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1989)
(city's failure to require continual and rigorous canine unit training caused injury to
suspects apprehended by canines); Parker v. District of Columbia, 850 F.2d 708 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (deficient extra-jurisdictional arrest procedure training and physical fitness
training), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
88. See Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1162-63 (1st Cir.) ("The absence of a
strictly enforced disciplinary system led the officers ... to believe they were above
the law and would not be sanctioned for their misconduct. A sufficiently supervised,
properly recruited, trained and disciplined group of officers would not have acted so
far below the level of accepted police behavior."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989); cf.
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-80 (1975) (denying injunctive relief; federal courts
are ill suited to second guess municipalities implementing police programs).
89. Canton implied that the deliberate indifference standard presumably applies to
failure to act cases besides failure-to-train where inaction is a moving force behind
constitutional injury. Canton, 489 U.S. at 394-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[W]here, as here, a claim of municipal liability is predicated upon a failure to act,
the requisite degree of fault must be shown by proof of a background of events and
circumstances which establish that the 'policy of inaction' is the functional equivalent
of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution."). Brown confirmed the
potential by considering deliberate indifference in the context of improper hiring. See
Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1390; see also Shari S. Weinman, Comment, Supervisory Liability
Under 42 U.S. C. Section 1983: Searching For The Deep Pocket, 56 Mo. L. REV. 1041
(1991).
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officers amounts to a policy of deliberate indifference to the need
for police supervision. Plaintiffs further assert that the failure to
investigate claims of misconduct or to discipline wrongdoers as-
sures that similar misconduct will recur within a climate of lawless-
ness engendered by non-supervision. 90 Fitting the claim into
Canton's test, one court has stated:
[A] city's complete failure to maintain an adequate system of
disciplining officers who act unconstitutionally might also "fairly
be said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible,
and for which the city may be held liable if it actually causes
injury."91
Just as Canton requires the fact finder ultimately to ask whether
a properly trained officer would have acted differently, these cases
ask whether a more effective system to address citizen complaints
would have prevented the officer from inflicting a constitutional
injury upon the plaintiff. The necessary premise at the core of this
claim is whether effective citizen complaint review would have led
to better performance by the errant police officer. As the decided
cases demonstrate, some courts eagerly have embraced that core
premise:
[A]lthough [plaintiff] has not demonstrated that [deficiencies in
the complaint process] actually encouraged additional miscon-
duct or excessive force violations, the ... inadequacies certainly
did permit serious misconduct to go unchecked. In that sense,
the District's policy "caused" or was a "substantial factor" in
[plaintiff's] injuries. Logically, "continued official tolerance of
repeated misconduct facilitates similar unlawful actions in the
future."92
The need to ask that core question in a narrow and case specific
manner was reaffirmed in Board of County Commissioners of Bry-
90. See, e.g., Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 328 (2d Cir. 1986)
("[P]roof that other claims were met with indifference for their truth may be one way
of satisfying the plaintiff's burden [to prove deliberate indifference]."), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 922 (1987); Brown v. City of Margate, 842 F. Supp. 515, 516 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
("[Plaintiff] argued that Margate police officers would use force with relative impu-
nity, knowing that the City would not follow up on complaints and would not disci-
pline or penalize officers for their excessive or unwarranted actions, and that this
custom led to the incident in which [the plaintiff] was injured"), afJ'd, 56 F.3d 1390
(11th Cir. 1995); Sango v. City of New York, 1989 WL 86995 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (recog-
nizing "proof of a policy of deliberate indifference based upon inadequate investiga-
tion of citizen complaints against police officers" is basis for § 1983 municipal claim).
91. Cox, 821 F. Supp. at 12.
92. Cox, 821 F. Supp. at 19 (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 851 (3d
Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted)).
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ant County v. Brown,93 decided in 1997. There, plaintiff Brown
complained that her excessive force injuries at the hands of Deputy
Sheriff Burns were a result of the county's failure to adequately
screen Burns prior to appointment as a deputy. Plaintiff pointed to
no general inadequacy in hiring officers. Rather, the apparent
breakdown was the result of a familial relationship between the
sheriff and the deputy. The primary issue for the Court involved
whether proof of a "single incident" (the failure to screen a new
hire's criminal record) by a policymaker (the Sheriff) was sufficient
to establish deliberate indifference. Nevertheless, the Court's gen-
eral comments about proving deliberate indifference claims are il-
luminating because they suggest that Canton has appropriate
application beyond failure-to-train:
We concluded in Canton that an "inadequate training" claim
could be the basis for § 1983 liability in "limited circumstances."
We spoke, however, of a deficient training "program," necessar-
ily intended to apply over time to multiple employees. Exist-
ence of a "program" makes proof of fault and causation at least
possible in an inadequate training case. If a program does not
prevent constitutional violations, municipal decisionmakers may
eventually be put on notice that a new program is called for.
Their continued adherence to an approach that they know or
should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employ-
ees may establish the conscious disregard for the consequence of
their action-the "deliberate indifference"-necessary to trigger
municipal liability.94
Thus, the Court agreed that deliberate indifference claims can
extend beyond failure-to-train, at least to other "programs" marred
by obvious deficiencies which cause constitutional injuries. How-
ever, the Court also acknowledged the difficulty of proving, outside
of the failure-to-train context, the ultimate question posed by Can-
ton: Would this officer have behaved differently if a proper pro-
gram were in place? The Court expressed skepticism as to whether
a plaintiff could prove that adequately screening applicants before
hiring could predict a particular officer's future behavior, especially
where the plaintiff proved only a single instance of neglectful
hiring:
The proffered analogy between failure-to-train cases and inade-
quate screening cases is not persuasive. In leaving open in Can-
ton the possibility that a plaintiff might succeed in carrying a
93. 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997).
94. Id. at 1390.
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failure-to-train claim without showing a pattern of constitutional
violations, we simply hypothesized that, in a narrow range of
circumstances, a violation of federal rights may be a highly pre-
dictable consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement of-
ficers with specific tools to handle recurring situations.
Where a plaintiff presents a § 1983 claim premised upon the in-
adequacy.of an official's review of a prospective applicant's rec-
ord, however, there is a particular danger that a municipality
will be held liable for an injury not directly caused by a deliber-
ate action attributable to the municipality itself .... To prevent
municipal liability for a hiring decision from collapsing into re-
spondeat superior liability, a court must carefully test the link
between the policymaker's inadequate decision and the particu-
lar injury alleged."
Importantly, the Court pointed out that inadequate training more
predictably leads to injuries than does a hiring decision and that
the causal link is therefore easier to prove in a training case. The
decision alerts litigants that, outside of failure-to- train claims,
proving causation between a municipal program and a constitu-
tional injury may prove to be a steep hurdle.
Unlike the risk from a particular glaring omission in a training
regimen, the risk from a single instance of inadequate screening
of an applicant's background is not "obvious" in the abstract;
rather, it depends upon the background of the applicant. A lack
of scrutiny may increase the likelihood that an unfit officer will
be hired, and that the unfit officer will, when placed in a particu-
lar position to affect the rights of citizens, act improperly. But
that risk is only a generalized showing of risk.96
The difficulty of linking a failure to adequately screen recruits
with their future misconduct is not unlike the challenge before
plaintiffs alleging that inadequate complaint review leads to contin-
ued misconduct. As the Court pointed out:
[A] finding of culpability simply cannot depend on the mere
probability that any officer inadequately screened will inflict any
constitutional injury. Rather, it must depend on a finding that
this officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury suf-
fered by the plaintiff. The connection between the background
of the particular applicant and the specific constitutional viola-
tion must be strong.97
95. Id. at 1391.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1392.
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Analogously, to establish a claim that the deficient citizen griev-
ance procedures resulted in injury, plaintiffs must prove that the
inadequate procedures made it highly likely that the officer would
inflict this constitutional harm upon the plaintiff.
Claimants rely upon one of three methods to prove that an of-
ficer would have behaved differently if a better system of citizen
complaint review was in place. First, a plaintiff may attempt to
prove that there is a "climate of lawlessness" within a police de-
partment and that misconduct by police officers generally goes un-
checked.98 Along with this method, a plaintiff must also prove that
the particular officer-tortfeasor misbehaved because of this atmos-
phere. 99 Following Brown, this method of proof may be dubious.100
A second method of proof is more direct. A plaintiff may attempt
to prove that the particular officer, with a propensity toward mis-
conduct as shown through prior incidents, misbehaved because that
officer believed from past experience that nothing would hap-
pen.'01 Finally, a plaintiff may attempt to prove that, had previous
complaints against the officer been addressed at an earlier oppor-
tunity or more thoroughly, the officer likely would have been dis-
missed or disciplined before this incident.10 2
Despite the rigorous requirements of proof, claims of deliberate
indifference are no longer readily decided on the pleadings. In
1993, the Supreme Court rejected a heightened pleading standard
for municipal claims in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics In-
telligence & Coordination Unit.'°3 Resolving a split among the fed-
eral circuits, the Court in Leatherman reaffirmed its commitment
to Monell causes of action by rejecting a heightened pleading stan-
dard for such claims. The Court, however, also signaled its expec-
tation that poorly articulated claims should be disposed of at
98. See infra notes 108-31 and accompanying text (discussing Fiacco v. Rennselaer,
783 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1986)).
99. See Fiacco, 783 F.2d at 327.
100. See infra notes 130 & 152 and accompanying text for a discussion of pre-
Brown analysis. As Brown explained, the court must "directly test the link between
Burns' actual background and the risk that, if hired, he would use excessive force."
Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1392. Thus, "testing the link" requires plaintiff to prove that the
municipality's indifference to complaints caused this officer to violate plaintiff's rights.
101. See infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text (discussing Parrish v. Luckie,
963 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1992)).
102. See infra notes 186-208 and accompanying text (discussing Cox v. District of
Columbia, 821 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993), aft'd, 40 F.3d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
103. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
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summary judgment. 10 4 Following Leatherman, municipalities must
be prepared to defend their city programs, including complaint re-
view systems, at summary judgment or trial. Early dismissal of
these claims at the pleadings stage is now less likely.10 5
B. Judicial Evaluation of the Complaint Review Process
1. Informal Complaint Review
While there are many variations, informal civilian complaint sys-
tems are typified by supervisory discretion. For example, citizen
complaints initially may be received by the chief or town leader,
assigned for investigation to other officers, and then finally re-
ferred to the chief for action. 06 The manner in which complaints
are received, whether or not to conduct an investigation, the disci-
pline, the reporting, and the monitoring may all be discretionary
decisions by the police chief. Informal systems are as effective or
ineffective as the person in charge. These systems often lack proce-
dural safeguards for the accused and the accuser. They also fail to
assign oversight and accountability roles to administrators. Thus,
while an informal method of citizen complaint review may work
effectively when a town has a conscientious police chief, the town
has no institutional assurance that the system will work
effectively.10 7
The judicial message is unmistakeable with regard to informal
systems: the town entrusting unfettered discretion to its police
chief will be liable for its police chief's failings. Fiacco v. Rensse-
laer'0 8 was one of the first cases to hold that a failure to investigate
prior complaints may evidence deliberate indifference. The case
arose in the context of a relatively small town with informal com-
plaint procedures. There, Mary Fiacco alleged that police used ex-
cessive force and caused her constitutional injury when she was
104. See id. at 168-69 (acknowledging an inundation of lawsuits and suggesting that
summary judgment is the appropriate mechanism to "weed out unmeritorious claims
sooner rather than later.").
105. See Illiano v. Clay Township, 892 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying Clay
Township's motion to dismiss); Curran v. City of Boston, 777 F. Supp. 116 (D. Mass.
1991) (denying Boston's motion to dismiss); Vasquez v. Reid, No. 90 C 1585, 1990 WL
207456 (N.D. Ill. Dec., 6, 1990) (denying Chicago's motion to dismiss); see also Eric
Kugler, A 1983 Hurdle: Filtering Meritless Civil Rights Litigation at the Pleading Stage,
15 REV. LITIG. 551, 552-58 (1996).
106. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 87-88.
107. See id.
108. 783 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987). The case fore-
shadowed Canton and is cited with approval in Canton for the deliberate indifference
standard. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 397.
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arrested for disorderly conduct following a night of heavy drink-
ing. 10 9 After passing out on the lawn of a Rensselaer, New York
home she arrested and was brought to the police station." 0 While
exiting the patrol vehicle, she claimed she was "shoved," "drag-
ged," "kicked," and "poked" without provocation or justification
by Officers Meyer and Harrington."' The plaintiff offered evi-
dence that the Chief of Police had ignored prior instances of al-
leged brutality brought to his attention by civilians. Fiacco
advanced the theory that the failure to exercise reasonable care in
investigating prior complaints demonstrated deliberate indifference
to police brutality and the municipality's responsibility to supervise
its officers." 2 She argued that this deliberate indifference allowed
officers to injure plaintiff.113 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed a jury verdict in favor of Fiacco against Rensse-
laer.1 14 The court approved Fiacco's theory of how municipal indif-
ference to complaints demonstrated failure to supervise and
resulted in her injury:
Fiacco's theory is not that the City intended to engage in unin-
tentional conduct. Rather it is that the City was knowingly and
deliberately indifferent to the possibility that its police officers
were wont to use excessive force and that this indifference was
demonstrated by the failure of the City defendants to exercise
reasonable care in investigating claims of police brutality in or-
der to supervise the officers in the proper use of force. We see
no logical flaw in such a hypothesis .... "I
The court was satisfied that this failure to supervise resulted in un-
checked abuse and made Fiacco's injuries likely."
Fiacco also addressed the admissibility of unsustained and un-
proven complaints as evidence of inadequate supervision. In re-
viewing the proceedings below, the Second Circuit agreed with the
109. See Fiacco, 783 F.2d at 321.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 323.
113. See id.
114. Compare id. with Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1996)
(describing situation in which mayor and city council members took immediate action
upon learning of misconduct), and Sharrar v. Felsing, No. Civ. A. 94-1878,1996 WL
117162, * 18 (D. N.J. March 7, 1996) (holding on summary judgment, town with only
twenty police officers not liable for failure to have an internal affairs department or
other formal complaint mechanisms in place), and York v. City of San Pablo, 626 F.
Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (finding no municipal liability in case of six complaints of
excessive force insufficient where complaints were all investigated by the city).
115. Fiacco, 783 F.2d at 326.
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trial judge that the probative value of unproven third party com-
plaints of misconduct outweighed their prejudicial value. 1 6 As the
court explained, evidence that past complaints had not been inves-
tigated proved Fiacco's theory of deliberate indifference. 117 "[I]f
the City's efforts to evaluate the claims were so superficial as to
suggest that its official attitude was one of indifference to the truth
of the claim, such an attitude would bespeak an indifference to the
rights asserted in those claims. "118 By alleging that a failure to in-
vestigate past complaints amounted to deliberate indifference
rather than a pattern of widespread abuse, the plaintiff overcame a
substantial obstacle. To prove a pattern of abuse, unfounded com-
plaints are not relevant. 119 However, to prove a climate of lawless-
ness due to a lack of supervision, the response to any complaint is
relevant.120
Having determined that unproven claims were admissible, the
court then examined the town's response to complaints and the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence. 12  Although Rensselaer's
town charter called for a Public Safety Board to supervise the po-
116. See id. at 327-28.
117. See id. at 328 ("[wjhether or not the claims had validity, the very assertion of a
number of such claims put the City on notice. . ."); see also Beck, 89 F.3d at 975
(holding that evidence of unproven complaints is admissible when allegation is that
the grievance process is inadequate).
118. Fiacco, 783 F. 2d at 328.
119. The mere number of complaints (whether sustained or not), seems dubious
proof of a widespread practice, even in a small community. See Kerr v. City of West
Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546, 1555 (11th Cir. 1989) (comparing injury rate within canine
units of other municipalities); Sarus v. Rotundo, 831 F.2d 397, 401 (2d Cir. 1987)
(holding that no unconstitutional practice was shown by number of complaints); Bry-
ant v. Whalen, 759 F. Supp. 410, 412 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (statistical evidence of complaint/
sustained rate in Chicago is not sufficient); Burnette v. Ciolino, 750 F. Supp. 1562,
1564-65 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (plaintiff bears burden of demonstrating a "history of wide-
spread abuse" and summary judgment is appropriate where plaintiff points to five
shootings in five years); McKenna v. County of Clayton, 657 F. Supp. 221. 225 (N.D.
Ga. 1987) ("The mere existence" of "common occurrences" such as previous false
arrest claims does not establish a failure to adequately investigate unless the plaintiff
shows they were resolved against the employer on the merits).
120.
The jury was instructed that there had never been any authoritative find-
ing as to whether or not any claimant's charge was valid and that the jury
was neither to assume that the claims were true nor to try to assess their
truth; rather, the jury was merely to "focus [its] attention on [whether] the
chief of police and/or the city [took] sufficient steps in their supervisory ca-
pacity in handling those claims."
Fiacco, 783 F.2d at 328; see also Sango v. City of New York, No. 83 CV 5177, 1989 WL
86995, *10 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 1989) (holding that unadjudicated complaints are rele-
vant to question of adequacy of the proceedings).
121. See Fiacco, 783 F.2d at 328.
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lice department, and the town had adopted rules to govern the de-
partment and discipline officers, Police Chief Stark had never seen
those rules. 122 The Board provided no form on which a civilian
could file a complaint against an officer. 123 Fiacco offered evidence
that seven written complaints had been filed with Chief Stark, that
the police chief typically took no written statements from the com-
plainants, that he did not open any formal investigation, and that
he did not make any notations in officer files concerning the com-
plaints. 24 No hearings had ever been held.125 Instead, the chief
testified that "he had conducted as much investigation as he
thought necessary.' ' 26
The chief testified that there had been other complaints against
officers and, after investigating those complaints he discharged
three officers. 127 Rensselaer attempted to show through this evi-
dence that its informal investigation and discipline process was ad-
equate and resulted in appropriate discipline. The court, however,
found the informal process completely inadequate. Rensselaer's
problems were compounded by the mayor's lack of response.
While the mayor was informed of all complaints, he condoned the
failure to prepare formal reports or submit the complaints to the
Public Safety Board. 28 Thus, rather than a negligently adminis-
tered program, the policymakers for the town deliberately ignored
the town's duly enacted citizen complaint procedure. Rejecting
Renneselaer's defense of its informal process, the court concluded
that, "the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to permit a
rational juror to find that the City had a policy of nonsupervision of
its police officers that amounted to a deliberate indifference to
their use of excessive force.' '1 29
Plaintiff's causation evidence was not particularly well-defined,
most likely because the case was decided before the edicts of Can-
ton and Brown that plaintiffs must establish and test the affirmative
link between the misconduct and the municipality's indifference.
However, plaintiff did establish that at least one of the misbehaving
officers was the subject of previous complaints. In addition, be-
cause of the informality of the complaint process, little or no inves-
122. See id. at 329.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 329-30.
125. See id. at 330.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 331.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 332.
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tigation of the officer's past misconduct occurred. The officer was
also promoted to sergeant without past claims being fully investi-
gated or adjudicated. It seems likely, therefore, that even after
Canton and Brown, Fiacco's evidence "directly tested the link be-
tween" the deficiencies in the complaint system and the miscon-
duct of that officer. 130 The court concluded that a jury rationally
could have inferred that:
[w]ith no formal statement being taken from the complainant,
no file being created, no notation being made in the officer's
file, and no further investigation being made-[the process]
would have been viewed by the officers, and should be viewed
by an objective observer, as reflecting indifference by the City to
the use of excessive force.' 31
Fiacco proved that an inadequate system for responding to citizen
grievances promoted a climate of unconstitutional misconduct as
well as an inference that this lawless climate was affirmatively
linked to the misconduct at issue.
An informal complaint review procedure also failed the citizens
of Utica, New York. The court's particular criticisms regarding
Utica are noteworthy and instructive. 32 In Hogan v. Franco,133 a
claim for excessive force was made against several Utica officers
following the plaintiff's arrest when he resisted officers attempting
to confiscate his alcohol at a public fireworks display.13  Arresting
officers beat the plaintiff with a baton and refused to grant medical
attention until the next day despite pleas from other arrestees on
his behalf. 135 As one basis of municipal liability, plaintiff alleged
130. Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1392.
131. Fiacco, 783 F.2d at 331.
132. An earlier case against Utica found no liability. In Sarus v. Rotundo, 831 F.2d
397 (2d Cir. 1987), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict
against Utica. The court noted multiple avenues to complain about police (the mayor,
the Public Safety Commission, and the chief) although complaints eventually fun-
neled to the chief. Importantly, Chief Rotundo testified that he routinely disciplined
based upon investigations. Id. at 401. The court cautioned, "[w]hile a more formal
process might be preferred, appellees offered no evidence that the Utica procedures
differed in any way from those employed by other municipalities." Id. Although de-
cided before Canton, the court followed the deliberate indifference standard, relying
on Fiacco. Id. Put in the context of Canton, the claim in Sarus apparently failed
because plaintiff failed to prove that the informal complaint review procedure in
Utica was deficient and the need for formality obvious. Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
133. See Sarus, 896 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). The Sarus claim arose from
events in 1984. 831 F.2d at 398. The Hogan injuries occurred in 1992. See Hogan, 896
F. Supp. at 1316.
134. See Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1316.
135. See id.
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that Utica's general failure to investigate citizen complaints evi-
denced deliberate indifference amounting to a policy or practice of
failing to properly supervise or discipline officers. 136  Equipped
with detailed information about supervision in Utica and a cogent
theory, the court examined Utica's system for reviewing citizen
complaints. 137
The court agreed with the plaintiff that the failure to institute
adequate civilian complaint procedures was evidence of inadequate
supervision and could lead to injuries such as the excessive force
injuries he suffered. 138 As to the complaint process specifically, the
Hogan court first faulted the manner in which past complaints
were investigated and resolved.139 In contrast to testimony in an
earlier case,"4 ° where Police Chief Rotundo testified to "previous
disciplinary actions and a system of handling complaints that did
not give him sole discretion[,]' 141 in Hogan, he testified that: "the
police department has no formal procedures for handling com-
plaints of police brutality;.., the police department does not index
such complaints; ... informal investigations are conducted by fel-
low officers . . 142 at the discretion of the chief. 43 The court
found that the investigation of the Hogan incident evidenced "pur-
poseful intolerance" from a department which "arrogantly refused
to search for answers, accepted without question denials by in-
volved officers, and concluded that the claims were not only un-
136. See id. at 1318. In addition to excessive force by beating, Hogan also com-
plained that being jostled in the back of the van while handcuffed and unable to stabi-
lize himself amounted to excessive force, and deliberate indifference to medical
needs. He also prevailed on a claim that the failure-to-train drivers to secure prison-
ers against injury in the vans, that the failure to provide medical attention, and the
failure-to-train officers in use of force each constituted deliberate indifference. See id.
at 1316, 1322, 1323.
137. The court applied Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 961 (1993), requiring conscious indifference of policymakers to
the inadequacy of the program. In this failure-to-train case, the court required plain-
tiff to prove that a policymaker "knows to a moral certainty" officers will confront a
given situation and that the failure-to-train will frequently lead officers making the
wrong choice and to a deprivation of civil rights. Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1321 (quot-
ing Walker, 974 F.2d at 297).
138. See Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1323.
139. Id. at 1320 ("Trial testimony indicated that the informal investigation proce-
dures consisted of a supervising officer asking the officer who was the subject of the
complaint to submit a statement on special report Utica Police Department Form
61.").
140. See Sarus v. Rotundo, 831 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1987).
141. See Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1323.
142. Id. at 1317.
143. See id. at 1323.
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resolved, but unsubstantiated. ' 144 From the court's perspective,
the complaint review process had deteriorated from the earlier
case: "[c]ontrary to the situation in Sarus, there is no longer a Pub-
lic Safety Commissioner to handle citizen complaints or to intro-
duce new police policy.... Chief Rotunda is now responsible for
the supervision of the police, and the informal investigation de-
scribed above is the result.' '1 45
The court faulted Utica's failure to index the complaints by of-
ficers' names or to place them in officers' personnel files even
when unsubstantiated.146 The court noted that indexing complaints
is recommended by the New York State Commission on Criminal
Justice and the Use of Force and that "lack of indexing may be a
factor of inadequate supervision if supported by other evi-
dence. 1 47 The court criticized Utica's maintenance of complaints
in alphabetical order by complainant. While the process protected
an officer's personnel file from the "smear" of "unsubstantiated
complaints," the court explained that this indicated "silent support
and protection," a "lack of supervision," and "deliberate indiffer-
ence to the truth.'1 48
144. Id. at 1320.
145. Id. at 1323. No mention was made of whether the other sources investigating
complaints in Utica remained intact. See Brown v. City of Margate, 842 F. Supp. 515
(S.D. Fl. 1993) (holding that informal resolution of complaints without written docu-
mentation is sufficient to establish deliberate indifference).
146. See Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1320; infra note 147. Regardless of the complaint
review system employed, record keeping policies may raise issues of inadequacy.
Compare Brown, 842 F. Supp. at 516 n.2 ("The City must, however, acknowledge that
allegations of a police department's failure to maintain thorough and accurate records
of citizen complaints-if substantiated-could be considered evidence of deliberate
indifference.") with Bosley v. Foster, No. Civ. A. 90-2409-L, 1992 WL 40696, at *2 (D.
Kan. Feb. 5,1992) (holding that the destruction of records of unfounded complaints
after six months, well-founded claims after two year statute of limitations is not an
unconstitutional policy, nor can plaintiff establish an affirmative link between destruc-
tion and injury suffered).
147. Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1324. Hogan is not alone in criticizing the failure to
index pending and even unsustained complaints. Other courts have complained that
the failure to place pending or unsustained complaints in an officer's personnel record
or to otherwise track and monitor them prevents the municipality from recognizing
early patterns of abuse. See, e.g., Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 973 (3d Cir.
1996) (reversing judgment in favor of Pittsburgh: "each complaint was insulated from
other prior and similar complaints and treated in a vacuum"); Vann v. City of New
York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1045 (2d Cir. 1995); Cox v. District of Columbia, 821 F. Supp. 1,
15 (D.D.C. 1993), affd, 40 F.3d 475 (DC. Cir. 1994). But see Brooks v. Scheib, 813
F.2d 1191, 1194 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that court will not mandate policy requiring
examination of prior complaints).
148. Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1319-21.
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Utica's informal complaint system, evidence of the inadequacy
of the investigation in plaintiff's own case, the town's failure to in-
dex complaints and anecdotal evidence149 of alleged past miscon-
duct were sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference to support
municipal liability. 5 ° The systematic failure to investigate prior
complaints convinced the court that: "[t]he inference that a policy
existed may ... be drawn from circumstantial proof, such as...
evidence that the municipality had notice of but repeatedly failed
to make any meaningful investigation into charges that police of-
ficers had used excessive force in violation of the complainants'
civil rights."'1 51
This case suggests that courts may be willing to infer that prior
complaints, without regard to their validity, coupled with a faulty
system of investigation, suffice to prove a municipality's failure to
supervise police officers.
Like Fiacco, Hogan also lacked direct evidence by which to an-
swer the question, "would the injury have been avoided ... [if] the
program . . . was not deficient in the identified respect[?]"'1 2 In-
stead, the court concluded the jury could infer that the injury was a
consequence of failing to supervise:
Regardless of whether the investigation would find [the police
officers] responsible for the assault upon Hogan, its undertaking
was necessary to convey a policy strongly discouraging such acts.
Yet policymaking personnel accomplished exactly the opposite,
conveying a strong statement of support for civil rights viola-
. tions by their tolerance of these violations. Their refusal to root
out the culprits . .. issues a shout of support for such actions
without a word spoken.' 3
149. The court credited the testimony of other victims of alleged abuse and an
emergency room physician who claimed to have treated victims of past abuse. "The
evidence introduced was sufficient to show a problematic number and regularity of
complaints...." Id. at 1324.
150. See id. The court makes no mention of sustained complaints or proven inci-
dents of past misconduct, an element the Sarus court found critical. See Sarus, 831
F.2d at 397, 402 (finding no evidence of past incidents "viewed as essential in Fiacco"
and court was "loath to affirm a finding of a policy of indifference when not even a
single incident of other misconduct was presented"). However, the Hogan court ap-
parently dismissed the need for proof of prior misconduct, implying that because of
inferior investigation of citizen complaints one could not infer a lack of prior miscon-
duct. See Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1325.
151. Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1320 (quoting Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth.,
941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991) (omission in original)).
152. Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989).
153. Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1320.
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Like Fiacco, Hogan used proof of a climate of lawlessness to create
the inference that the system's failure caused the instant injury.
Other lessons can be drawn from Fiacco and Hogan. These
cases demonstrate a dissatisfaction with informal complaint sys-
tems in which the responsibility for receiving and investigating
complaints resides with an individual vested with unbridled discre-
tion to pursue complaints or not. These communities pay the price
for the judicially perceived shortcomings of their chief of police.154
Hogan also foreshadows an emerging judicial expectation: all
complaints (not merely sustained complaints) against officers
should be indexed and noted in officer personnel files so that re-
peated complaints yield data about an officer's overall perform-
ance. While each misconduct complaint may be judged in the
vacuum of impartiality, an officer's overall performance must be
judged in the context of his or her past performance.' 5 Experts
suggest that multiple complaints, regardless of the adjudicatory
outcome, may suggest officers require additional supervision, mon-
itoring, or retraining.1 5 6 Thus, courts expect that the system will
potentially identify problem officers from patterns of past com-
plaints and act to protect the public.
2. Internal Affairs
Police departments employing internal affairs units to investigate
civilian complaints are subject to criticisms that the internal investi-
gations are perfunctory or biased, especially when a police chief
directly supervises the investigators or affords them little indepen-
dence. 157 Moreover, lodging complaints against police to the police
154. See e.g., Carney v. White, 843 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (holding that
Village of Darien may be liable where police committee did not monitor the internal
complaint process), aff'd, 60 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir. 1995); Brown v. City of Margate, 842
F. Supp. 515, 518 (S.D. Fla. 1993) ("The City admitted that prior to 1988 citizen com-
plaints were routinely disposed of orally with no record kept of the complaint nor any
documentation made of any investigation that was conducted."), aff'd, 56 F.3d 1390
(11th Cir. 1995). An informal system may be successfully defended, however, when
the policymakers are responsive. See Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir.
1996) (describing case in which police chief brought misconduct to the attention of the
city council promptly and requested immediate termination; three prior incidents
were also met with swift termination).
155. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
156. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
157. See Alison Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is Inef-
fective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 794 (1993) (discussing in-
ternal affairs investigations posing a serious potential for bias, cover-up and
unfairness).
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department itself may be viewed as intimidating by the public.15 8
Without a nondepartmental unit for receiving citizen complaints,
internal affairs systems are subject to allegations that they actively
discourage complainants from coming forward through threats, in-
timidation, and reprisals. If a system discourages complaints by
fostering fear, the system is patently deficient.
Parrish v. Luckie159 is notable both for its assessment of the in-
ternal affairs complaint system and the direct link plaintiff proved
between the municipality's non-supervision vis-a-vis its defective
complaint procedures and -the particular injury suffered. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a verdict in favor of
plaintiff Parrish for false arrest and sexual assault against the City
of North Little Rock, Arkansas. Following her arrest, Ms. Parrish
was forced to perform oral sex on the arresting officer, Luckie. 6 °
She complained to Officer Dallas about Luckie. Dallas in turn re-
ported back to Luckie. Luckie told Dallas "not to report the inci-
dent to his supervisor because he knew that if a written complaint
was not filed, the Department would not investigate.' 16 1 There
was evidence of prior incidents of misconduct involving Luckie. 62
The plaintiff did file a written report about the incident and Luckie
was eventually charged and convicted of first degree sexual
abuse. 63
As to the deficiencies in the complaint system, the court agreed
with the jury's conclusion that the police department under the di-
rection of its police chief "implemented a policy of avoiding, ignor-
ing, and covering up complaints of physical and sexual abuse.' '1 64
The internal affairs division in North Little Rock did not select
cases for investigation independently but was solely controlled by
the chief:
Chief Bruce created and maintained a system in which he was
the only person who could open an internal affairs investigation.
Chief Bruce maintained a policy of opening investigations only
when citizens filed written complaints. After Chief Bruce
opened an' investigation, he controlled its scope and direction.
Investigators would report to Chief Bruce as to whether the
written complaint was substantiated or unsubstantiated.
158. See infra note 166.
159. 963 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1992).
160. See id. at 203.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 204.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 203.
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Evidence also showed that the Department required citizens fil-
ing written complaints against officers to submit a statement
under oath and to sign a statement that they understood Arkan-
sas' felony statute regarding false swearing. Investigators also
discouraged citizens from filing complaints by telling persons
that if the investigator believed they were not telling the truth,
they might be prosecuted and fined or imprisoned.1 65
The court agreed with the plaintiff that this internal affairs proce-
dure intimidated citizens and made them reluctant to file com-
plaints. 166 Therefore, the absence of complaints did not indicate an
absence of misconduct within the force. Instead, the court inferred
that officers operating under this system could "act with impunity
unless a citizen filed a written complaint. 167
Most importantly, Parrish demonstrates an effective method to
prove that the municipality's faulty complaint review system di-
rectly permitted a particular officer to violate a citizen's constitu-
tional rights. Here, evidence showed that Officer Luckie knew that
if he could convince fellow officers not to file written reports, and
could intimidate complainants from coming forward, he could es-
cape investigation and discipline. Thus, the inadequacy of the com-
plaint process allowed Luckie repeatedly to violate the
constitution, and Luckie was aware of the lack of consequences for
misconduct. The affirmative link, required by Brown and Canton,
was quite strong.
165. Id. at 204-205. This is not an uncommon procedure. Regardless of the system,
the hope is that sworn complaints curb false complaints, however, the procedure may
also discourage valid ones:
Civilian review boards have varying procedures, some of which are subject
to the same criticisms as are police investigatory process. For example, a
body calling itself a "civilian review board" in Richmond, California, re-
quires complainants to sign complaints and gives a stern warning about the
prosecution of false statements. Not unlike the police officers' bill of rights
in Maryland, this procedure can be criticized on the grounds that it is intimi-
dating to citizens. It quashes one of the arguments put forth historically in
favor of civilian review.
PEREZ, supra note 15, at 130.
166. The fear of complaining is particularly problematic to internal complaint mod-
els. See Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 565 (1st Cir. 1989) ("The
investigations of complaints against officers required witnesses to come to the station
house to give sworn written statements .... [T]he effect of such a requirement was to
'frighten[ ] most of the average citizen[s] .... This hampered the department's ability
to discover the truth surrounding alleged incidents of misconduct.") However, as Pe-
rez notes, civilian review can apply similarly stifling requirements. PEREZ, supra note
15, at 130.
167. Parrish, 963 F.2d at 205.
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Nonetheless, an internal affairs system is not a necessarily fatal
choice leading inevitably to municipal liability. In Brooks v.
Scheib, 6 s the plaintiff alleged a constitutional injury against an At-
lanta police officer and also complained that the city failed to su-
pervise its officers adequately, specifically attacking the internal
citizen complaint review process. 16 9 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed a jury verdict against Atlanta, finding plaintiff's
evidence insufficient to support the verdict. 7 ° As to the plaintiff's
"complain[t] about the failure to have a citizens' review committee
or other outside involvement in the complaint process,' 171 the
court explained that the plaintiff lacked evidence that "police of-
ficers cannot be fair and objective in judging complaints against
other officers.' 1 72 Unlike in Parrish, the Brooks plaintiff offered
no evidence to show that the police actively discouraged complain-
ants from making complaints or that the police chief exercised uni-
lateral control over the investigation.
Brooks also asserted that the large number of complaints against
the officer involved demonstrated Atlanta's deliberate indiffer-
ence, even if some of those complaints were pending or unsus-
tained. 73 The court rejected this contention. It held that it was
improper for the jury to infer that the city had knowledge of mis-
conduct from the number of complaints alone. 74 After all, the
court explained, the officer worked in a high crime area where ar-
restees frequently complain "as a means of harassing officers who
arrest them.' 1 75 As to the failure to index complaints by officer
name, the court commented that while such a practice might be
168. 813 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir. 1987).
169. See id. at 1193. Plaintiff pointed to three specific deficiencies with regard to
the internal complaint process: 1) the failure to have a written policy requiring that
past complaints be brought to the attention of investigators of fresh complaints; 2)
failure to administer polygraphs to officers involved in complaints; 3) failure to have a
policy giving citizens a role in the complaint review process. See id. at 1194.
170. See id. at 1195.
171. Id. at 1194.
172. Id. at 1194; see also Perez, supra note 15, at 115.
173. See Brooks, 813 F.2d at 1194. Perez reports that most police receive one or
fewer complaints per year and that a typical officer receives between two and four
complaints over their career. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 29.
174. See id. at 1193 ("City presented testimony that each complaint was fully inves-
tigated and found to be lacking in merit"). Perez cautions that errant officers do not
necessarily receive the most complaints, "these ideas do not square with the realities
of the reports of police misconduct .... [i]ndividual patterns and career histories are
far more complex than such simple analysis implies." PEREZ, supra note 15, at 30.
175. Id. at 1193; see also Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 975 (quoting Straus
v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 768-69 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that people file com-
plaints against the police "for many reasons, or for no reason at all")).
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helpful, it would not "mandate a policy which would require that
prior complaints always be examined."' 76 The court recognized
that Atlanta might be liable if the plaintiff could prove "that more
effective citizens' complaint procedures would have prevented his
injuries.' 7 However, plaintiff failed to do so.
Proving internal systems lack legitimacy and integrity requires
more than vague inferences that the system is necessarily biased
merely because it is an internal system. 178 Canton requires far
more.179 Over eighty percent of municipal police departments rely
on an internal affairs model to review citizen complaints.18 0 In Par-
rish, the plaintiff provided a narrowly-crafted allegation that the
internal affairs system actively discouraged complainants from
coming forward and that complaints received only cursory investi-
gation in a system designed to cover up more than it revealed.
Moreover, Parrish proved that the faulty system was a likely factor
in Officer Luckie's tendency toward misconduct based on a review
of Luckie's past record.
The perceived lack of integrity and legitimacy' 8' within informal
and internal affairs systems may lead judges and juries to infer that
misconduct within a department likely goes unchecked. Yet
Brooks demonstrates that a plaintiff must muster more than a mere
inference of bias to prove deliberate indifference. 8 2
3. Civilian Review Procedures
Participation by civilians in the review of complaints against po-
lice may eliminate the perception that investigations are biased and
self-serving. Chief among the strengths of civilian review are per-
ceptions of independence and integrity. Although the perception
176. Brooks, 813 F.2d at 1194; see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
177. Brooks, 813 F.2d at 1195. Brooks is notable because it is one of few decisions
expressing skepticism concerning the "provability" of a narrowly crafted allegation
that a defective complaint procedure caused a constitutional injury, recognizing Har-
ris's edict not to second-guess communities. Id. at 1194.
178. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 114-115 (stating that internal affairs can be "ex-
tremely effective in influencing police behavior" and "clean[ing] house").
179. See Chudzik v. City of Wilmington, 809 F. Supp. 1142, 1149 (D. Del. 1992)
(holding that "sweeping" generalizations that internal affairs system is inadequate is
insufficient to oppose summary judgment-plaintiff, as a complaining witness at inter-
nal affairs hearing, was permitted opportunity to witness hearing but not to confront
witnesses or be represented by counsel).
180. See supra note 41.
181. See PEREZ, supra note 15.
182. See id. ("The classic internal review model is not at all as sinister as has been
asserted by external observers. The deterrent effects of internal investigative mecha-
nisms are significant.").
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of integrity and legitimacy of investigations of citizen grievances
against officers may be restored by independent civilian review,183
such a system also raises efficiency problems. Further, if the civil-
ian review process does not interface with other departments and
have an impact on personnel decisions, then the review does not
yield meaningful results. Communities transitioning to civilian re-
view should find the District of Columbia's disastrous experience
instructive.
The District of Columbia enjoyed an early litigation success fol-
lowing implementation of a civilian review board to hear citizen
complaints against officers. 184 Its success was short-lived. 185 The
failure to investigate citizen complaints and discipline officers as a
species of failure to supervise was advanced a second time as a
basis of municipal liability in Cox v. District of Columbia.86 In
Cox, the plaintiff alleged unconstitutional use of force by Officer
Goodwin. Officer Goodwin had against him several prior com-
plaints of excessive force. At least one of those incidents had oc-
curred during his probationary service, when, had the complaint
been decided against Goodwin, Goodwin could easily have been
terminated. 8 7 However, the plaintiff was able to prove that, be-
cause of a woefully inadequate complaint review procedure, Of-
ficer Goodwin remained on the force while his conduct went
unchecked and his probationary period on the force expired.
In most respects, the plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim was
similar to Fiacco's: that the citizen review system was fundamen-
tally flawed and that the resulting failure to discipline officers as-
sured continued constitutional deprivations. Cox demonstrates
that the case against a municipality can be proven in large cities as
well as in small towns. As in Fiacco, not only did the plaintiff
demonstrate that there were past complaints, but also that the mu-
183. See id. at 142-56.
184. Prior to 1982, citizen complaints were handled through an internal process.
See Cox v. District of Columbia, 821 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1993) (describing develop-
ment of the Civilian Complaint Review Board), affd, 40 F.3d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
185. In Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986), a civil rights
plaintiff offered a mixture of evidence to support a claim of a pattern of excessive
force against the District of Columbia. The Carter plaintiff failed to adequately attack
the procedure for reviewing complaints, instead attempting to show that the number
of complaints and the sustained complaint rate was circumstantial evidence of a cus-
tom or policy of misconduct. A directed verdict was entered in favor of the munici-
pality and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed. The court
found that the statistics alone were "wanting in detail" and plaintiff lacked a cogent
theory of the District's deficiencies. Id. at 122-5.
186. 821 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993), affd, 40 F.3d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
187. See id. at 9.
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nicipality did not have an effective system to address the com-
plaints. Moreover, the plaintiff in Cox also showed that complaints
against the police officer in question went unanswered and that he
remained on the force while the complaints were languishing in the
city's bureaucracy. As Canton and Brown demand, Cox also
proved a link between the deficient program and the injury by
demonstrating the officer continued in municipal service without
discharge or discipline.
In Cox, the plaintiff offered evidence188 that the District of Co-
lumbia's complaint review process for its Metropolitan Police De-
partment was inadequate due to an ever-increasing backlog. For
example, the plaintiff offered evidence that in 1983 the average
time required to dispose of a complaint was eight months, but by
1990 the time had increased to 33.10 months.189 The plaintiff
demonstrated:
At the end of its first five years of existence, the CCRB [Civilian
Complaint Review Board] had received a total of 1,742 com-
plaints and had a backlog of approximately 1,000 cases. Of the
1,742 cases filed, the CCRB had made findings on the merits in
only 145 cases, sustaining at least one allegation of misconduct
in 65 of those 145 cases.' 90
According to the court, the District of Columbia mandated that
all cases be brought before the CCRB prior to disciplining officers;
thus, the CCRB's deficiencies assured officers went undisciplined
for years. 191 The District of Columbia responded to the backlog by
increasing the budget of the CCRB (although not necessarily to the
level requested), but the backlog proved intractable. 192 To the mu-
nicipality's credit, in 1991 CCRB requested permission to increase
its capacity to hear complaints by establishing a panel system. In
1992 the District of Columbia Council finally adopted panels,
mediators, and an "Early Warning Tracking System" to identify of-
188. See Cox, 821 F. Supp. at 3. The case procedure was unusual. Plaintiffs de-
faulted police officer defendants in 1991. The District of Columbia and Plaintiff
agreed to submit the case without trial, filing a joint stipulation of facts, individual
statements of evidence, individual proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
and briefs. See id.
189. See id. at 6.
190. See id. at 7 (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, the CCRB processed less than
one-third of the complaints received. See id.
191. See id. at 6.
192. See id. at 7.
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ficers involved in three or more citizen complaints within two
years. 1
93
The Cox court noted that under Canton, "a city's complete fail-
ure to maintain an adequate system of disciplining officers who act
unconstitutionally might 'fairly be said to represent a policy for
which the city is responsible, and for which the city may be held
liable if it actually causes injury. '"'194 The court framed the issue:
Accordingly, the next step is to determine whether the consis-
tent and chronic delays endemic to the District of Columbia's
civilian complaint review process constituted a policy or custom
and whether maintenance of that policy or custom amounted to
deliberate indifference by the District to its residents or to any
other individuals who might come in contact with District police
officers.195
The court distinguished the quality of proof from an earlier case, 96
explaining that "[t]o establish a pattern, policy or custom, a plain-
tiff must present 'concentrated, fully packed, precisely delineated
scenarios' of unconstitutional conduct."1 97 Acknowledging that
this proof "is not easy to quantify,"'198 the court concluded that
"Cox has firmly demonstrated a pattern on the part of the District
of maintaining a complaint and disciplinary procedure so ineffec-
tive so as to virtually constitute a nullity, and, at the very least,
deliberate indifference. '" 199 Moreover, Cox demonstrated "that the
District of Columbia did maintain, and indeed advance, a custom
of egregiously delayed investigations."2 ° The deleterious effects of
the delays were compounded by the CCRB's role as the "exclusive
receptacle for citizen complaints. '20  Worse, the delay resulted in
failure to eliminate troublesome probationary officers, thus thwart-
ing the purpose of the probationary period.20 2 Finally, Cox
presented a logical theory of statistical relevance: due to the egre-
193. See id. at 9.
194. See id. at 12. (quoting Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)).
195. Id. at 12.
196. See Carter v. Disrict of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
197. Id. at 13 (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 850 F.2d 708, 712 (D.C. Cir.
1988)); see also Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 975 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining
that statistical evidence coupled with actual written complaints is sufficient evidence
from which to draw inference that procedures are inadequate).
198. Cox, 821 F. Supp. at 13.
199. Id. at 14.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 15. Moreover, the CCRB failed to comply with its own statutory
deadlines (a thirty day requirement). See id.
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gious delays (and static number of cases resolved) complaints
against officers rose, presumably as a result of a failure to discipline
and dismiss aberrant officers.20 3 Because of the lack of discipline
(a consequence of delays), the court concluded that the District of
Columbia's deliberate indifference to disciplining officers assured
constitutional injuries would continue. °4
Of some comfort to cash-strapped municipalities, the court
noted that it was not implying that the District of Columbia should
merely continue to throw increasing amounts of money at its
flawed system (nor that merely increasing funding would be suffi-
cient). Rather, the court suggested that "non-monetary alterna-
tives" such as prioritization might suffice to remedy the failing
system.2 °5 Cox serves as a warning to large cities that while civilian
review boards may serve important public interests, to the extent
that their operation creates delays and inefficiencies in the overall
disciplinary system, they must be redesigned or supplemented with
simultaneous, parallel internal review and discipline. Arguably,
the District of Columbia's primary problem arose because the civil-
ian review board was the "sole receptacle for citizen complaints ' '2 6
and that discipline was delayed pending outcome of the board's
review.20 7 As a result of the system's delays, the District of Colum-
bia failed to take corrective action and officers gained permanent
employment status in the department while awaiting hearings on
alleged misconduct.20 8
In addition to liability based upon inefficiencies within the citi-
zen board system, the manner in which the civilian review system is
designed to investigate complaints may also expose municipalities
to liability just as an internal system might. For example, in Sango
v. City of New York, °9 the plaintiffs successfully claimed that the
abuses against them resulted from a faulty disciplinary system,
marred by cursory investigations and inadequate cross-examina-
203. See id. at 16 nn.15, 17.
204. See id. at 16.
205. Id. at 17 n.19 (explaining that "the Court does not suggest that a particular
sum of money should have been or should now be appropriated to address citizen
complaints.., other non-monetary alternatives could have been implemented").
206. Id. at 14.
207. See id. at 6.
208. Courts are particularly intolerant of municipalities that permit promotions and
other personnel actions to go forward while complaints (especially multiple com-
plaints) are pending. See Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995);
Cox, 821 F. Supp. at 15.
209. No. 83 CV 5177, 1989 WL 86995 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 1989).
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tion of police witnesses. 210 A magistrate's report agreed with plain-
tiff's assessment that the investigations and the proceedings
conducted by the review board were inadequate.2  Thus, like in-
ternal review, civilian review does not ensure thorough or rigorous
investigations and may be similarly faulted for a lack of investiga-
tory thoroughness. Worse, the civilian investigators may lack the
competency of a police investigators.21 2
210. Id. at *13. New York City's system ultimately subjects complaints to an eight
member civilian panel. Id. at *4. Perez categorizes New York City's system as a hy-
brid system, with roles for both police and civilian monitors. PEREZ, supra note 15, at
166. New York is currently considering creating an Independent Police Investigation
and Audit Board with authority to subpoena, investigate, audit and refer cases to the
prosecutor. This independent board would compliment, not eliminate, the Civilian
Complaint Review Board. See Dan Janison, Cop Watchdog/New Panel is end-run on
Rudy, NEWSDAY, Oct. 1, 1997 at A28.
211. Sango, 1989 WL 86995, at *3. Despite a three level complaint review proce-
dure, a Magistrate's Report found that the Civilian Complaint Review Board's inves-
tigation of complaints against the officer were "less than adequate." Id. The report
criticized the investigations and hearings, noting "brief questioning" and lack of vigor-
ous cross examination of the officer, failure to interview witnesses or in some cases, a
failure to document how investigations were conducted. Without success, the City
attempted to rebut the evidence with proof that the overall system was adequate,
citing an overall 10% "substantiated" claims rate. The court rejected its argument
stating, "it simply cannot be said that the percentage identified so conclusively dem-
onstrates plaintiffs' inability to establish inadequate investigations amounting to delib-
erate indifference that summary judgment against plaintiffs is warranted." Id. at *12.
See Dan Morrison, Brutality Blind/Safir: Couldn't Predict Precinct Torture, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 12, 1997 at A8 (following incident of egregious brutality, Mayor plans to provide
additional funds to hire more experienced investigators for the Civilian Complaint
Review Board).
212. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 143; Jones, supra note 39, at 517. Beck v. City of
Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. . 1086 (1997), highlights
the fact that civilian systems can experience the same deficiencies as internal systems.
There, the Office of Professional Standards ("OPS") investigated complaints against
police officers. Id. at 968. Perez identifies Pittsburgh as an example of a hybrid sys-
tem, with roles for police and civilian investigators. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 263.
In reversing summary judgment in favor of Pittsburgh, the court faulted determina-
tions made in a vacuum, lack of rigorous investigation, and lack of tracking officers.
The OPS itself was structured to curtail disciplinary action and stifle investi-
gations into the credibility of the City's police officers. Even if complain-
ant's witnesses were credible, their testimony became inert under OPS
policy, while at the same time police officers' statements appeared to have
been given special, favorable consideration.
Because there is no formalized tracking of complaints for individual officers,
a jury could find that officers are guaranteed repeated impunity, so long as
they do not put themselves in a position to be observed by someone other
than another police officer.
Beck, 89 F.3d at 974.
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Even if complaints are adequately and professionally investi-
gated and resolved promptly, determinations under any system
must result in discipline when appropriate.213 Unlike internal or
informal systems closely connected to the chief and the depart-
ment, external, civilian systems must develop a method to commu-
nicate with the internal police departments. In order to impact
personnel decisions, the actions of a civilian review board must in-
terface with those charged with supervision and discipline of of-
ficers. In Vann v. City of New York,214 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed a decision granting summary judgment to New
York based in part on a claim that an inadequate complaint review
procedure demonstrated deliberate indifference regarding supervi-
sion of abusive police officers.215 The court explained that deliber-
ate indifference could be found "if the complaints are followed by
no meaningful attempt on the part of the municipality to investi-
gate or forestall further incidents. ' 216 In Vann, the plaintiff com-
plained that various units of the police department failed to
coordinate their independent knowledge of the police misconduct
of officer Raul Morrison and this failure to communicate resulted
in a failure to discipline the officer.217 In this instance, the Depart-
ment's Early Intervention Unit, which monitored problem police
officers, knew about certain misconduct by Police Officer Morri-
son.218 In addition, Morrison was referred to the Psychological
Services Unit ("PSU") for perceived deficiencies. The Civilian
Complaint Review Board received complaints about Morrison
both before and after his probationary period.219 Other depart-
ments working with problem officers, including the Department of
Advocate's Office and the Central Personnel Index also knew of
the officer's shortcomings.220 In reversing summary judgment in
favor of New York the court noted that, "[n]one of these units,
213. Typically, decisions to discipline rest finally within the department and that
fact alone should not be seen as a flaw unless recommendations are routinely ignored.
In order to hold the chief accountable one must give the chief the responsibility. See
Rudovsky, supra 26, at 497 (commenting that Civilian Review Board's recommenda-
tion of discipline should be given serious consideration); Jones, supra note 39, at 517;
West, supra note 38, at 395; PEREZ, supra note 15, at 268 (stating that a discipline
decision should reside with chief who must be held accountable).
214. 72 F.3d 1040 (2d Cir. 1995).
215. See id. at 1041.
216. Id. at 1049.
217. See id. at 1045.
218. See id. at 1042-43.
219. See id. at 1044.
220. See id.
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except PSU, attached any significance to the filing of [civilian]
complaints; and PSU did not advise those who know of the com-
plaints to pass the information on to the supervisory units."'22'
These cases instruct municipalities that no matter which system
is used to address citizen complaints, courts expect independent
and thorough investigations within a system which functions effi-
ciently and results in prompt corrective action. Personnel decisions
such as promotion from probation and promotions to a higher rank
must account for the existence and disposition of civilian com-
plaints.222 Finally, to cure pockets of abuse or system-wide abuse,
departments must chart the location of trouble spots within their
communities.223 As Cox demonstrates, courts are willing to infer
that delayed discipline means the municipality is deliberately indif-
ferent to the constitutional injuries of its citizens.
C. Negligently Administered Complaint Review Procedures
A negligently administered complaint system alone is insufficient
to hold a municipality liable under § 1983. When a plaintiff does
not allege that the system of citizen complaint review is systemi-
cally flawed or that the policymakers for the city deliberately ig-
nore procedures, the claim will fail. If the municipality adopts an
adequate system and policymakers demand its implementation,
then mere mismanagement, even if it directly results in constitu-
tional injury, will not suffice to impose municipal liability.
221. Id. at 1045. The court also noted that "commanding officers were not in-
structed to, and normally did not, report the filing of new civilian complaints. Nor did
DAO seek or receive such information from CPI or CCRB. Foppiano testified that
DAO was not concerned about the fact that a new civilian complaint had been filed
against a DAO-monitored officer unless and until the officer was found guilty." Id. at
1046.
222. In Vann, a police department psychologist explained the relevance of unsub-
stantiated complaints:
[T]he very fact that an unusual number of civilian complaints had been filed,
without regard to how they were ultimately resolved, could create concern
that the officer was experiencing psychological problems and was suffering
from stress that caused him to escalate minor situations into major
confrontations.
Vann, 72 F.3d at 1045.
223. See Rudovsky, supra note 26, at 497 (stating that civilian review boards should
have the authority "to gather statistical data relevant to patterns of abuse"); Hecker,
supra note 52, at 597-604 (recognizing that civilian review boards have the potential to
cause institutional reforms); Petterson, supra note 38, at 273 (noting civilian review's
potential to make institutional changes); see also Beck, 89 F.3d at 974-75 (noting that
police force does not make adequate use of the statistical evidence of problems it
gathers).
1998]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
Wilson v. City of Chicago224 exemplifies how Canton and Brown
require more than mere negligence on the part of municipal policy-
makers. There, the plaintiff proved, at best, a negligently adminis-
tered system of citizen complaint review. Plaintiff alleged his
confession was coerced by torture and that Chicago policymakers
tolerated such torture. Evidence revealed numerous complaints
that police abused suspects accused of injuring or murdering police
officers in a specific geographic area. The Court of Appeals for
Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of
Chicago despite strong evidence that widespread abuse took place
against these suspects. Of the quality of anecdotal evidence, the
court commented:
A rational jury could have inferred from the frequency of the
abuse, the number of officers involved in the torture of Wilson,
and the number of complaints from the black community, that
[Superintendent of Police] Brzeczek knew that officers.., were
prone to beat up suspected cop killers. Even so, if he took steps
to eliminate the practice, the fact that the steps were not effec-
tive would not establish that he had acquiesced in it and by do-
ing so adopted it as a policy of the city.225
To compound the trouble in this Chicago neighborhood, the
court concluded that, while the complaints against officers were
properly referred for investigation, they apparently were not thor-
oughly investigated. 6 The court concluded that a rational jury
might have concluded that the policymaker knew of widespread
torture by police in this particular neighborhood; however, the
court explained that this was insufficient to establish liability.22 7
The court noted that Superintendent Brzeczek referred the com-
plaints to an investigatory system that, if doing its job properly,
should have ferreted out the abusers:
It was the plaintiff's responsibility to show that in doing this
Brzeczek was not acting in good faith to extirpate the practice.
That was not shown. At worst, the evidence suggests that
Brzeczek did not respond quickly or effectively.., that he was
careless, maybe even grossly so given the volume of complaints.
More was needed to show that he approved the practice. Failing
to eliminate a practice cannot be equated to approving it.
Otherwise, every inept police chief in the country would be
224. 6 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993).
225. Id. at 1240.
226. See id. ("the office had done nothing except lose a lot of complaints").
227. See id.
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deemed to approve... the misconduct of the officers under his
command.
Deliberate or reckless indifference to complaints must be
proved in order to establish that an abusive practice has actually
been condoned and therefore can be said to have been adopted
by those responsible for making municipal policy.2 28
Unlike in Hogan and Cox, where plaintiff attacked a flawed sys-
tem of complaint review, in Wilson the municipality had developed
a procedure to hear and respond to citizen complaints. 229 Plaintiff
did not establish that the system, as designed, was inadequate to
meet the public needs. Moreover, unlike the cases involving Chief
Rotunda in Utica, Chief Bruce in North Little Rock, or Chief Stark
in Rensselaer, plaintiff could not convince a court that Chicago
policymakers permitted claims of misconduct to fall through the
cracks with deliberate indifference to their merits. The failing, ac-
cording to the court, was not a systemic deficiency but rather the
negligent administration of the program.
Monell, Canton, and Brown make clear that mere negligence is
not a basis of municipal civil rights liability. Canton specifically
cautioned that no municipal liability would attach when "an other-
wise sound program has occasionally been negligently adminis-
tered.' 2 30 Municipal policymakers must ensure that an adequate
system of civilian complaint is adopted and must deliver the
message to subordinates that the system must be implemented.
However, as Wilson demonstrates, negligent mismanagement in
the follow-through is not alone sufficient to find municipal liability.
V. What Courts Expect From Municipalities
Municipal liability for civil rights violations based upon a faulty
citizen complaint system will continue to be imposed even as more
municipalities develop elaborate, citizen complaint procedures.
Lower court decisions reflect a judicial willingness to impose cer-
tain standards for reviewing citizen complaints against police.
While this might be viewed as the judicial "second-guessing" Can-
ton eschewed, 231 a community is nevertheless well-served by reas-
228. Id.
229. See Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864, 873 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that expert testimony to establish pattern of failure to investigate
complaints).
230. Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
231. Id. at 392.
1998]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
sessment of its complaint procedures in light of the increasing
claims.
An examination of the judicial criticism of various civilian com-
plaint models leads to the conclusion that to avoid liability for fail-
ure to respond effectively to citizen complaints a community
should, at a minimum:
1) adopt a formal review system regardless of the size of the
municipality;
2) provide an outside (nondepartmental) unit to receive com-
plaints so that complainants can come forward without fear
or intimidation;
3) accord investigators significant independence from the police
chief;
4) ensure professionalism in the conduct of investigations and
hearings whether conducted by police or civilians;
5) provide an opportunity for witnesses, officers, and complain-
ants each to be heard;
6) set and enforce time requirements to ensure that the review
system results in speedy resolution and discipline when
appropriate;
7) prioritize cases by the nature of the complaints so that those
suggesting public danger are addressed first;
8) index pending, sustained and unsustained complaints by indi-
vidual officer to ensure early identification of problem of-
ficers;232 and
9) take action based upon the identification of problems and
communicate the outcome of citizen complaint review to de-
partmental agencies taking other personnel action. 33
232. Even if discipline cannot be meted out for unsustained complaints, judicial
opinions suggest that many complaints in an officer's personnel file may suggest nas-
cent problems deserving evaluation and prophylactic intervention short of discipline.
In addition, multiple pending complaints may reveal a need for swift intervention.
See Beck, 89 F.3d at 974 ("[B]ecause there is no formalized tracking of complaints for
individual officers, a jury could find that officers are guaranteed repeated impunity");
Vann, 72 F.3d at 1050; Cox, 821 F. Supp. at 13-15. Placing unsustained complaints in
personnel files may conflict with collective bargaining agreements.
233. My recommendations are a result of reviewing litigation trends. However,
they are not inconsistent with the recommendations of law enforcement evaluators.
For example, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) model policy statement,
"[w]ith regard to the complaints system itself,... stresses that it must be accessible to
all persons who wish to file a complaint, must function consistently, and must collect
and analyze misconduct complaints on a monthly basis. Additionally, it argues for a
120-day limit on the disposition of all complaints." West, supra note 38, at 398 (citing
PERF, Police Agency Handling of Citizen Complaints: A Model Policy Statement
(Washington, D.C. 1983)); Livingston, supra note 26, at 664 (recommending broader
civilian role in providing information about police performance); Hecker, supra note
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While these suggestions seem to come as much from common
sense as from judicial wisdom, surprisingly, the cases suggest that
municipalities have had difficulty implementing these standards.
So long as the federal courts are engaged in the evaluation of mu-
nicipal programs, it behooves municipalities to take note of judicial
decisions and adapt their citizen complaint procedures accordingly.
VI. Conclusion
While the Supreme Court has expressed a desire to spare federal
courts from "the endless exercise of second-guessing" which would
"implicate serious questions of federalism," '234 judicial scrutiny of
the adequacy of civilian complaint procedures employed by munic-
ipalities is increasing. Police departments of all sizes may be held
liable for poorly designed or implemented civilian complaint pro-
cedures. When these procedures fail to detect and discipline of-
ficers engaging in misconduct, the fault rests with policymakers
who act with deliberate indifference. Both internal and external
models of complaint review pose problems for police forces. Re-
cent cases instruct municipalities to formally and promptly address
citizen complaints. The litigation experience of some municipali-
ties suggests that, to avoid municipal liability, municipalities might
consider adopting a system utilizing both internal and external re-
view235 of police misconduct. At the outset, the municipality is bet-
ter served by a citizen complaint system which provides multiple
units to receive complaints. During the investigatory stage, inde-
pendence and competence are essential to creating a sense of in-
tegrity and legitimacy in the eventual outcome. At the resolution
stage, the decision must be rendered promptly and appropriate dis-
cipline delivered. Municipalities must also engage in regular evalu-
ation of their complaint procedures, or else mere supervisory
negligence will rise to deliberate indifference. Finally, municipali-
ties must systematically track complaints by officer and geographic
area, looking for patterns and pockets of misconduct within its
52, at 602 (recommending monitoring through data collection); Jones, supra note 39,
at 517 (recommending that civilian boards be empowered to make policy changes).
234. Canton, 489 U.S. at 392; see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76 (1976)
(denying injunctive relief for alleged widespread police abuses in Philadelphia and
indicating that delicate issues of federal-state relationships would be implicated if
such relief were granted).
235. See William C. Smith & Geoffrey P. Alpert, Law Enforcement: Policing the
Defective Centurion-Decertification and Beyond, 29 CRIM. L. BULL. 147, 155-58
(1993) (advancing a decertification model for certain misconduct which should ac-
tively solicit citizen complaints as well as those internally generated).
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force. Without indexing and tracking complaints, the municipality
may be viewed as ignoring its institutional problems. Despite the
municipality's freedom from respondeat superior liability for civil
rights violations, if a municipality does not take the complaint re-
view process seriously, municipalities will be exposed to civil rights
liability for even a few bad apples.
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO NEW
YORK STATE'S DEATH PENALTY STATUTE
John M. Shields*
I. Introduction
New York State's death penalty statute is constitutionally flawed
in many respects. It violates the state and federal prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment and provides unrestricted
prosecutorial discretion to pursue the death penalty. This standar-
dless and unfettered discretion creates the risk of arbitrary or dis-
criminatory application of capital punishment.
The statute is unconstitutionally vague in many ways. For exam-
ple, the statute fails to provide an adequate definition of "serial
murder" under New York Penal Law section 125.27 (1)(a)(xi).
There is also no description or definition of "similar fashion" or
"common scheme or plan" to adequately guide the various prose-
cutors in this most final of decisions. The existing statute must fail
as a result of this unconstitutional vagueness, particularly in light of
the stakes confronting the accused.
Should the statute, as it exists today, be held constitutional, capi-
tal defendants must be provided with a preliminary hearing to de-
termine the specific procedures and standards employed by the
District Attorney in deciding to pursue the death penalty in each
specific case. Such a preliminary hearing would be necessary to
ascertain whether the decision in each case adheres to these stan-
dards, assuming any standards exist. Such a hearing is imperative
to determine whether, in a particular case, the prosecutor arbitrar-
ily has pursued the death penalty.
A defendant, once indicted on first-degree murder charges, faces
a potential death sentence. To date, the various District Attorneys'
decisions to pursue the death penalty in New York have been en-
tirely internal. Neither defense counsel nor any other external
party has become privy to any existing death penalty determination
procedures.
The New York death penalty statute itself does not establish or
provide any procedure or standard to guide the various District
Attorneys in the process of deciding whether to pursue capital pun-
ishment. Unlike at the federal level, where internal sentencing
* (INSERT BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION)
256 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
guidelines supplement the federal statute, New York prosecutors
have not formalized or memorialized any policy or procedure
which must be followed prior to seeking the death penalty. As a
result, prosecutors' offices are insulated from any review or scru-
tiny of the decision to pursue the death penalty in a particular case.
New York Courts are now facing the first death penalty cases in
fifteen years.' This Article uncovers the numerous constitutional
infirmities of the New York death penalty statute. Part II discusses
the recent New York case which held the existing death penalty
plea provisions unconstitutional. Part III explains the heightened
scrutiny required in capital cases, focusing primarily on the neces-
sity of preventing arbitrary application of the death penalty. Part
IV reveals the unfettered discretion with which the various District
Attorneys are provided under the current statute, which creates
the risk of unconstitutionally arbitrary application. Part V analyzes
the existing vagueness in the current statute.
Consequently, Part VI recommends clear statewide guidelines to
assist in the capital selection process. Finally, Part VII discusses
the necessity of a preliminary hearing in each case to determine
whether the death penalty has been pursued in an arbitrary
fashion.
lI. The New York Provisions Regulating Guilty Pleas in Capital
Cases Are Unconstitutional
The relevant sections of the New York death penalty statute per-
mit a capital defendant to plead guilty only with consent from the
prosecution and the court and where the agreed upon sentence is
other than death.2 In People v. Hale,3 the court held that these
provisions violate the New York and Federal Constitutions.'
The Hale court rejected the argument that, since the defendant
did not offer to plead guilty, he did not suffer an actual injury, and
therefore lacked the proper standing to challenge the statute.' The
court held that the plea provisions not only denied a defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination, they also penalized his right to
a jury trial.6 Therefore, even if the defendant were to persist in
1. See Daniel Wise, Brooklyn, Dutchess Courts Courts Prepare for Capital Trials,
N.Y. L.J., March 5, 1998, at 1.
2. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii), 220.60(2)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1998).
3. 173 Misc.2d 140, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1997).
4. See id. at 185, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
5. See id. at 177, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
6. See id. at 177-78, 185, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 478, 483.
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pleading "not guilty" and "exercise his right to a jury trial, he
would still have standing to raise this claim."7 The court followed
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Jackson,8 in which the Court held that a similar provision of the
Federal Kidnaping Act unconstitutionally infringed upon the right
to a jury trial by exposing the defendant to the risk of death only
when he pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial, and thus,
needlessly encouraged guilty pleas.9
Similarly, New York's current death penalty statute provides for
imposition of the death penalty only pursuant to the recommenda-
tion of the jury.1" Moreover, the statute prohibits imposing a death
sentence when a defendant enters a guilty plea or waives a jury
trial. 1 Therefore, only if a defendant waives his or her Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial and Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination can he or she avoid death.12 Accord-
ingly, the Hale court held the pertinent plea provisions
unconstitutional.13
Judicial scrutiny and consent of the prosecutor (the defendant's
primary adversary) do not remedy the constitutional infirmity of
the existing provision. 4 In fact, the current plea provisions en-
courage prosecutors to use the threat of death to induce guilty
pleas.' 5 Arguably, a prosecutor is more likely to consent to guilty
pleas in cases where evidence is lacking and conviction is uncer-
tain.' 6 Such a scheme discourages a defendant from exercising his
or her constitutional rights for fear of a death sentence. 7
Prior to Hale, New York courts did not have an opportunity to
apply the Jackson holding to a death penalty statute. However,
only two years after the Jackson decision, the Court of Appeals
relied on Jackson and struck down a similar provision.' 8  In
Michael A. C., the court struck down a provision which allowed for
7. Id. at 178, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 478 (citing Robtoy v. Kincheloe, 871 F.2d 1478,
1480 (9th Cir. 1989)).
8. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
9. See id. at 583.
10. See Hale, 173 Misc.2d at 179, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 179-80, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80.
13. See id. at 180, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 480 (citing People v. Black, 312 N.Y.S.2d 658
(1970), aff'd, 281 N.E.2d 849 (1972)).
14. See id. at 181-82, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
15. See id. at 182, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 183, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 482 (citing People v. Michael A.C., 27 N.Y.2d
79, 86, 261 N.E.2d 620, 624, 313 N.Y.S.2d 695, 700 (1970)).
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"youthful offender" treatment for certain defendants only if they
waived their right to a jury trial. 9 A procedure that offers prefer-
ential treatment contingent upon the waiver of a fundamental con-
stitutional right, or imposes a harsher penalty for asserting it, is
unconstitutional.2" If such a provision is constitutionally impermis-
sible in a non-capital case, it is clearly more repugnant in a death
penalty situation, which is greater in severity and finality.2'
The Hale court advised that courts of first instance should not
declare legislative acts unconstitutional unless they are invalid on
their face and involve life and liberty.22 Clearly, life and liberty are
at stake in any capital case. Therefore, it would be illogical to al-
low cases to proceed under suspect provisions only to have them
later reversed.23 In the face of overwhelming evidence, the Hale
court held that the New York death penalty provisions violated the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
its corresponding provisions in the New York State Constitution.24
New York courts should follow these recommendations and closely
examine the remaining portions of the statute for constitutional
infirmity.
II. The Heightened Scrutiny in Capital Cases Cannot Tolerate
the Potential for Arbitrariness
The pending capital cases in New York are the earliest applica-
tions of a new statute exposing a defendant to the most severe pen-
alty tolerated by law. The death penalty, the taking of human life,
is an irrevocable and supreme punishment which violates the most
basic human rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution
and further protected by the New York State Constitution. The
Supreme Court consistently has referred to the unique finality and
severity of the death penalty, stating that capital sentencing must
be subject to special scrutiny to avoid unfair or arbitrary applica-
tion. The awesome governmental power to extinguish human life
requires the most heightened scrutiny.25 The substantive and pro-
19. Michael A.C., 27 N.Y.2d at 86, 261 N.E.2d at 624, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
20. See Hale, 173 Misc.2d at 183-84, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 482 (quoting Michael A. C., 27
N.Y.2d at 86, 261 N.E.2d at 624, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 700).
21. See id. at 184, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 482 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976)).
22. See id. at 185, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 483 (quoting McKINNEY'S STATUTES, ch. 6,
§ 150 at 312 (McKinney 1971)).
23. See id. at 185-86, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
24. See id. at 185, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
25. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 340-42 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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cedural provisions unique to capital cases evidence the necessity
for heightened reliability. The lack of existing guidelines fails to
fulfill these strict requirements.
To be considered constitutional, a death penalty statute must,
among other things, genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible
for the death sentence and reasonably justify this most final sen-
tence on the defendant as compared to others found guilty of mur-
der.26 The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment analysis of capital
sentencing has proceeded from the premise that the imposition of
death is a punishment so profoundly different from all other sanc-
tions that it requires a heightened degree of reliability.27 Proce-
dures that may be completely acceptable in ordinary cases may be
condemned in capital cases.28
No punishment implicates equality and fairness more than the
death penalty, clearly the ultimate exercise of governmental power
concerning individual rights.29 The New York statute does not pass
muster under this federal test, as no such special scrutiny exists in
the statute. In the pending capital cases, the District Attorneys in
New York's various counties have not employed any such height-
ened scrutiny in deciding to pursue the death penalty.
26. See U.S. v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1092 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Lowenfield v.
Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988)); U.S. v. Pitera, 795 F. Supp. 546, 553 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)).
27. See, e.g., Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308(1991) (reversing death sentence as
arbitrary and capricious); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing that death
penalty has been treated differently from all other punishments); Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1988) (observing that decision to execute a defendant is unlike
any other decision); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (holding that execu-
tion is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; death is different) (citing
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28,
35 (1986) (holding that the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments
requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing deter-
mination) (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)); Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 437 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (observing that the uni-
queness of the death penalty requires that the sentencer's discretion be channeled and
guided by clear, objective, and specific standards); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); U.S. v. Davis, 912 F.
Supp. 938 (E.D. La. 1996); United States v. Pitera, 795 F. Supp. 546, 553 (E.D.N.Y.
1992).
28. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) (citing Strickland v. Washing-
ton, 466 U.S. 668, 704-5 (1984)).
29. See Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., et al., Race, Unbridled Discretion, and the State
Constitutional Validity of New York's Death Penalty Statute-Two Questions, 59 ALB.
L. REV. 1545, 1546 (1996).
1998]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
Any marginal benefit to the state from a death sentence, as op-
posed to life imprisonment, is "considerably less than the marginal
difference to the defendant between death and life in prison."3
Such disparity confirms that the potential for arbitrariness cannot
be tolerated in capital punishment.3' Consequently, the degree of
arbitrariness that would invalidate a death penalty as "cruel and
unusual" would not serve to invalidate lesser penalties, as death
penalty supporters contend.32
McCleskey demonstrated that the prosecutorial decision-making
process necessary to determine whether to pursue the death pen-
alty was susceptible to arbitrariness and discriminatory applica-
tion.33 In fact, the District Attorney confirmed the broad and
unguided discretion that the prosecutor's office consistently em-
ployed.34 Given the qualitative difference between death and any
other penalty, as well as the correlating necessity for confirming
the reliability of such a final punishment, the risk of arbitrary appli-
cation is unacceptable .3  Any possible risk that the death penalty
will be imposed arbitrarily is unconstitutional.36
In McCullah, the Court held that the existing statute tended to
skew the process, creating the risk that the death penalty will be
imposed arbitrarily, and thus unconstitutionally.37 Again, the New
York capital scheme does not have the requisite standards to pre-
vent arbitrary application. In fact, no standards exist.
Even assuming that the New York death penalty statute can sur-
vive a federal constitutional challenge, it does not satisfy the
heightened scrutiny and increased individual protections afforded
by the New York Constitution. New York State traditionally af-
fords greater constitutional protection for individual rights than the
federal Constitution, particularly in the criminal arena, and places
a "particular emphasis on principles of fairness and equality. ' 38 In-
30. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 340 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. See Id.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 357.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 366 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. See United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1111 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 230-32 (1992)).
37. See id.
38. See Hancock, supra note 29 at 1546; see e.g., People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474,
593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992) (discussing searches of private land); Peo-
ple v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990) (discussing
search and seizure); People v. Van Pelt, 76 N.Y.2d 156, 556 N.E.2d 423, 556 N.Y.S.2d
984 (1990) (discussing state due process protection); People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67,
555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990) (regarding disclosure of exculpatory evi-
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deed, New York has traditionally been a leader, and the New York
Court of Appeals has consistently interpreted the New York State
Constitution to extend and increase protection of individual rights
and liberties beyond the federal Constitution as construed by the
Supreme Court.39
Surely individual states, and specifically New York, may construe
their own constitutions to more stringently constrain police or state
conduct than the federal Constitution.n0 Similarly, other states
have also recognized that state constitutional protection should ex-
tend past that of its federal companion, especially in the area of
capital punishment. 41 Due to the magnitude of the decision to take-
a human life and the accompanying unacceptable risk of error, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court struck down that state's death pen-
alty statute as unconstitutional.4 n In Watson, the Court held that
the prosecutor's unlimited charging discretion created an imper-
missible risk of arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.43 In
Tichnell v. State,44 the Maryland Court of Appeals held that unfet-
tered prosecutorial discretion resulted in arbitrary death penalty
sentencing.
The prevailing inconsistency and uncertainty in the manner in
which the decision to pursue the death penalty is made, coupled
with New York's traditional heightened protection of individual
rights, forces the conclusion that New York's recently enacted
dence); People v. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d 517, 553 N.E.2d 1008, 554 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1990)
(regarding right to counsel); People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555
N.Y.S.2d 647 (1990) (holding that state's equal protection clause extends beyond fed-
eral); People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 224, 543 N.E.2d 61, 544 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1989) (dis-
cussing automobile searches); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of
Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987) (regarding mandatory
urine tests); People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d
907 (1986) (discussing search warrants); People v. Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d
444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1986) (discussing automobile searches); People v. Bigelow, 66
N.Y.2d 417,488 N.E.2d 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1985) (discussing probable cause); Peo-
ple v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 432 N.E.2d 745, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1982) (discussing
search of car incident to arrest); People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d
360, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1980) (discussing waiver of right to counsel).
39. See Hancock, supra note 29, at 1549-51 (discussing thoroughly recent cases and
relevant scholarly articles).
40. See Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 504-05 (Kaye, C.J., concurring).
41. See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992); State v. Gerald, 549
A.2d 792 (N.J. 1988); State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939 (N.J. 1987); State v. Ramser,
524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987).
42. See District Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1286 (Mass.
1980).
43. Id.
44. 468 A.2d 1, 24 (Md. 1983).
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death penalty statute is unconstitutional. Further, no realistic pro-
portionality review exists for those individuals sentenced in New
York prior to the collection of relevant statistical data. The review
of an isolated sentence is useless if the underlying statutory frame-
work is inherently arbitrary, and thus unconstitutional.
IV. New York's Death Penalty Statute Provides a District
Attorney with Unfettered Discretion to Pursue the
Death Penalty, Thereby Creating the Risk of
Unconstitutionally Arbitrary
Application
Under the present statutory scheme in New York State, the Dis-
trict Attorney in each county has absolute discretion in determin-
ing whether to seek the death penalty. The State provides
inadequate, if any, guidance or standards to assist or govern the
prosecutor's decision to charge first or second degree murder, the
former carrying the possible death sentence.
The lack of guidance or standards within the New York statute
allows for wide variations in the imposition of the death penalty
from county to county depending on the individual views of the
local prosecutor. This unbridled, state-sanctioned discretion
presents the potential for arbitrary administration in violation of
both the state and federal constitutions.
The New York statute, Penal Law § 125.27, defines first-degree
murder as the intentional killing of another person accompanied by
one of a number of enumerated aggravating factors. At Penal Law
§ 60.60, the statute provides three possible sentences for those
found guilty of violating the statute, including death. The aggravat-
ing factors themselves are vague and troublesome, as the statutory
definitions vest prosecutors with wide discretion. Prosecutors also
have wide discretion with regard to the type of murders that can be
charged as capital. Once a case is "death eligible" no further
guidelines exist either in the statute itself or in other policies or
sentencing guidelines to determine when the District Attorney
should pursue capital punishment.
Once an individual is indicted for first-degree murder, the prose-
cutor has one hundred and twenty days to file a notice of intent to
seek the death penalty. The governing statute fails to provide any
further prosecutorial guidelines or procedures for prosecutors to
follow in determining when to pursue the death penalty and how
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such a decision should be made.45 Therefore, the ultimate life or
death decision is entirely subject to the unguided whim of the pros-
ecutor in clear violation of both the federal and state constitutions.
Further, unique to all other defendants, a capital defendant may
not enter a guilty plea without the consent of the court and the
prosecutor, providing the District Attorney with veto power in cap-
ital cases.46 Consequently, the District Attorney may reject a guilty
plea, which is otherwise acceptable to the court, in order to pursue
the death penalty.
Ultimately, unfettered prosecutorial discretion in this most criti-
cal decision allows the individual prosecutor's personal, ethical,
moral, philosophical, and religious beliefs to influence or even dic-
tate his or her decision to pursue the death penalty. Based on such
beliefs, the District Attorney may even force a defendant to go to
trial and receive the death penalty, rather than enter a guilty plea
prior to trial. Without clearly articulated procedures, this tremen-
dous decision is further influenced by other tangible and intangible
outside pressures, including economic and political variables.47 In-
deed, there already exists a clear disparity among the current Dis-
trict Attorneys in the different counties, creating a significant
degree of variation in who receives the death penalty.48 The recent
45. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.40 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
46. See Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 478, 173 Misc. 2d at 178.
47. See, e.g., Marshall, 613 A.2d at 1144-49 (N.J. 1992) (Handler, J., dissenting)
(discussing exorbitant costs in capital cases, including statistics and figures); Koeda-
tich, 548 A.2d at 1018 (N.J. 1988) (Handler, J., dissenting) (indicating that political
pressures which influence prosecutorial discretion may lead to arbitrary results); see
also Steven H. Jupiter, Constitution Notwithstanding: The Political Illegitimacy of the
Death Penalty in American Democracy, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 437, 438-9 (1996);
Daniel Wise, Doubts Emerge Over Death Penalty Costs: Defenders, Prosecutors Ap-
prehensive About Adequacy of State Appropriations, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 17, 1995, at 1
(describing the overwhelming cost of a capital trial); Daniel Wise, Prosecutors Want
Death Penalty; Qualms Voiced About Costs, Time, Training of Lawyers, N.Y.L.J., Mar.
3, 1995, at 1. (reporting that Manhattan District Attorney stated that the death pen-
alty will be a major impediment to law enforcement because of wasted money, re-
sources and time. Similarly, Monroe and Tioga County District Attorneys voiced
disapproval of capital trials for economic reasons).
48. See, e.g., Dean Chang, Death Penalty Still in Wings, DAILY NEWS, Sept. 1,
1996, at 18; Daniel Jeffreys, New York Invites its Murders to Take a Seat, THE IN-
DEPENDENT, Aug. 31, 1995, at 4-5; Molly McCarthy, DA to Seek Serial Suspect's Exe-
cution if Jury Convicts, NEWSDAY, Aug. 13, 1996, at A3, A18 (reporting Suffolk
County District Attorney James Catterson's announcement that he had "no realistic
choice" but to seek the death penalty); see Gloria Wright, Onondaga D.A. Will Seek
Death Penalty, POST-STANDARD, Jan. 1, 1996, at Al (reporting that Onondaga County
District Attorney has announced his intention to seek the death penalty). Similarly,
Ulster County's District Attorney publicly stated intention to seek the death penalty.
See David E. Rovella, Fake Plea Bargain in Death Case Raises Concerns, NAT'L L.J.,
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circumstances in Johnson v. Pataki,49 where the District Attorney
decided not to pursue the death penalty in a death eligible case,
revealed the inherent arbitrariness of unguided discretion in the
individual decision making process. That the Attorney General
eventually usurped the District Attorney's authority in Johnson
only confirms that the personal opinions of one human being are
dictating the life or death determination.
Indeed, the recent New York death penalty statute is inconsis-
tent with New York's traditional role as a leader in providing
heightened protection for individual liberties and expanding the
protections afforded by the Federal Constitutional and courts. Un-
fortunately, in some of the recent federal cases involving Eighth
Amendment challenges to the arbitrary discretion of the prosecu-
tion, the courts have not articulated any clear answers.50
In Furman v. Georgia,51 the United States Supreme Court struck
down Georgia's death penalty statute as unconstitutional.-2 In its
decision, the Court determined that the Georgia statute was tanta-
mount to cruel and unusual punishment.53 The central and con-
stant theme throughout Furman was that the statute lacked
sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary, inconsistent, and discrim-
inatory imposition of the death penalty.54 Since Furman, the
touchstone in evaluating a particular sentencing decision is the
mere risk of an arbitrary application of this severe and final imposi-
tion of capital punishment.
An arbitrary capital scheme results from a lack of guidance in
any phase of the process. The lack of adequate prosecutorial gui-
dance in the decision to pursue capital punishment is analogous to
Oct. 9, 1995, at A13. Conversely, the Bronx County Chief Prosecutor has stated that
he has no intention of ever seeking the death penalty. See Joseph Dolman, The Bronx
D.A. Who Says No Way, NEWSDAY, Mar. 16, 1995, at A33; Excerpt from Messages by
Governor George E. Pataki and Robert T. Johnson, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at B2;
Jan Hoffman, News Analysis: Death Penalty Test, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1996 at 43;
Rachel L. Swarns, Governor Removes Bronx Prosecutor from Murder Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at Al.
49. 229 A.D.2d 242, 655 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1st Dep't 1997).
50. See, e.g., U.S. v. Chanthadara, 928 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D. Kan. 1996) (dis-
missing an Eighth Amendment challenge that the federal death penalty statute cre-
ates a risk of arbitrary death sentence); U.S. v. Walker, 910 F. Supp. 837, 857-8
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (dismissing defendant's challenge that they had been arbitrarily se-
lected for punishment).
51. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
52. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
53. See, id.
54. See id. at 244-45 (Douglas, J. Concurring with per curiam decision).
55. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 322-23, citing Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 427.
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a lack of appropriate limitations on sentencing discretion. The
Supreme Court, in McCleskey v. Kemp,56 articulated critical con-
cerns about the arbitrary nature of a capital sentencing scheme.
Although the McCleskey decision upheld the Georgia death pen-
alty statute, it was a vigorously contested five to four decision. In
fact, Justice Powell, author of the majority opinion in McCleskey,
has since publicly indicated that he would now join the dissent.57
Justice Brennan, in his dissent in McCleskey, stated that although
a state may attempt to provide prosecutorial guidance in capital
sentencing, the discretion afforded prosecutors and jurors creates
the potential for arbitrary or discriminatory applications:58 "[n]o
guidelines govern prosecutorial decisions to seek the death
penalty. 59
In United States v. Pitera, the court dismissed the defendant's
claim of arbitrary prosecution as being without merit.6 ° The Pitera
case involved a federal statute making it a capital offense to com-
mit intentional murder in connection with the commission of seri-
ous drug crimes.61 The statute contained an arguably clearer
definition of "common scheme" than the New York statute and
reflected obvious public policy considerations with relation to
large-scale drug trafficking. Further, the federal system has cleaily
articulated rigid and thorough internal prosecutorial guidance and
standards.62 Ironically, the court's discussion of the facts in Pitera
reveals precisely the exact potential risk of arbitrary application
the federal standard prohibits.63 The court in Pitera stated that due
process would not tolerate arbitrary and discriminatory prosecu-
tion. Conversely, the court also held that any undue inquiry into
prosecutorial decisions might "chill" law enforcement efforts and
56. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
57. See Stewart F. Hancock Jr. et al., Race, Unbridled Discretion,, and the State
Constitutional Validity on New York's Death Penalty Statute, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1545,
1558 (citing Mark A. Graber, Judicial Recantation, 45 SYR. L. REV. 807 (1994)); Nor-
man Redlich Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process
Survive the Perceived Political Pressure? 21 FORD. URB. L.J. 239, 294 (1994); Marcia
Coyle, Powell Recants Death Penalty View, NAT'L L.J., June 13, 1994, at A12; John C.
Jeffries, Jr., A Change of Mind That Came Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1994 at
A23.
58. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 333.
59. Id.
60. United States v. Pitera, 795 F. Supp 546, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
61. See id. at 550.
62. See id.; see also infra Part VI.
63. Pitera, 795 F. Supp. at 551.
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undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing government en-
forcement policies.'
New York, like other states, recognizes the individual state's in-
terest in extending the rights and protections guaranteed by the
federal Constitution. Capital punishment is a matter of particular
state interest and does not require a uniform national policy.65 It is
imperative that the states invalidate sentencing schemes that may
result in unequal sentencing.66
In District Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson,67 the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court held that unfettered prosecutorial discretion
created an unconstitutional risk of arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty. In Tichnell v. State,68 the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals found untrammeled prosecutorial discretion resulted in arbi-
trary death penalty sentencing. Similarly, New York prosecutors
do not have any standards to follow in this grave decision process.
New York cannot tolerate arbitrary imposition of the death pen-
alty. Given the existing uncertainty, coupled with New York's tra-
dition of enhancing federal protections against cruel and unusual
punishment, New York's death penalty scheme is inherently dis-
criminatory, posing a clear and unacceptable risk of being meted
out arbitrarily.69 Further, the New York Court of Appeals has not
addressed the constitutionality of a capital punishment statute
since striking down the previous death penalty statute over ten
years ago on similar grounds. 70
In People v. Smith, the New York Court of Appeals struck down
the then existing death penalty statute. The Court in Smith dis-
cussed the prohibition against arbitrary and capricious imposition
of the death penalty and rejected the people's argument that the
capital statute was narrowly drawn.71 The recently enacted death
penalty statute similarly fails adequately to guide the prosecutor's
discretion and further fails entirely to define the requisite aggravat-
ing factors to be considered in seeking death.
64. Id. at 568.
65. See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1123 (N.J. 1992) (Handler, J., dissenting
opinion); State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 951 (N.J. 1988) (citing State v. Ramseur,
524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987)).
66. See Marshall, 613 A.2d at 1123.
67. 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1284-85 (1980).
68. 468 A.2d 1, 19 (1983).
69. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting opinion).
70. See People v. Smith, 468 N.E.2d 879 (1984), 63 N.Y.2d 41, 279 N.Y.S.2d 706;
see also People v. Davis, 371 N.E.2d 456 (1977), 43 N.Y.2d 17, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735;
People v. Fitzpatrick, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139.
71. Smith, 468 N.E.2d at 894, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 720, 63 N.Y.2d at 71.
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V. The New York Death Penalty Statute Is
Unconstitutionally Vague
The New York death penalty statute is unconstitutionally vague,
creating an impermissible risk of arbitrary application. In general,
when interpreting a statute, the court examines whether the plain
meaning of the words is ambiguous.72 If not, the court's inquiry
ends. But if the plain meaning creates "grievous ambiguity, courts
apply the "rule of lenity," which requires a narrow reading of the
text.73 The New York death penalty statute violates the consitution
because it lacks clear guidelines and unambiguous definitions of
the alleged crime involved.
The lack of an adequate definition of "serial murder," "common
scheme or plan," and the other aggravating factors creates a genu-
ine risk of arbitrariness. For example, Penal Law section
125.27(1)(a)(xi), the "serial murder" clause, allows a prosecutor to
seek the death penalty when the defendant "intentionally caused
the death of two or more additional persons within the state in
separate criminal transactions within a period of twenty-four
months when committed in a similar fashion or pursuant to a com-
mon scheme or plan."' 74 This clause is unduly vague, as no defini-
tion exists to define "similar fashion" or "common scheme or
plan." These terms are open to very broad interpretations by indi-
vidual prosecutors within a given office, let alone the sixty-two
counties throughout the state.
Additionally, the statute provides no guidance regarding the
date of commission of predicate offenses. Nonetheless, where the
predicate offenses (which allow the district attorney to pursue the
death penalty) may have occurred prior to the effective date of the
statute, the prosecutor should not be able to legally apply such of-
fenses in consideration or calculation of pursuing the death
penalty.
In particular, where procedures convey any appearance of a risk
of arbitrariness, such procedures should be avoided.75
This emphasis on risk ... reflects the fact that concern for arbi-
trariness focuses on the rationality of the system as a whole, and
that a system that features a significant probability that sentenc-
72. See U.S. v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1108 (10th Cir. 1996).
73. See U.S. v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525, 1534 (D. Kan. 1996).
74. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1993).
75. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349, 370 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ing decisions are influenced by impermissible considerations
cannot be regarded as rational.7 6
In Williamson v. Reynolds,77 the district court held that
Oklahoma's death penalty statute was impermissibly vague. 78 The
court stated that a "failure to limit the sentencer's discretion
through appropriate objective instructions, combined with
Oklahoma's standardless construction of aggravating circum-
stance[s]," resulted in a violation of the constitutional right to due
process.79 "A state that imposes capital punishment must apply its
laws in a manner that directs the sentencer by 'clear and objective
standards' providing 'specific and detailed guidance . ' .80
Clearly New York has failed to provide such critical and specific
standards and guidance.
The New York statute creates the same risk as the statute in Wil-
liamson. No objective instructions exist to guide the New York
sentencer. In addition, the lack of definition of the aggravating fac-
tors within the statute creates a further risk of arbitrariness.
Walton v. Arizona is another five to four Supreme Court deci-
sion where the dissent focussed on the lack of meaningful limits on
sentencing discretion.8' Arizona's statutory language provided no
meaningful basis for imposition of a death sentence.82 Justice
Blackmun chastised the majorities' failure to assess whether Ari-
zona case law confined the terms of the statute to constitutional
limits. 83
In Stringer v. Black,84 the Supreme Court reversed a death sen-
tence on the grounds that the existing statute was unconstitution-
ally vague, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Court held
that the death penalty statute lacked the necessary guidance and
76. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 323 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. 904 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D.Okla. 1995).
78. See id. at 1571.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1574 (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (holding Geor-
gia Supreme Court's construction of the aggravating circumstances provision of that
state's death penalty law unconstitutional)); see also, Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1
(1990) (holding Mississippi's application of its death penalty aggravating circumstance
provision unconstitutionally vague); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988)
(holding application of aggravating circumstances provision of Oklahoma's death
penalty law unconstitutionally vague); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)
(finding that a prosecutor's argument that misleads jurors into believing that the
courts, not them, imposed the death penalty violates the constitution).
81. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 697 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (1990).
82. Id. at 706.
83. Id. at 707.
84. 503 U.S. 222 (1992).
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precision, inviting arbitrary and capricious application.85 Similarly,
in Espinosa v. Florida,86 the Supreme Court reversed a Florida
death sentence. The vague aggravating factors violated the consti-
tution because they provided little guidance, thus risking
arbitrariness.87
In Tuilaepa v. California,88 Justice Blackmun stated in his dissent
that the California capital punishment scheme failed to guide the
sentencer's discretion.8 9 He continued that one of the greatest
evils of unguided discretion is the risk that it will be exercised un-
constitutionally. 9° Justice Blackmun further questioned whether
the death eligibility process adequately performed a meaningful
narrowing.91
The Supreme Court has professed a commitment to monitoring
discretion in capital cases to minimize arbitrary and capricious ac-
tion and to achieve principled distinctions between those who re-
ceive the death penalty and those who do not.92 Future litigation
and review will expose the failure of existing factors to adequately
guide discretion in capital cases.93 The critical focus is on how the
various elements of a death penalty prosecution function together
and the rationality and fairness of who ultimately receives the
death penalty.94
In their dissent in Arave v. Creech,95 Justices Blackmun and Ste-
vens stated that the Idaho death penalty statute was unconstitu-
tionally vague because it contained a total lack of meaningful
guidance for the sentencer. 96 A limited construction must do more
than invite the sentencer to consider, in an unspecified fashion, the
individual circumstances of each case. 97 "[T]he State must provide
a construction that, on its face, reasonably can be expected to be
85. Id. at 228.
86. 505 U.S. 1079 (1992).
87. See also U.S. v. Tipon, 90 F.3d 861, 899 (4th Cir. 1996); U.S. v. McCullah, 76
F.3d 1087, 1110 (10th Cir. 1996); Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1570-71
(E.D. Okl. 1995).
88. 512 U.S. 967 (1994).
89. See id, at 984 (citing Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 235 (1992)); see also Cal-
lins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (stating that the death penalty could never be
constitutionally implemented).
90. See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 984 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 989.
92. See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 995 (citing Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992)).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. 507 U.S. 463 (1993).
96. See id. at 479.
97. See id. at 480.
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applied in a consistent and meaningful way so as to provide the
sentencer with adequate guidance."98 This is exactly what the New
York statute fails to do by allowing juries to consider unspecified
mitigating factors. Without guidance and proper definitions, arbi-
trary application of capital punishment is inevitable.
No formal death penalty guidelines exist in New York. The lack
of coherent and extensive guidelines, coupled with the unduly
vague descriptions of eligible crimes, mandate that the statute must
fail on constitutional grounds.
VI. New York Prosecutors Must Develop the Necessary
Statewide Guidelines to Assist and Guide the Capital
Selection Process
The New York death penalty statute fails to establish or provide
any procedures or standards to guide the various District Attor-
neys in their capital decision-making process. Unlike at the federal
level, where internal sentencing guidelines supplement the federal
statute, neither the State of New York, nor the individual District
Attorneys has formalized a policy or procedure for prosecutors to
follow. Therefore, there is no actual review of a prosecutor's deci-
sion to pursue the death penalty.
In federal capital cases, prosecutorial discretion may be reviewed
where the relevant statute provides guidelines for the agency to
follow in exercising its decision-making authority.99 In January
1995, the Attorney General issued a Protocol to guide federal pros-
ecutors in their decision to pursue the death penalty.100 The Death
Penalty Protocol ("Protocol") from the United States Attorney's
Manual requires United States Attorneys to obtain written author-
ization from the Attorney General before seeking the death pen-
alty.101 The Protocol provides that a United States Attorney must
submit a death penalty evaluation and a prosecution memoran-
dum.10 2 Thereafter, the Attorney General appoints a special com-
mittee to review these items and make an independent
recommendation.0 3 Defense counsel may also submit reasons why
the death penalty should not be sought, prior to a recommendation
98. Id. at 482.
99. See Walker v. Reno, 925 F. Supp. 124, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
100. See id. at 128-29.
101. See Nicholls v. Reno, 931 F. Supp. 748, 750 (D. Colo. 1996) ("To request such
approval, a United States Attorney must follow departmental procedure.") (emphasis
added).
102. See Walker, 925 F. Supp. at 129 (citing Protocol at 9-10.000(C)).
103. See id. (citing Protocol at 9-10.000(D)); Nicholls, 931 F. Supp. at 750-51.
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by either the United States Attorney or the committee. °4 The At-
torney General then makes the final review and determination as
to whether to pursue the death penalty. 10 5 The Protocol also con-
tains standards to guide the United States Attorney, the commit-
tee, and the Attorney General. These standards include
assessments of the aggravating factors and other reasons for or
against seeking the death penalty.0 6
Even if regulations are not published they are still enforceable
against the government.0 7 Furthermore, where individual rights
are affected, "it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own
procedures. "108 In fact, if internal guidelines are more demanding
than otherwise required, the agency must adhere to the guide-
lines.10 9 In essence, New York State District Attorneys, by inten-
tionally failing to create, articulate or memorialize any procedures,
have attempted to insulate themselves from any review or scrutiny
in their decision to pursue the death penalty.
In Walker, the Court stated that the Death Penalty Protocol was
enacted "to remove unfairness from the prosecutorial process."" 0
Accordingly, New York should enact equal, if not more rigorous,
standards to remove the unfairness from the existing prosecutorial
decision process. In Walker, the Court upheld the Attorney Gen-
eral's determination largely because no one had alleged that the
Attorney General had not followed the prescribed Protocol."' In
fact, in the Walker case, it appears that the Attorney General me-
ticulously followed each requirement of the Protocol guidelines.1 2
No such protocol exists in New York.
If anything, New York prosecutors should follow more extensive
and rigid standards than their federal equivalent, due to New
York's traditional heightened protection of fundamental rights. In-
stead, New York has failed to enact any such protocol or standards
to guide this ultimate decision. New York must not only establish
104. See Walker, 925 F. Supp. at 129 (citing Protocol at 9-10.000(D)); Nicholls 931
F. Supp. at 751.
105. See Walker, 925 F. Supp. at 129.
106. See id. (citing Protocol at 9-10.000(G)).
107. See Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 748 (2d Cir. 1995).
108. See id. at 749 (quoting Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991); Mor-
ton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974); Walker, 925 F. Supp. at 132.
109. See Walker, 925 F. Supp. at 132 (quoting Montilla, 926 F.2d at 167); Morton,
415 U.S. at 235.
110. Walker, 925 F. Supp. at 134.
111. See id. at 132.
112. See id. at 132-33.
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similar criteria, but must adopt an equivalent supervisory system,
involving several levels of evaluation.
In Tichnell v. State,113 the Maryland Court of Appeals held that
the various prosecutors throughout the state did not employ com-
mon standards in deciding to pursue the death penalty.114 Similarly,
and most importantly, New York prosecutors do not employ com-
mon standards in this grave decision-making process. In fact, no
standards exist. As previously discussed, prosecutors in individual
counties have already expressed their preference with respect to
pursuing the death penalty. This preference can, in theory, and
does, in reality, vary from county to county.
At a minimum, New York should follow New Jersey's lead and
establish statewide death penalty guidelines to assist and guide
prosecutors in this most serious procedure. New Jersey has re-
cently confronted the issue of uncontrolled prosecutorial discre-
tion. In State v. Koedatich,"5 the defendant argued that the New
Jersey death penalty statute failed to check the prosecutor's unfet-
tered discretion and therefore could not guarantee that the state
would not arbitrarily or capriciously impose the death penalty.1 6
The defense relied, in part, on the statistical disparity in the selec-
tion of cases for capital prosecution from county to county. 1 7 In
New York, the disparity not only exists, but is openly acknowl-
edged by the various prosecutors.
In the dissent in Koedatich, Justice Handler agreed with the ma-
jority that the existing prosecutorial discretion might lead to arbi-
trary imposition of the death penalty. He stated, however, that
such a risk should translate into a mandate for the necessary state-
wide prosecutorial guidelines for the death penalty determination
process."" Following a discussion of the McClesky and Watson de-
cisions, Justice Handler stated that:
the lack of guidance with respect to the prosecutor's decision to
charge a defendant with capital murder unacceptably increases
the danger that the death penalty will be imposed arbitrarily be-
cause the needed narrowing function is not provided at this cru-
cial initial stage of a prosecution.
113. 468 A.2d 1 (M.D. 1983).
114. See id. at 24.
115. 548 A.2d 939 (N.J. 1988).
116. See id. at 951-52.
117. See id. at 954; see also Hancock, supra note 29 at 1558-59 (discussing various
studies evidencing the statistical disparities in death sentencing).
118. See Koedatich, 548 A.2d at 1019 (Handler, J., dissenting).
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Not surprisingly, given the latitude for decision-making al-
lowed by the statute, arbitrary results are emerging. 9
Justice Handler referred to the relevant statistics presented in
the Koedatich case as clearly indicative of the arbitrary conse-
quences of unfettered prosecutorial discretion. 20 To avoid the po-
tential arbitrary death penalty prosecution and promote
uniformity, Justice Handler suggested a statewide standard for de-
ciding whether to pursue a capital murder charge.' Without co-
hesive and comprehensible standards, the statute could not be
fairly and impartially imposed. 22
In State v. Marshall,123 the New Jersey Supreme Court again rec-
ognized the potential for abuse or arbitrariness in prosecutorial dis-
cretion with respect to capital cases. The majority in Marshall
reiterated the necessity for formal, statewide guidelines to promote
uniformity among prosecutors and safeguard against arbitrary ap-
plication in the administration of the death penalty. 124 The court
then used as an example the statewide capital guidelines adopted
in 1989 as a result of Koedatich.125
New Jersey contained a noted discrepancy in the death sentenc-
ing rate among counties. 26 Interestingly, this new group of statis-
tics was not compiled by the Public Defender, but by the court's
own Special Master and an additional independent expert hired by
the State. 27 Ironically, the Marshall Court did not accept as con-
clusive the findings of the various reports. 128 In support of its hold-
ing, the court referred to a specific report's conclusion that "'the
notion that prosecutors differ substantially in terms of their per-
sonal propensities to seek the death penalty appears
implausible. "'129
The self-serving Weisberg Report, submitted by the prosecution
in Koedatich, clearly does not assist the prosecution's position in
New York. As discussed earlier, a stated policy difference exists
among the current New York District Attorneys. Various prosecu-
119. Id. at 1018.
120. See id. at 1018-19.
121. See id. at 1019, 1022.
122. See id.
123. State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1103 (N.J. 1992).
124. See id. at 1104.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 1105 (N.J. 1992).
129. Id. at 1106 (quoting the WEISBERG REPORT submitted by the Attorney
General).
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tors have already expressed their willingness or unwillingness to
pursue the death penalty.
As the United States Supreme Court has stated that the mere
risk of arbitrary application must be avoided, guidelines clearly are
needed. Unless and until no disparity exists among the counties,
the mere fact that a crime is committed within a particular county
can dictate whether a defendant is put to death. According to both
federal and state constitutional law, this is impermissible.
Even if the guidelines adopted by New Jersey prosecutors cured
the federal and state constitutional defects in the New Jersey stat-
ute, New York has still failed to adopt any such standards. New
Jersey prosecutors are required to closely adhere to the statutory
requirements and avoid any extraneous influences in their deci-
sion-making process. 13 ° New York, however, has not adopted any
guidelines whatsoever, thus continuing to allow completely unbri-
dled and unchecked prosecutorial discretion in pursuing the death
penalty.
In the dissent in Marshall, Justice Handler stated that the ex-
isting capital scheme fails to meet constitutional standards prohib-
iting cruel and unusual punishment and demanding exacting
procedural protections. 3 1
This case further confirms that capital punishment cannot be
sensibly administered, soundly applied, or rationally managed.
Our capital-murder law not only cannot be integrated into our
system of criminal justice, it serves to weaken and distort it. The
conclusion is irresistible: capital punishment is unconstitutional,
unwise, and untenable. It should be abandoned.' 32
Justice Handler acknowledged that capital punishment is a mat-
ter of particular state interest and does not require a uniform na-,
tional policy.133 Within a state, however, the governing principles
for sentencing are uniformity and evenhandedness. 3 4 Although
some discretion and latitude is tolerated in certain sentencing con-
texts, arbitrary and capricious application of capital punishment is
absolutely unacceptable. 35 The New Jersey Supreme Court has
concluded that the state constitution's cruel and unusual punish-
130. See id. at 1107.
131. See id. at 1120.
132. Id.
133. Id., at 1123 (citing State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J.,
dissenting)).
134. See id. at 1124.
135. See id. at 1125 (citations omitted).
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ment clause affords greater protection to capital defendants than
its federal Eighth Amendment counterpart. 36
The statute with its serious flaws of overbreadth, vagueness, and
the blurring of decision-making, to which may be added un-
checked prosecutorial discretion, is grossly defective if it cannot
provide an ultimate fail-safe that could otherwise rectify individ-
ual injustice and spare the life of a defendant improvidently sen-
tenced to death.13
7
Similarly, New York has traditionally afforded greater protec-
tions of its citizens than the federal constitution. Accordingly, New
York should follow New Jersey's lead and strike down the current
death penalty statute as unconstitutional. Although prosecutors
are vested with the initial authority to determine whether to pursue
death as a punishment, they should not have ultimate unchecked
power.' 38 Thus, additional guidelines and safeguards must exist at
this initial level. As Justice Handler stated,
our current decentralized system of capital prosecution is rife
with potential for prosecutorial abuse of power. Prosecutors ex-
ercise their capital charging authority with almost no supervi-
sion, and the decisions they make are often highly idiosyncratic.
All data collected to date reveal that prosecutors seek the death
penalty for death-eligible defendants with little consistency or
predictability. 139
In his dissent in State v. Jackson, Justice Handler stated that the
case exemplified and documented how prosecutorial discretion in
determining death eligibility was "unprincipled and unguided.' 140
Prosecutorial charging practices are so inconsistent and dispa-
rate that the end results have become irretrievably arbitrary and
capricious. The Court ... should set clear and objective stan-
dards governing the prosecutorial charging responsibility and
prescribe firm procedures, including judicial review, to assure
that the prosecutorial role in determining death eligibility is
soundly, fairly, and consistently exercised .... Prosecutors are
vested with initial authority to decide that a defendant deserves
to die for his or her crime .... [I]n the exercise of that authority
prosecutors are completely unsupervised and their decisions un-
136. See id., at 1126 (citing State v. Gerald, 549 A.2d 792 (N.J. 1988)).
137. Id. at 1128 (citing Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, (Handler, J., dissenting)).
138. See id. at 1131.
139. Id.
140. State v. Jackson, 607 A.2d 974, 975 (N.J. 1992) (Handler, J., dissenting).
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fathomable .... That early general concern over inconsistent
prosecutorial charging practices has been a repeated refrain.141
Justice Handler acknowledged that every County Prosecutor had
adopted statewide guidelines for capital determinations, but be-
lieved that such guidelines still failed to meet federal and state con-
stitutional standards. 142  The "substantive standards of the
guidelines [we]re vague and unfocused.' 1 43 They failed to provide
"effective procedures to assure consistent and sound decision mak-
ing."'144 Ultimately, the guidelines provided totally unsupervised
discretion to prosecutors in determining whether to pursue
death. 145 To remedy the potential for disparate treatment resulting
from such standardless and unguided prosecutorial decision-mak-
ing, the court mandated statewide capital guidelines for
prosecutors.
146
New Jersey has at least attempted to confront the problem of
unfettered prosecutorial discretion in death sentencing. Although
the current guidelines do not adequately confront the lack of gui-
dance or clear direction, they are a positive development. New
York has yet to mandate the necessary standards, nor have the var-
ious District Attorneys voluntarily adopted the appropriate guide-
lines. Accordingly, the New York death penalty statute remains
unconstitutional.
In New Jersey, and more so in New York, the lack of procedures
for structuring a prosecutor's capital charging decisions further un-
derscores the arbitrariness of the present system. 147 Even if the
existing guidelines were completely followed, prosecutors iievita-
bly must make decisions based in part on their own biases.'48
"Thus, arbitrariness in charging and, eventually, in sentencing is in-
escapable even if the guidelines are followed rigorously and consci-
entiously by every single prosecutor in the state."' 49
141. Id. at 975, 977.
142. See id. at 978.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 984 (citing State v. Lagares, 601 A.2d 698 (N.J. 1992)).
147. See id. at 983 (Handler, J., dissenting).
148. See id.
149. Id.
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VII. At a Minimum, the Defendant Is Entitled to a Hearing to
Ensure that the Death Penalty Has Not Been Pursued
in an Arbitrary Fashion
Even if the New York statute, with its total absence of requisite
prosecutorial guidelines, could survive federal and state constitu-
tional challenges, the defendant should be entitled to a hearing to
determine the process employed by the prosecutor in deciding to
pursue this most final and severe punishment. Since the prosecutor
has complete discretion at the first level, the defendant should have
the right to a hearing on whether any measures were taken to en-
sure that the decision to seek the death penalty was not made
arbitrarily.
In State v. McCrary,5 ' the court held that the defendant was en-
titled to hearings to determine the validity of aggravating factors
upon receipt of a death penalty notice.1 5 1 The review established
in McCrary has already nullified one defendant's exposure to capi-
tal sentencing.15 2
The potential for abuse or arbitrariness in the capital decision
process, coupled with the grave and final consequences of such a
decision, requires judicial scrutiny of the prosecutorial charging
process. 153 Accordingly, a court should allow the potential capital
defendant, once he has been served with capital notice, the neces-
sary hearing to challenge the determination. 154
The evidence and justifications for this "life-and-death decision
must be fully exposed.' '1 55
Minimally, the proper discharge of the charging responsibility
requires clear and fair procedures entailing recourse to genu-
inely probative evidence, integrity of the record, full explana-
tions of determinations, internal review, and centralized
coordination and supervision. 56
150. 478 A.2d 339 (N.J. 1984).
151. See id. at 343-44.
152. See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1119 (citing State v. Matuelewicz, 557
A.2d 1001 (N.J. 1989)).
153. See id.
154. See id. (citing State v. McCrary, 478 A.2d 339 (N.J. 1984)).
155. State v. Jackson, 607 A.2d 974, 984 (N.J. 1992) (Handler, J., dissenting) (citing
State v. Smith, 495 A.2d 507 (N.J. 1985) (holding that defendant was "entitled to
discovery on criteria and procedure" of capital selection by prosecutor to support
claim of arbitrary and capricious charging)).
156. Id. at 984 (emphasis added).
19981
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
The "portentous consequences" of the death penalty warrant
greater restrictions on prosecutors than in typical criminal cases. 57
A capital defendant is entitled to a hearing to ascertain if the Dis-
trict Attorney's decision was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. 58 Given the stakes, such a hearing is a
minimal intrusion into the area of prosecutorial discretion. 59
VIII. Conclusion
The Hale court has taken an important step in holding the ex-
isting death penalty guilty plea regulations unconstitutional. New
York State's death penalty statute provides unrestricted
prosecutorial discretion to pursue the death penalty. This standar-
dless and unfettered discretion creates the risk of arbitrary and dis-
criminatory application of capital punishment in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Further, the statute is unconstitutionally vague in that it fails to
provide an adequate definition of serial murder under P.L. section
125.27 (1)(a)(xi). The existing statute must fail as a result of this
unconstitutional vagueness, especially considering the severity and
finality of the punishment. 160
New York should follow the example of New Jersey and estab-
lish procedures and standards to guide the various prosecutors in
their capital decision-making. New York should also follow federal
law, which has extensive internal guidelines that supplement the
federal statute in guiding prosecutors' decisions to pursue the
death penalty.
In the alternative, a preliminary hearing is necessary to ascertain
whether the decision to pursue the death penalty adhered to the
proper standards, if any standards exist. Such a hearing is impera-
tive to determine whether the death penalty has been pursued in
an arbitrary fashion.
157. See id. (citing McCrary).
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES: LEGAL
AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE LSC
RESTRICTIONS
Foreword
Steven Epstein*
Eric B. Fields**
Jack E. Pace III***
Staci Rosche****
In 1974, Congress created the Legal Services Corporation
("LSC") to provide low income people with legal representation in
civil matters. Over the past twenty-three years, LSC-funded orga-
nizations successfully represented victims of fraudulent loan
schemes, waged court battles over the delivery of medical services
to the elderly and the poor, and championed the rights of children.'
Despite its many successes, the LSC fell victim to the conserva-
tive revolution of the 104th Congress and its attempt to "defund
the left."2 The conservative restrictions on the LSC were the cul-
mination of hostilities that had been building since the early 1980s.
During the first term of the Reagan Administration, a proposal was
made to replace the LSC with increased pro bono efforts from the
private Bar. Although this early initiative failed, LSC funding was
cut by approximately 25%. The erosion of funding was especially
significant in light of other reductions in social welfare programs.
In fact, a 1983 survey conducted by the Washington Council of
Lawyers found that as a result of reduced funding: (1) local legal
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1998; B.S., Cornell Uni-
versity, 1994. Thanks to mom and dad for their guidance, support, and unconditional
love.
** J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1998; B.A., Binghamton
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worthwhile but enjoyable.
*** J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1998; B.A., Fordham Uni-
versity, Fordham College, 1995. Thanks to my family (MaryAnne, Jack, David, Greg-
ory, and Robert) for their inspiration and support. '
**** J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1998; B.A., University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1991. Thanks to my mom for her unflagging support.
1. See David Barringer, Downsized Justice, 82 A.B.A.J. 60, 64 (1996).
2. 142 CONG. REc. H8149-04, H8185 (remarks by Hon. Robert Dornan, R-Ca).
3. See JOHN A. DOOLEY & ALAN HOUSEMAN, LEGAL SERVICES HISTORY 25
(1984).
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services programs lost up to 30% of their staff attorneys; (2) 85%
of the local programs closed at least one office; and (3) 87% of the
local programs were forced to decline the representation of up to
4000 potential clients.4
Congress adopted further funding cuts in 1995, reducing the total
LSC budget 30%, from $400 million in fiscal year 1995 to $278 mil-
lion in fiscal year 1996. Moreover, just as the 1981 budget cuts had
done before, the recent cuts had an immediate negative impact on
local programs. In Maryland, for example, the Legal Aid Bureau
lost $1.4 million in funding, and subsequently had to reduce its staff
from 143 lawyers and 80 legal assistants to 92 lawyers and 57 legal
assistants.' Neighborhood Legal Services in Washington, D.C., laid
off nearly half its staff, closed three offices, and eventually may
eliminate up to 50% of its services.6 Some legal aid providers have
had to shut down altogether.7
In the wake of devastating funding cuts, Congress further hob-
bled the LSC by implementing extensive restrictions on the kinds
of services local organizations could provide with either the federal
funds or private donations.8 At a time when recent welfare reform
legislation 9 makes it particularly important for poverty lawyers to
be active, the restrictions proscribe a wide variety of legal tools
previously available to these lawyers, including welfare reform lob-
bying'0 and participating in class actions." The restrictions also
prohibit legal representation of immigrants,' 2 prisoners,' 3 and pub-
lic housing residents who face drug charges.' 4 As a result of these
constraints, serious questions have arisen over whether lawyers si-
4. See WASH. COUNSEL OF LAWYERS, REPORT ON THE STATUS OF LEGAL SERV-
ICES FOR THE POOR (1983).
5. See 142 CONG. REC. E1380-03.
6. See Barringer, supra note 1, at 61.
7. See id.
8. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, § 504, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53 (1996) [hereinafter Act of 19961. Con-
gress re-enacted the restrictions in substantially unchanged form in the Omnibus Con-
solidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 502, 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-59 (1996), and the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 502, 111
Stat. 2440, 2510 (1997); see also 62 Fed. Reg. 27,695 (1997) (codifying recent regula-
tions promulgated by LSC).
9. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
10. See Act of 1996, § 504(16).
11. See id. at § 504(7).
12. See id. at § 504(11).
13. See id. at § 504(15).
14. See id. at § 504(17).
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multaneously can honor these restrictions and provide the zealous
advocacy required of all attorneys. Under the restrictions, what
strategies can legal services can legal services lawyers use to effec-
tively advocate for the poor? Is it constitutional for the federal
government to silence the voices of the poor and disenfranchised?
What ethical obligations do lawyers have to their clients in spite of
the restrictions?
The Future of Legal Services: Legal and Ethical Implications of
the LSC Restrictions seeks to address these issues of lawyering
under the restrictions. We organized the conference as part of
Fordham's Advanced Seminar in Ethics and Public Interest Law.
We comprised a student working group in the class who worked to
organize the conference with the Legal Aid Society and the Stein
Center for Ethics and Public Interest Law. The conference, held
on May 30, 1997, brought together practitioners, academics, and
law students to discuss the delivery of legal services under the fed-
eral restrictions. In the remarks that follow, participants address
the issues germane to lawyering under the restrictions and provide
their own insights into the future of legal services for the poor.
The works that follow are organized in the format used at the
conference. This includes addresses by Alan W.. Houseman and
Alexander D. Forger, and four panels,"5 presented in the following
order: (1) Legislative Issues: Alexander D. Forger, Alan W. House-
man, Dwight Loines, and Dennis J. Saffran; (2) Implementation
Issues: Lucy Billings, Valerie J. Bogart, and Jill Ann Boskey; (3)
Constitutional Issues: Eric M. Freedman and Steven R. Shapiro;
and (4) Ethical Issues: Helaine Barnett, Stephen Ellmann, Stephen
Gillers, and Emily J. Sack.
We are indebted to all the participants for giving generously of
their time and expertise. We also graciously thank Professors Mat-
thew Diller and Russell Pearce of Fordham University School of
Law, as well as Scott Rosenberg and April Newbauer of the Legal
Aid Society, for their invaluable support and guidance on this
project.
15. At the speakers' request, the following remarks do not include those by Shir-
ley Traylor and John 0. Mc Ginnis.
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OPENING REMARKS*
JOHN D. FEERICK:
On behalf of Fordham Law School and the Fordham University
community, I am obviously very pleased to welcome you to this
very timely and important conference on "The Future of Legal
Services: Legal and Ethical Implications of the LSC Restrictions."
I would like to certainly congratulate and commend The Legal
Aid Society, and obviously the students and faculty of our School,
for bringing together such an outstanding group of panelists and
moderators to focus on achieving justice for the poor and those of
limited means.
I wish to acknowledge the presence of Alexander Forger, who
just a few weeks ago received in this very room our Law School's
Louis J. Lefkowitz Award for his extraordinary public service. I
noted on the occasion that Alex is a sterling example of the differ-
ence one person can make in the life of a community. It's always a
great honor for our School when Alex can be here.
I also want to particularly salute Professors Matt Diller and Rus-
sell Pearce of our faculty - and obviously, there are others as well
who are very much involved in the subject of legal services, but, in
particular, those two professors - for making the kinds of subjects
that you deal with today a central part of their work in the aca-
demic community.
In a UCLA article a few months ago dealing with the subject of
"Disability in a Social Welfare System," Professor Diller reminded
us that the tensions and dynamics we deal with in this area "can
only be resolved by breaking through the belief that the poor rep-
resent a hostile threat to society so that the public views assistance
to the poor as an acknowledgment of human dignity rather than a
threat to the social fabric."1
Samuel Johnson, the great eighteenth century writer and lexicog-
rapher, once noted that "decent provision for the poor is a true test
of a civilization."' 2 This ideal has been one of the cornerstones of
our nation and, in large measure, has defined the best of American
civilization, particularly in the last half of the twentieth century.
* EDITOR'S NOTE: This transcript has undergone minimal editing to remove the
cadences of speech that appear awkward in writing.
1. Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social
Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361, 465 (1996).
2. JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 423 (Edmond Malone ed. 1927).
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Like any virtue, however, its daily existence depends on the con-
stant nurturing and cultivation of men and women of conscience
and commitment. Like other creations of the human spirit, a de-
cent provision for the poor is continuously threatened by forces of
cynicism and indifference. All too often, it becomes an unwilling
victim of the political process.At the present time, in fact, as you well know, there exists in this
country a formidable challenge to the concept that all Americans,
regardless of economic status, are equal under the law. We have
seen, alarmingly, the progressive dismantling of a system of legal
services, which in many cases is the only voice for a large number
of our fellow citizens.
We also have been reminded by recent events that promising
equality and justice while denying the means of achieving those
ends is a guarantee which rings hollow and requires us to examine
our commitment to our stated ideals as a free people. This confer-
ence, therefore, becomes an important part of this examination. In
a very real sense it is a ringing statement by all of you that justice
should not be a privilege of wealth, but a right guaranteed and de-
livered to all.
Our School is truly honored by your presence and inspired by
your commitment to the underprivileged through your work with
and support of legal services for the poor. I salute you and wish
you a very successful conference.
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ADDRESS: INTERPRETATION OF LSC
RESTRICTIONS
MATTHEW DILLER:
Before I introduce our keynote speaker, Alan Houseman, I want
to say one or two more words about how this conference came to
be and the sponsors of the conference.
The conference is sponsored by the Stein Center on Ethics and
Public Interest Law here at Fordham, founded in 1992 through the
generosity of Louis Stein, Class of 1926, and also jointly sponsored
by The Legal Aid Society, which is the oldest provider of civil legal
services to the poor in the country, and also one of the largest, if
not the largest, to this day.
This conference grew out of a course taught by Professor Pearce
and myself, a seminar of ethics and public interest law, in which the
students worked in groups with different public interest organiza-
tions around the City on particular topics and projects. One group
focused on the recent enactment of restrictions on organizations
that receive funding through the Legal Services Corporation. That
student group took the lead in organizing this conference, both
from the conceptual start of what issues should be discussed, down
to the smallest details of will there be water on the table for the
panelists. I want to acknowledge their fabulous contribution in
making this event happen. They are Steve Epstein, Eric Fields,
Staci Rosche, and Jack Pace. There are three of them there. Eric
is probably outside - he's up in the booth. Staci and Steve you
will hear from in actually just a few minutes, as they moderate two
panels on today's program.
I also want to thank Helaine Barnett for really helping this col-
laboration between Fordham Law School and The Legal Aid Soci-
ety take off. This is our second year in working with The Legal Aid
Society on this course. Last year, the students organized a very
successful conference on representing tenant groups. We are thril-
led with this collaboration and hope that it deepens and develops.
This year the students also worked with New York Lawyers for
the Public Interest, with the City Bar Association, with Brooklyn
Legal Services - I'm probably leaving out someone - with the
Welfare Law Center. We look forward to working with other
groups around the City as well.
Finally, before I move on, I just want to note that next Novem-
ber 5th and 6th we will be having another conference here at Ford-
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ham Law School.1 I forget the exact working title, but it will be
more generally on the future of poverty law as we move into the
years ahead. You'll be hearing more about that as it develops.
I want to introduce our keynote speaker, Alan Houseman. Alan
Houseman is the Director of CLASP, the Center for Law and So-
cial Policy, which is one of the principal public policy and legal or-
ganizations that focuses on the problems of low-income families
with children and securing access to justice for low-income Ameri-
cans. Mr. Houseman is Counsel to the National Legal Aid and De-
fender Association and the Project Advisory Group. He is a
nationally known expert on legal services to the poor. He has
worked on anti-poverty policies for over thirty years, written nu-
merous articles and publications on legal services and poverty law,
and served as counsel to the legal services community. Between
1976 and 1981, he was a member of the senior staff of the Legal
Services Corporation, where he directed the Research Institute.
Prior to that, Mr. Houseman was founder and Director of Michi-
gan Legal Services. Between 1973 and 1976, Mr. Houseman was
one of two principal representatives of legal services who lobbied
for the creation of the Legal Services Corporation. Currently he
continues active involvement in the congressional actions on the
Legal Services Corporation and provides guidance and assistance
to the legal services programs that are funded through LSC. He
also focuses on the long-term future of the legal services program
and innovative anti-poverty policies for the future. I give you Mr.
Houseman.
ALAN W. HOUSEMAN:
Thank you.
It is a great pleasure to be here at Fordham and to hear your
terrific Dean, who has helped make Fordham one of the premiere
public interest law schools in the country. As most of you know,
every year at the National Association of Public Interest Law An-
nual Conference in Washington, D.C., it is reported that Fordham
Law School consistently raises more funds for student public inter-
est work. You should be proud!
I also want to thank the students for putting on this conference,
for it offers an opportunity to focus on some very difficult ques-
tions that we face in legal services. Finally, it is always a privilege
1. Symposium, Lawyering for Poor Communities in the Twenty-First Century, 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming, May 1997). The symposium was held at Fordham
University School of Law on November 6 and 7, 1997.
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to be present with Alex Forger, Helaine Barnett, and others in the
audience.
My job today is to set a framework for the discussions on the
four panels. I will begin by discussing what has happened in the
104th Congress, describe what can and cannot be done under the
restrictions imposed by that Congress, and then frame the context
for the later discussions. In doing so I will be using some
overheads.
When we think about what has happened in the 104th Congress
to legal services, one has to first understand what it was before,
what it looks like afterwards, and take into account three sets of
decisions that Congress made: funding decisions, structural deci-
sions, and restrictions.
If you look at the chart, you will see what the program looked
like in 1995, and what it then began to look like in 1996. Obvi-
ously, there were severe funding reductions. Beginning in 1995,
the original budget was $415 million. There was a recision of $15
million. In 1996, the funding was cut back to $278 million and in-
creased to $283 million in 1997.
Note also that the amount of non-LSC funds that were distrib-
uted to LSC funded programs went down from approximately $254
million to $209 million. It should be noted that the total amount of
non-LSC funding did not go down; however, the amount that was
received by LSC funded programs went down. The total amount
of non-LSC funding in fact went up.
One of the consequences of the funding reduction and the impo-
sition of restrictions is the development of a dual delivery system in
parts of the country. We now have twelve states where there are
two sets of full-service providers, one funded by LSC and one
funded by non-LSC sources - something akin to the funding of
the Legal Aid Society and Legal Services for New York City. In
addition, twenty-six other cities have developed a dual delivery sys-
tem. By "dual," I mean a full-service provider delivery system, not
just an entity that does one or two kinds of cases or activities.
The decisions of the 104th Congress also eliminated the entire
infrastructure of legal services. Prior to 1996, the infrastructure
consisted of national and state support centers, the National
Clearinghouse (which publishes the Clearinghouse Review) re-
gional training centers, and a few other entities. Congress stopped
funding these entities and, collectively, they lost about $25 million.
Many of these programs are still in existence. However, there
are no longer any regional training centers; state support units have
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Chart A
Funding Decisions, Structural Decisions, and Restrictions
1995 1996 & 1997
FUNDING LSC: $415 million LSC: $278 million in '96
$400 million $283 million in '97
(after recision)
Non-LSC: $254 million Non-LSC: $209 million in '96
($209 million estimate in '97)
TOTAL: $654 million
TOTAL: $487 million in '96
TOTAL: $492 million in '97
STRUCTURE 292 Basic Field Programs 281 Basic Field Programs
32 Native American Grants 32 Native American Grants
50 Migrant Grants 50 Migrant Grants
8 Supplemental Field Programs 0 Supplemntal Fiecl Prcgrams
16 National Support Centers 0 Ntietacl Support . ntrz.
1 National Clearinghouse 0 National Clearingho.us
50 State Support Units 0 Stat Supp crt Uait
5 Regional Training Centers 0 Rcgicnal Trainig C...Lr
6 CALR' Units 0 CALR Units
STAFFING 9561 FTE2  8324 FTE
(-12.9%)
OFFICES 1064 929
(-12.7%)
CASES 2,161,936 1,846,447
(Open & (-14.6%)
Closed)
CALR is an acronym for Computer-Assisted Legal Research.
2FTE is an acronym for Full Time Employees.
been cut by about half; at least two national support centers are no
longer in existence, and several are just barely surviving.
These funding reductions had an impact, obviously, on the kind
of services that can be delivered. If you look at numbers, you will
see that the number of staff in the program has gone down approxi-
mately 12.9 %. The number of full-time offices has also been re-
duced. The cases opened and closed have gone down as well.
Now let's turn to the restrictions of what legal services can do.
First note that there were restrictions on LSC funds and on private
funds prior to the 104th Congress. However, there were no restric-
tions on non-LSC public funds and some restrictions on non-LSC
ADDRESS
private funds. As a consequence, even though there were restric-
tions on what you could do with LSC dollars, most programs in the
country - not all, but many at least - had non-LSC dollars. Re-
cipients could undertake a full range of advocacy with non-LSC
dollars. That is no longer the case if you're an LSC-funded pro-
gram. An LSC-funded program now can only do certain activities
with its funds.
The Congress added a number of restrictions on what a recipient
of LSC funds can do. However, to understand what has and what
hasn't happened, it's important and necessary to look at what can
still be done in legal services programs funded by LSC.
As the list indicates, much of the work that has gone on nation-
ally in legal services can still go on, and most of the cases that were
done in 1995 can be done in 1997. So in one sense, the restrictions
have not substantially altered the basic work that most legal serv-
ices programs around the country can continue to do.
e For example, economic development work and group repre-
sentation can continue. There are no limits on group representa-
tion with non-LSC funds. The old limits that were in effect in 1995
are in existence still; they haven't been changed by the restrictions
of the 104th Congress.
* You can still represent clients before administrative agencies in
administrative proceedings that adjudicate clients' rights.
* You can still sue government entities. It is true that you can't
initiate a class action any longer. The regulations define a class
action as an action brought under Rule 23 or equivalent state rule.2
In a number of states, there are procedures that have class impact
but that are not Rule 23 class actions. Those are still permitted
activities. Thus, LSC funded programs can still sue governmental
entities to obtain injunctive of declaratory relief.
* LSC funded advocates can work to change agency practices
and can participate in systematic efforts to enforce laws.
* LSC funded advocates can undertake community legal educa-
tion programs. The solicitation restriction,3 as interpreted by LSC,
does not prevent outreach and community education activities that
many legal services programs have historically done. Moreover,
the LSC regulation permits LSC providers to continue to act as
ombudsmen at either the state or local level under both govern-
mental and private ombudsman's programs.
2. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
3. See 45 C.F.R. § 1638 (1998).
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Chart B
Activities Still Allowed by LSC Funded Programs
Over 95% of the work done in legal services in 1995 can continue in 1997 and over
98% of the cases brought to court in 1995 could be brought in 1997.
" all evictions and federal housing cases;
" bankruptcy, collections and repossessions, consumer debt, fraud, warranty
and utility cases;
" family law matters such as child support, domestic violence, custody,
visitation, divorce/separation and paternity establishment;
• foster care, termination of parental rights and child welfare matters;
* elderly and disability advocacy;
" migrant and Native American matters;
* employment discrimination, wage claims and unemployment insurance;
" income maintenance cases including Medicaid, food stamps, AFDC, SSI,
SSA and Veterans Benefits;
* education;
" health including Medicare;
" juvenile matters;
" individual rights including mental healthy; and,
• most aliens including those battered or subjected to extreme cruelty.
Economic development work and group representation can continue.
Clients can be represented before administrative agencies in administrative processes
that adjudicate the client's rights.
LSC-funded recipients can still sue governmental entities.
Recipients can also work to change agency practices.
Recipients can participate in efforts to enforce laws.
Recipients can undertake community legal education (CLE) programs.
Recipients can use non-LSC funds to seek funds from State or local legislative and
administrative bodies.
Recipients can use non-LSC funds to prepare oral or written comments in a public
rulemaking proceeding.
Recipients can use non-LSC funds to respond to a written request for information or
testimony from a government agency, legislative body or elected official.
* Advocates can continue to do legislative advocacy. LSC recipi-
ents can use non-LSC funds to seek funds from state or local legis-
latures and administrative bodies.
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* Advocates can continue to participate in rule-making. LSC re-
cipients can use non-LSC funds to prepare written or oral com-
ments in a public rule-making proceeding, which is any rule-
making proceeding - state, local, or federal.
* Finally, LSC recipients can use non-LSC funds to respond to
written requests for information or testimony from government
agencies, legislative bodies, or elected officials. A considerable
amount of legislative advocacy that has gone on in the past using
non-LSC funds is still permissible.
In light of what can be done, lets look at what can't be done.
First, the program announcement contains an error. There is no
prohibition on filing fee-generating cases. Earlier versions of the
legislation had such a prohibition, but the final legislation did not.
The compromise between the House and the Senate on this issue
provides that recipients cannot claim, collect, or retain attorneys'
fees in cases initiated after April 25, 1996.4 LSC programs can
bring the case but cannot seek fees in those cases by the recipient.
LSC programs can continue to claim, collect, and retain attorneys'
fees in cases pending or initiated by April 26th, including welfare
reform cases and class actions.5 Thus, if an LSC recipient had a
welfare reform case or a class action and it was pending on April
26th, the program could continue to collect the fees until the time
until the program withdrew from that case.
This restriction does not apply to cases in which a recipient is
appointed by a court, or payment is made pursuant to a govern-
ment grant or contract, fees from court sanctions, and to reimburse
costs and expenses. Moreover, it's quite clear that recipients may
co-counsel with non-LSC funded attorneys or pro bono attorneys,
and-those non-LSC attorneys can seek attorneys' fees in the co-
counseled cases.
Even so, this restriction on attorneys' fees has two consequences
for programs: it limits the amount of funding for programs; and it
takes away a leverage point that lawyers can use when negotiating
with the other side.
One of the most onerous of the restrictions is the welfare reform
prohibition.6 The basic rule is that recipients can't challenge state
or federal welfare reform laws.7 LSC has been interpreted to pro-
hibit recurrent challenges to the provisions of the Personal Re-
4. See 45 C.F.R. § 1642.3 to .4.
5. See 45 C.F.R. § 1642.5.
6. See 45 C.F.R. § 1639 to 1639.3.
7. See 45 C.F.R. § 1639(a).
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sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act,8 except for
the child support provisions. LSC recipients cannot challenge state
laws or regulations adopted pursuant to notice-and-comment rule-
making (to implement the Personal Responsibility Act) and they
can't challenge state general assistance program laws or formally
adopted regulations.9
However, there are two exceptions that are very important:
9 First, recipients can use non-LSC funds to comment in a public
rule-making proceeding and can use non-LSC funds to respond to
requests from legislators, elected officials, or administrative agency
officials about welfare reform laws, regulations, or policies. 10 In a
number of areas across the country, legal services programs have
been able to be involved in the state implementation of the Per-
sonal Responsibility Act.
e In addition, recipients can represent an individual client who is
seeking relief from a welfare agency because of the threatened ad-
verse action based on the welfare reform law, regulation, or pol-
icy.1" In such representation, an LSC-funded program can raise
most of the legal issues that normally would be raised and they can
challenge agency policies and practices as violative of the law or
the Constitution. What they can't do is challenge a statutory law or
regulations that have been adopted pursuant to notice-and-com-
ment rule-making.
This interpretation of the welfare reform prohibition presents
one of the most difficult ethical issues that you're going to discuss
later. There will be cases where the only way a lawyer can effec-
tively vindicate an individual client's right is to challenge a regula-
tion or policy as violative of a higher law or the Constitution.
How, then, in that context do you provide effective representa-
tion? Does it mean that you have to decline all representation in
these cases? Can you narrow the scope of your representation and
stay within ethical precepts?
Another critical restriction prohibits recipients from participat-
ing in civil litigation on behalf of persons incarcerated in a federal,
state, or local prison. 12 That has been interpreted to prohibit pro-
grams from engaging in civil litigation in court on behalf of a pris-
8. Pub. L. 104-193, Aug. 22, 1996, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 601).
9. See 45 C.F.R. § 1639.2-.3.
10. See 45 C.F.R. § 1639.5.
11. See 45 C.F.R. § 1639.4.
12. See 45 C.F.R. § 1637.1.
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oner who is actually in a prison or jail, and to prohibit participating
in administrative proceedings challenging conditions of
incarceration.
However, programs can represent prisoners in administrative
proceedings that don't involve conditions of incarceration. Pro-
grams can also provide advice and non-litigation-type services to
prisoners. Furthermore, if a client is arrested after civil representa-
tion has commenced and is incarcerated for brief periods of time,
i.e. three or four months, programs do not have to stop representa-
tion in that case. Programs can continue such representation if the
incarceration doesn't interfere with the representation. However, if
the incarceration is going to be longer than three to four months,
then programs would have to take steps to withdraw from the case.
Two other restrictions have a bearing on the subsequent ethical
discussions. First is the new provision that requires programs to
identify potential clients by name to the defendant if the program
is going to file litigation or engage in pre-complaint settlement ne-
gotiations where litigation is anticipated. 13 In addition, programs
are required to obtain a written statement of facts from any plain-
tiff/client if they are going to litigate on behalf of that client or
enter pre-complaint settlement negotiations with the anticipation
of litigation.'4
These provisions initially caused considerable worry, but LSC
has interpreted the provision to minimize the harm.
" First, the request doesn't apply in emergency situations.
" Second, programs need only identify the plaintiff by name to
the defendant; programs don't need to identify the plaintiff to any-
body beyond the defendant.
* Third, the written statement of facts need only include the in-
formation included in the complaint, at least in most circumstances.
* Finally, adverse parties cannot obtain access to the information
included in the statement of facts. The LSC regulation makes it
quite clear that the statutory provision does not create a new right
of access. Any right of access is governed solely by the law and
discovery rules of the court in which the action is brought.
The second restriction that raises ethical concerns is the statutory
provision on access to records.1 5 The legislation gives LSC
monitors and auditors access to financial records, time records, re-
tainer agreements, client trust fund and eligibility records, and cli-
13. See 45 C.F.R. § 1636.2.
14. See 45 C.F.R. § 1636.2.
15. See 45 C.F.R. § 1619.2.
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Chart C
Activities Not Allowed by LSC Funded Programs
1995
RESTRICTIONS
1996 & 1997
i4
LSC FUNDS
Ahor-tio4q
f-edistr-etflg
undzzumented and ether
Elliefis
adveeae- trainmg
self help lobbying
class action
can recover attorneys' fees
rulemaking
legislative contact on behalf
of client
welfare reform advocacy
prisoner representation
all public housing cases
could solicit if not for
pecuniary gain
treated like other lawyers
NON-LSC FUNDS ($240M)
all aliens
all lobbying
rulemaking
class actions
attorneys' fees
welfare reform advocacy
prisoner representation
all public housing cases
solicitation if no pecuniary
gain
treated like all lawyers
PRIVATE FUNDS
abortion
redistrietifg
PUBLIC & IOLTA FUNDS
($172M)
abortion
redistricting
advocacy training
ALL FUNDS OF A
RECIPIENT
tbertief
redistr-eting
rzpresentati. in
administative rfling
wefare referm
Sepeseal el
uCdoumented aliens
drug related publi hising
eoeties
Statement of Facts before
negotiation or filing suit
NON-LSC FUNDS
State/Local self-help
lobbying
Comment in Public
Rulemaking
Response to requests of
legislative and administrative
bodies.I
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ent names if they appear in those records, unless the information in
those records is protected by the attorney-client privilege. As a
consequence, the ethical rules on client confidentiality, which are
considerably broader than the attorney-client privilege in most
states, would not prevent LSC monitors and auditors from ob-
taining access to this information.
The practical problem for programs is whether they can develop
financial records, time records, client trust fund and eligibility
records, and even retainer agreements, to minimize any confiden-
tial information that's included within such records. In many cases,
legal services programs have been able to design their financial
records so that neither client names nor confidential information is
included within those records.
Moreover, monitoring is no longer done by LSC staff; it is done
by local program auditors who are hired by the local program and
are in privity with the local program. In most states, auditor access
doesn't create an ethical conflict. Very rarely does LSC ask for
information that would be subject to the confidentiality rules.
Next, I would like to set the framework for two more discussions
that we're going to have today by looking at several more dia-
grams. First is a diagram about Part 1610 of the LSC Regulations,
45 C.F.R. 1610.16 This Regulation was adopted by the Corporation
in an effort to win the litigation that has been brought in Hawaii by
five legal services programs. The Federal District Court held that
the restrictions created an unconstitutional condition because LSC-
funded recipients couldn't exercise their First Amendment rights
through an affiliated organization or some other independent en-
tity under the provisions of the LSC policy on interrelated organi-
zations and the interim regulation Part 1610.17
In response, the LSC Board adopted new regulations that would
permit a recipient to set up an affiliated legal services program and
carry out restricted activities through that affiliate, so long as the
funds that went to that affiliate from the recipient were non-LSC
funds.
16. See 45 C.F.R. § 1610 (implementing statutory restrictions on the use of non-
LSC funds by LSC recipients).
17. See Legal Aid Society of Hawaii v. Legal Services Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1402 (D.
Haw. 1997).
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Chart D
IMPAC" OF 45 CFR 1610
(MAY 21, 1997)
[ LSC ] Non-LSC Funders
Recipient Affiliated Legal Services Program
All Fnds estrctedMay Have Some or Overlapping Boards.
May do Restricted Work but only if:
(1) Separate Legal Entity;
(2) No LSC Funds; and
Separate Entity That (3) Physically and Financially Separate,
Delivers Legal Determined by Relevant Factors such as:
Services: Cannot do (a) Existence of Separate Personnel;
Restricted Work (b) Existence of Separate Accounting
Unless it is a PAl and Timekeeping Records;(c) Degree of Separation from FacilitiesProgram. in Which Restricted Activities
Occur; and
(d) Presence of Signs and Other
Totally Separate Legal Services Identification which Distinguish
Program: Can do Restricted the Recipient from the Affiliated
Work Organization.
The double lines in the chart are non-LSC funds. The single
lines are LSC funds. A recipient of LSC funds could set up an
affiliated legal services program. That program could have the
same board as the recipient or overlapping boards. The affiliated
entity could do restricted work if it were a separate legal entity, no
LSC funds were transferred, and it was physically and financially
separate from the LSC entity.
There are four factors that are used to determine whether the
entity is physically or financially separate: the existence of sepa-
rate personnel, separate accounting and time-keeping, the degree
of separation of the physical facilities, and the presence of signs or
other identifications which distinguish the recipient from the affili-
ated organization.
Thus, if a recipient sets up an affiliated organization that had the
same board but was a separate legal entity, did not receive LSC
funds, and met these factors, the affiliated entity could carry out
with non-LSC funds all of the restricted activities that are other-
wise prohibited for a recipient. This design is based on the Rust v.
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Sullivan 8 criteria, which the legal panel will discuss later. Unfortu-
nately, we don't know how these various factors will be interpreted
by LSC, and programs will have to proceed cautiously.
Under the new regulation, a recipient could transfer non-LSC
funds to a totally separate program that has no affiliation with the
recipient and that program could do restricted work. Before the
March 1997 interim regulation, non-LSC funds that were trans-
ferred could only be used as restricted.
Finally, note that this litigation 19 is really about what kind of an
affiliated organization a recipient can set up. The litigation will not
likely result in a decision which invalidates the restrictions.
The Implementation Panel will be talking about the difficulties
of implementing these restrictions and the problems that lawyers
faced in order to comply.
Since the restrictions went into effect, in April 1996, LSC has
implemented fifteen new Regulations. TWo Regulations that were
affected by the restrictions were implemented prior to that, the
time-keeping2° and the competitive bidding Regulations. 21 That's a
huge number of Regulations. The only comparable time in LSC's
history was at the very beginning of LSC, in 1975, when LSC issued
eight Regulations in a period of a year and a half. During 1996,
LSC issued fifteen Regulations over a period of four months. In
addition, every program has had to develop written program poli-
cies that were to be distributed to staff to implement these new
Regulations.
Finally, there was a transition period in the legislation requiring
the withdrawal of recipient staff from class actions, litigation cases
involving prisoners, and cases involving aliens who were no longer
permitted to be represented. At the time that the restrictions went
into effect, there were 630 class actions pending. Most of them
were not filed in 1995 or 1996, but before. In addition, there were
428 cases involving prisoners and 2993 cases involving aliens who
were in the new prohibited categories. As of now, according to
program certifications, none of these cases are being handled by
LSC programs. In a few class actions, any activity that is now going
on fits within the "safe harbor" provision of the class action restric-
tion, which permits non-adversarial activities. That transition pe-
riod, as horrible as it was, is essentially over.
18. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
19. See Legal Aid Society Of Hawaii, 961 F. Supp. at 1402.
20. See 45 C.F.R. § 1635.
21. See 45 C.F.R. § 1634.
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I'd like to make another note about the conference program
which indicates that you can't represent aliens or immigrants.
That's actually not the case at all. As you see from the chart, there
are a number of categories of alien cases that can be represented.
In fact, of the immigrants that are currently in the country, includ-
ing undocumented immigrants, between two-thirds and three-
fourth of them can still be represented under the restrictions im-
posed by Congress. The point is not that the regulation is accepta-
ble. It is not. The point is that much of the representation of
immigrants can go on. As you know, that's fairly important in New
York City. The Legal Aid Society, of course, started as a program
to serve German immigrants, and immigration work in New York
has been a significant part of the case load.
Finally, let me set a context for the Legislative Panel, by review-
ing some by votes in 104th and 105th Congresses.
Chart E
CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR LSC
104TH AND 105TH CONGRESS
Conservative:
House Leadership
Eliminate LSC and Federal
Funding
Senate Leadership
Moderates:
Representatives:
Fox
McCollum
Stenholm
Mollohan Favored Restricted LSC
Senators: And Limited Federal Funds
Domenici
Jeffords
Hollings
Liberals:
Senators:
Kennedy
Wellstone
Specter Favor Generally
Representatives: Unrestricted LSC and
Berman Increased Federal Funding
Frank
First, the conservatives and the leadership in both the House and
the Senate, except for Senator Domenici, favor the elimination of
LSC and federal funding. This was the case in the 104th Congress,
and continues to be so in the 105th Congress.
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The liberals - and I have mentioned only a few of the leaders in
the liberal camp - favor generally an unrestricted LSC and in-
creased federal funding. But, they are a weak minority.
The balance of power is in the hands of what I have labeled as
"moderate" leadership. The key players in the House are Repre-
sentatives Fox, Ramstad, McCollum, Stenholm, and Mollohan; and
in the Senate, Senator Domenici, Jeffords, and Hollings. All are
moderates, not liberals.
The key players remain Representatives McCollum and Sten-
holm in the House, who favor a restricted Legal Services Corpora-
tion and limited federal funds. There are a few more Democrats in
the House, than there were in the 104th Congress, but there are
four fewer Democrats in the Senate. So the balance of power is
roughly the same.
Now let's look at four key votes - two on legal services, two on
non-legal services issues - to get a realistic perspective about the
Congress.
Chart F
KEY LSC
FY 1996 ANT
Domenici Amendment to FY 1996
Appropriations
Democrats For:
Republicans For:
Fox Amendment for FY 1997
Appropriations:
Democrats For:
Republicans For:
VOTES
) FY 1997
60-39
All but Byrd (Glenn did not vote)
Bond
Chafee
Cohen
D'Amato
Domenici
Gorton
Hatfield
Jeffords
Lugar
Packwood
Santorum
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thompson
200 out of 202
56 out of 233
First is the vote on the Domenici Amendment to the FY 96 ap-
propriations in the Senate. This was in September of 1995. That
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vote was won 60-39. All the Democrats, but Senator Byrd, voted
for the Domenici Amendment.
Fifteen Republicans voted for the Domenici Amendment. I
want to note a couple of developments. Senator Cohen is now Sec-
retary of Defense; he was replaced by a moderate Republican from
Maine who, presumably, would vote the same way he did. Senator
Hatfield is no longer in the Senate; he was replaced by a conserva-
tive Republican from Oregon who probably would vote against
legal services. Senator Packwood is also gone, but he was replaced
by a liberal Democrat, Ron Wyden, who clearly would vote the
same way, since Ron was an ex-legal services lawyer.
In terms of the Democrats who voted for it, there were four sig-
nificant losses that were replaced by four more conservative
Republicans. As a result, if we had the Domenici Amendment
vote today, we would probably win 55-45.
Last year, in the summer of 1996, there was a vote on the Fox
Amendment on the FY 97 appropriations. Just to give you a sense
of how that went: we got most of the Democrats; we got 56 out of
233 Republicans. Of those 56, 45 have returned; the other 11 lost
to democratic seats, and, virtually all of those new Democrats will
vote with the Democrats. If the same vote were held today, we
should be able to win that amendment.
Finally, it might be helpful to look at two other votes to give you
some sense of the relative strengths of liberals in this Congress.
First is the Welfare Reform Act, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.22 This was in July
1996. The House vote was 256-170, the Senate vote 74-26, on the
respective House and Senate bills. In the house 30 Democrats
voted with the Republicans. In the Senate, 25 Democrats voted
with the Republicans. Thus, judged by the welfare reform vote,
which clearly was a very political vote, the liberals are not in a very
strong position.
If you look at the Balanced Budget Amendment that occurred
last week, there are similar margins. The key here is to look at the
Democrats who voted for the Balanced Budget Amendment both
in the House and the Senate to understand the weakness of the
liberal strength in the Congress.
I have tried to set a framework for the next set of panels which
will dig into these issues in more depth and present different per-
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1997).
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Chart G
OTHER KEY VOTES
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY ACT
(July 1996)
House: 256-170
Republicans Against: 4
Democrats For: 30
Senate 74-26
Republicans Against: 1
Democrats Against: 25
BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT (MAY 1997)
House: 333-99
Republicans Against: 0
Democrats For: 108
Senate: 78-22
Republicans Against: 0
Democrats For: 23
spectives and viewpoints about what this all means to legal
services.
Thank you very much.
MATTHEW DILLER:
Thank you.
AS!
LEGISLATIVE ISSUES PANEL
STEVEN EPSTEIN:
Good morning, everyone. My name is Steve Epstein. I'm a stu-
dent here at Fordham Law School and also the Moderator for this
panel.
Before we begin this morning, what I'd like to do is tell you a
little bit about the format for our panels. We are going to have
each speaker deliver some opening remarks for about ten minutes,
after which the next speaker will go, and so on. After all the
speakers have had a chance to give some opening remarks, we will
then open things up for discussion. We encourage active and lively
audience participation, because that's really what this day is about.
Let me begin by introducing the Legislative Panel. We have
here a great panel, and I'm really happy that they all came today.
First, Alexander Forger. As the Dean said before, Mr. Forger
was honored recently here with the Louis J. Lefkowitz Award. He
has spent a large portion of his legal career at the law firm of
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, and took a couple of years off
to be the President of the Legal Services Corporation. We're very
happy to have him.
Next to him is Dwight Loines. Mr. Loines is the President of an
organization that represents around 4,000 legal services workers
and formerly was a staff attorney at The Legal Aid Society himself.
Sitting on the left of me is Dennis Saffran. I would like to say
that I'm very happy to have him here today representing a different
point of view, and a point of view that we'd like to have here at the
conference today. Mr. Saffran is the New York Regional Director
of the Center for the Community Interest. CCI is a non-partisan
citizens' coalition that represents the community interests when
civil liberties demands are carried to unreasonable extremes. CCI
supports a progressive, but rational, policy that links compassion
and common sense in the community. I'd like to thank Mr. Saffran
for being here.
In the interest of time, I'm not going to re-introduce Mr.
Houseman.
With that, I'd like to begin with Mr. Loines offering his com-
ments first.
303
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
DWIGHT LOINES:
Thank you very much. I didn't realize I was going to start, but
that's fine.
Let me just amplify a little bit on the introduction. I'm President
of the National Organization of Legal Services Workers. We are
part of the United Auto Workers. It's important that you under-
stand that because it will give you, I think, some insight into the
role that we play.
First of all, I was delighted to get the invitation to participate in
this panel, particularly when I heard that both Alan and Alex were
going to participate.
I'm going to take a second actually to tell a little story about
Forger. I met him after he became President of the Legal Services
Corporation, even though, I guess, we come from the same city. I
did not actually work for The Legal Aid Society; I worked for
Legal Services of New York. I understand that Alex in one of his
capacities was the Chair of the Board of The Legal Aid Society.
He was not my boss, so I did not get to know him in that capacity.
But in Washington I got to know him and the excellent leadership
that he brought to the Legal Services Corporation. But the thing
that really endeared him to the Union was the fact that he spoke at
our convention earlier this year. The convention was in Ottowa,
about an hour outside of Chicago. We were somewhat vague on
that point when we extended the invitation. The rank and file of
legal services really respect you for that and your leadership. I just
wanted to make that point.
And, of course, it's always good to see Alan. I see him running
around D.C. quite a bit, and his role in terms of preserving legal
services has been tremendous.
I just drove in this morning from Washington, where I spend,
unfortunately, more time than I like to these days. So I am a little
light-headed, but I think I can still string words together and make
a sentence here.
In the last several weeks, as a representative of a labor organiza-
tion, I've had the occasion to meet with quite a few people on the
Hill. It wouldn't surprise you to know that we have excellent rela-
tionships with just about every major Democrat on the Hill, and
that has benefited legal services tremendously over the years. But
it may surprise you to know that we also sit down and talk to peo-
ple who we have actually tried to defeat. We've had meetings in
the last several weeks trying to explore the possibility of addressing
both the funding problem and the problem of restrictions.
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I think Alan was very accurate in terms of where Congress is
these days, and we don't have any illusions of being able to turn
things around immediately. But it was important to start some dis-
cussions with people in the Republican Party - frankly, some peo-
ple fairly senior in the Party - who will acknowledge privately
that these restrictions are horrendous. Of course, they will then
blame it on their right wing and the fact that the House is so
volatile.
We have to get back to the point where there are no restrictions
on non-LSC funds from other public sources and on private funds.
We clearly have to get back to that point, and we have to reduce
the number of restrictions as best we can on LSC funds. So that
has to be our long-term goal.
We also have been talking about trying to push up the level of
funding, even though we hear very ominous sounds coming from
the House side, in terms of what they may be thinking about doing.
In addition to all the things that Alan pointed out in terms of the
restrictions, the impact of the restrictions in different parts of the
country causes us a great deal of concern. In places like in the
Southeast, where they don't have the luxury of having non-LSC
resources available, in those states these restrictions are absolute
and there is no way around them. They are in place and they de-
fine reality.
In a number of places, like New York, Boston, and Philadelphia,
where there are significant non-LSC funds, they have essentially
developed dual programs, separate programs. That's how they
have attempted to accommodate themselves to the situation. But
it has created sort of a system of two classes of programs. Pro-
grams that are not restricted, are viewed as the elite. The other
programs are often considered second-class. There is strain and
there is a great deal of discomfort in that situation. The restrictions
placed on legal services programs are extensive. The view that the
employees have of themselves and their programs has been
diminished.
The restrictions also have led to, unfortunately, frictions within
the legal services community. I think everybody has tried desper-
ately to keep those frictions from becoming any more pronounced
than they are. But there are frictions that have developed. There
is, frankly, name-calling and blaming. The lawsuits that were
brought challenging the restrictions - and the people who brought
those lawsuits - are distrustful of the people they see as being
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responsible for the day-to-day political activities in Washington. So
there is a great deal of suspicion there that is causing problems.
Whether or not LSC, in adopting its revised Regulations with
respect to interrelated organizations, whether that was the wisest
thing to do under the circumstances remains a question. I mean,
there is a lot of debate on that. We were hoping, at least up until a
few days ago, that Congress, including members of the Republican
Party in the House, would simply allow the lawsuits to run their
course and essentially accept LSC's explanation for why they re-
vised the restrictions. It's not absolutely clear that strategy is going
to work out, and that may complicate our legislative efforts in
Washington. So things are not entirely rosy and there are problems
that have developed that we are going to have to stay on top of.
Just so people can have some sense of the political context that
existed when these restrictions came into being, right after the new
104th Congress came in, the Gingrich Congress came in. I was in
Washington. We first went around to talk to the Democratic lead-
ership, people with whom we had worked for years. They were
completely and totally demoralized. You have to understand that.
Their only answer to any issue we raised was, "Let's let the Repub-
licans hang themselves. They're going to destroy programs that are
going to affect people and ultimately they're going to pay the
price." Their honest assessment was that the program was as good
as dead.
The reason I wanted to take a few seconds to talk about that is
because what happened, in terms of the restrictions, represented
the outcome of a debate that was essentially within the Republican
Party. The Democrats and moderate Republicans were not really
involved in that debate. The debate was essentially between Mc-
Collum, who wanted to "reform" the program, and people like
Gekas, who wanted to block grant and phase out the program.
That's where the debate was. The Democrats were out of it, except
for the "blue dog" Democrats, who, through Stenholm, were par-
ticipating in this process.
So that's how these restrictions came about. There was next to
no chance to affect things. We sat down with McCollum, even
though we had beaten him throughout the 1980s. His agenda was
very clear: his agenda was the imposition of these restrictions, and
he didn't deviate one iota from that. So that's where the restric-
tions came from. We had next to no ability to stop that from
happening.
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The one thing that I think everybody decided to do, however,
was to support continued funding for the program and hope to be
able to be in a position to fight the good fight another day. That's
sort of my take on where things were historically and where things
are now.
I'm not terribly optimistic about where things are going to go in
the short run. Part of it has to do with the lack of real coordination
and working together of the various organizations that have been a
part of the struggle over the years.
To be totally honest, a few bar leaders will not turn the situation
around. It's going to take more passion, more commitment; it's
going to take broader coalitions; it's going to take a lot more noise
- a much more developed, coordinated strategy - in order to
turn the situation around. The people who are voting in Congress
don't, for the most part, care about the merits. If they did, when
the Christian Coalition says the legal services should be ended be-
cause it promotes dissolution of the family - they would be dis-
missed as lunatics - if you don't immediately dismiss these groups
when that argument is raised, then I don't know what kind of
thinking is going on here. So it's not a matter of convincing people
on the merits. It's a matter of, for the most part, bringing to bear
pressure on people so that they are so uncomfortable, so that their
standing, their ability to get re-elected, is challenged.
I'll give you one example. There is a Congressperson from New
York State - and I will not mention his name - who came in as a
Gingrich clone several years ago. We met with him and went over
every issue, explaining in great detail why he should not be sup-
porting the opponents of the program. He listened and voted con-
sistently against us. This year he has done a complete about face.
He has totally reversed himself. His position now is he will sup-
port labor initiatives and he will support legal services initiatives.
What turned him around? Again, it was not the merits. What
turned him around was the work that was done in his district to
make it clear to him that there was a great risk to his future in
Congress if he didn't reverse himself. Of course, it helped that one
of his colleagues was defeated, primarily by organized labor, be-
cause of his embrace of right wing issues.
That's what it's going to take. I don't see, to be totally honest
with you, the leadership coming from the traditional organizations
that have been involved in this struggle. I don't see the coordina-
tion that should be going on. This year, for the first time in many
years, the Union is basically, essentially, working alone. We're
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talking to people in the White House, we're talking to people, as I
said, on the Hill, and we're talking to senior people on both parties.
We are also attempting to build a broad coalition in support of the
program.
The White House.gives lip service to legal services. They are not
going to be prepared to go all out unless they are getting pressure.
A few nice letters to people in the White House is not going to do
it. Our strategy is to make them feel uncomfortable on this issue
so they do the right thing. That's going to take a broad-based, well-
coordinated effort. I do not see it happening at this point, but
again, I'm happy to be able, as a representative of labor, to bring to
bear - the UAW, their political action funds, their community ac-
tion programs, and the rank-and-file members, people who work in
legal services - I'm pleased to be able to bring them to bear in this
struggle.
STEVEN EPSTEIN:
Thank you, Mr. Loines. I'd like Mr. Saffran to go next.
DENNIS J. SAFFRAN:
Thanks very much, Steve. Since I'm kind of the "black sheep"
on the panel, let me begin by telling you a bit about who I am and
where I'm coming from.
The Center for the Community Interest is a public interest group
that, as Steven said in his introduction, attempts to represent what
we call the progressive, but rational, center.
By way of background, most of us in CCI actually come out of a
background in the progressive or public interest movements or the
liberal wing of the Democratic Party. We retain a commitment to
active and compassionate government and to helping the poor.
But, all too often, we have seen decent and human liberal policies
carried to unintended extremes that hurt the very people they're
intended to help.
We formed CCI to try to provide a common-sense counter to
these extremes, without going to the other extreme, and to try to
speak up for the real day-to-day interests of poor people who are
too frequently ignored by the Right but disserved by their pur-
ported champions on the Left.
There is an implicit assumption - and I understand a lot of peo-
ple came here for a workshop basically on what to do about these
terrible restrictions, and I respect that -but I do want to challenge
the implicit assumption that the policies of Legal Services and the
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interests of the poor automatically coincide, so that anything that
restricts Legal Services is necessarily bad for the poor. Rather, I'd
like to suggest that in several important areas the ideology of Legal
Services is actually at odds with the day-to-day interests of the
great majority of poor people, and that the restrictions passed last
year represent a flawed, but necessary, effort to get Legal Services
back to its original mission of helping poor people with their legal
needs.
My position on Legal Services is mend it, don't end it. I guess I
fit in with what Mr. Houseman described as the moderates. Given
that I do, I think that I can give you an important perspective on
where those moderates and swing votes are coming from.
I said that it was a flawed but necessary step. It's actually
flawed, I believe, in two contradictory ways. In some respects, I
would actually agree with the other members of the panel and
with, I assume, most of the audience, that some of the restrictions,
such as the class action restriction, 1 go too far - it's a blunderbuss
approach. In other respects, however, the restrictions are actually
strewn with loopholes and really do not go far enough to respond
to genuine abuses. This is particularly true of the drug-dealing re-
striction,2 which I'll talk about at more length. So I think that the
restrictions were not properly tailored.
Let me talk about the drug dealer aspect of this, which my group
is most familiar with. Legal Services has consistently represented
drug dealers in eviction cases in public housing and other low-in-
come housing throughout the country. The case that we were in-
volved in was a class action suit - and, by the way, even though as
I said I think the class action restriction goes too far, as I describe
this case I think it might give you some hint of why Congress just
threw up its hands and said "no class actions whatsoever."
The case we got involved in was the Escalera3 case, which some
of you may be familiar with, where my organization was allied with
the Dinkins Administration and the elected public housing tenant
leadership throughout the City in opposition to the Legal Services
Corporation and The Legal Aid Society, which were opposing the
modification of a twenty-five-year-old consent decree that Legal
Services and Legal Aid had obtained against the Housing Author-
ity in 1971. 4
1. See 45 C.F.R. § 1617 (1998).
2. See 45 C.F.R. § 1633.
3. Escalera v. New York Housing Auth., 924 F. Supp. 1323 (1996).
4. See id.
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This is a case dating from 1967, during the "rights revolution,"
when groups like Legal Services were quite properly leading the
way in responding to the kinds of abuses we'd had before then,
abuses in which tenants and other poor people were denied basic
rights and dealt with in an arbitrary, and sometimes racially insen-
sitive, fashion.
In Escalera, Legal Aid and Legal Services, on behalf of a desig-
nated class of all public housing tenants, obtained a detailed evic-
tion process, where essentially you have to go through a
labyrinthine procedure to evict anyone from public housing in New
York City.5 It's a two-step procedure that sometimes can take up
to two years.
What Escalera did was set up a required internal administrative
proceeding with multiple layers of review. Then, even after that
first step runs its course (and that can take well over a year) the
Housing Authority still has to go into Housing Court, like any
other landlord, and deal with all the problems there of getting to
the final step of an eviction.
As bad as the drug and crime problem was then with heroin,
since this went into effect in 1971, we have had the crack/cocaine
epidemic, we have had massive escalation of drug-related crime,
particularly in low-income areas, and particularly in public housing
projects, throughout the country.
While this crack/cocaine epidemic was going on, anti-drug activ-
ists in low-income communities in New York discovered on the
books something called the "Bawdy House Law,"6 an 1870s-era
statute that was originally designed for just what it sounds like,-;to
close down speakeasies and so-called houses of ill repute. But it
turned out to be a wonderful tool in the effort to rid poor and low-
income neighborhoods of the scourge of drugs.
What it allows for is an expedited eviction proceeding - still
with a due process hearing, but with a calendar preference -
against tenants who are engaged in illegal operations on a prem-
ises. A "Bawdy House" action can be brought by either landlords
or by other tenants: If the landlord won't act or just wants to sit
there and let a drug dealer pay his rent on an apartment, poor peo-
ple themselves who are neighbors can go into court to get the drug
dealer out.7 It generally takes about forty days.
5. See id.
6. N.Y. REAL PROP. Acrs. LAW § 711(5) (McKinney 1997).
7. See id. § 721.
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When the community anti-drug activists brought this to the at-
tention of some of the DAs - specifically, Bob Morgenthau in
Manhattan and, at that time, Liz Holtzman in Brooklyn - they
started setting up special "Bawdy House shops" within the District
Attorneys' Office to bring some of these cases. It started to be
used throughout the state, and was very effectively used in both
public housing and other low-income housing projects upstate and
in suburban areas, and in all non-public low-income housing, such
as subsidized housing in New York City.
It has been an extraordinarily important tool in doing something
about the drug problem in low-income housing. The one housing
provider that could not take advantage of it, though, as a practical
matter, was the largest provider of low-income housing in the
country, the New York City Housing Authority. It couldn't be-
cause the "Bawdy House Law" expedites step two of this lengthy
two-step program down to forty days from four-to-six months, but
you've still got step one, which is a year-and-a-half. So essentially
the "Bawdy House Law" was useless.
The Dinkins Administration, under Sally Hernandez Pinero,
moved to re-open the 1971 consent decree to modify it to allow the
Housing Authority itself to bring "Bawdy House" cases directly in
court without going through the preliminary administrative process
in situations of drug dealing. That was instantly opposed by the de
jure class representatives, the Legal Aid Society and the Legal
Services Corporation.8 They came in to court to oppose this with a
knee-jerk response in opposition, without making any attempt to
ascertain the wishes of their clients who were of course supposed to
be all of the residents of New York City public housing. They said
in their court papers that "the instance of drug-related crime has
not increased in New York City public housing since 1971."
What we did was to organize the elected tenant leadership who,
in fact, unanimously supported the City's effort to modify the de-
cree. Every New York City public housing project elects a tenant
association president, and then the presidents, in turn, elect eight
district leaders throughout. We had every one of those elected ten-
ant leaders sign on to our motion to intervene in the case on their
behalf, and say to the court, "While the de jure class representa-
tives from 1967 are opposed to the City's motion, in fact our con-
stituents - the real tenants, overwhelmingly support what the
Dinkins Administration is trying to do." The City won that case. I
8. See Escalera v. New York Housing Auth., 924 F. Supp. 1323 (1996).
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think a big part of the reason why is that the presence of the
elected tenant leadership in the case forced the court to reexamine
the assumption that lawyers make that the Legal Services position
is necessarily in the interests of the poor.
I made a lot more notes because you assume that ten minutes is
going to go on forever, but I think this gives you a flavor of where
we're coming from and, I hope, will cause people to see that there
are definitely two sides to this issue. As I said, my position on legal
services is mend it, don't end it. I think I'm certainly representa-
tive, as Mr. Houseman said, of the moderate swing votes in Con-
gress. I think I'm representative of where the great majority of the
public, including the great majority of poor people, are on some of
these restrictions.
What I would like to leave with you is that you're going to drive
away those moderates, and you're going to lose all funding, if Legal
Services continues to maneuver to get around these restrictions in
every way: if it continues to set up the dual mirror organizations
and to bring lawsuits to strike down any limitations that Congress
imposes; if it continues to thumb its nose at the political center and
to flout the spirit of the restrictions by bringing cases against many
moderate Clinton Administration initiatives, such as bringing a
lawsuit, as they did in one area, to oppose a school uniform re-
quirement. Now I have no strong feelings one way or the other on
school uniforms. But what in heaven's name, given the limited re-
sources of Legal Services, does attacking a school uniform require-
ment have to do with serving the interests of poor people?
ALEXANDER D. FORGER:
I'll tell you in a minute.
DENNIS J. SAFFRAN:
Tell me now. Doesn't it reflect a '60s lifestyle ideology that has a
lot to do with the personal philosophies of Legal Services lawyers
but little or nothing to do one way or another with serving the day-
to-day needs of poor people?
Mr. Forger says that this case was brought because of the cost
and embarrassment to young people who couldn't afford the
uniforms.9 Of course that's mind-bogglingly out-of-touch. What
does he think they would wear instead of the uniforms? Does he
think they would go naked? Doesn't he know that the reason that
9. See infra p. 317.
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almost every Afrocentric academy has imposed a uniform require-
ment, and the reason the idea has spread like wildfire among par-
ents' associations in the inner city, is because of the "cost and
embarrassment," and the crime and violence, resulting from the
peer pressure on kids to spend their mothers' entire paycheck or
welfare allotment'on a pair of Air Jordans or a designer jacket? It
certainly seems as if Legal Services is more interested in promoting
the lifestyle of its lawyers rather than the needs of its clients when
it brings a case whose primary economic beneficiaries are Tommy
Hilfiger and the Nike Shoe Company.
The other key point here is limited resources. A lot of people
say on the drug cases, "Well, don't they deserve a right to represen-
tation? Doesn't everybody have a right to representation, even in
a civil case?" But we hear at the same time that Legal Services
does not have enough staff attorneys to go around to serve all the
needs of the poor. Given that, don't priorities have to be set? And
if you're going to set priorities, if you set that priority that you are
representing a drug dealer, who are you not representing? There's
no free lunch here.
In fact, there is evidence in a survey that the Legal Services Cor-
poration did in the early 1990s that the priorities of many Legal
Services grantees and lawyers may be totally out of whack and may
actually favor the drug dealer over the ordinary tenant. They
found that public housing authorities had a much easier time
against some of the same drug-dealing tenants, who the local Legal
Services chapter had defended to the hilt, if they instead brought a
non-drug-related eviction. If they found the same guy is not paying
his rent, we'll go after him for non-payment of rent, or we'll go
after him for some other lease violation. Somehow, those cases
where far less frequently taken up by Legal Services than were the
drug dealer cases. That represents a very skewed sense of
priorities.
Decisions have to be made. I think, to give a hypothetical, if you
had a tenant in public housing who was shouting vile racist epithets
at African-American and Latino neighbors, and was thus in viola-
tion of his lease by violating those people's right to quiet enjoy-
ment, that person would "deserve" representation in an eviction
hearing also. I don't think Legal Services would choose to repre-
sent that person. Because of their limited resources, they would
say, "Let's devote these limited resources to poor people who are
not harming other poor people."
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In fact, of course, those who deal drugs out of their apartments
and bring about all the associated gang violence and crime, and
who create a situation where poor people are literally putting their
children to bed in bathtubs to protect them from the drug dealers'
bullets, of course, those people are doing far more harm to the day-
to-day lives of average poor people and minority people than is the
vile racist in my hypothetical.
I think Legal Services has to make those choices about priorities.
I think if they don't, they are going to bring about a reaction on the
part of the moderates in Congress that's going to wind up with a
total cutoff.
Thanks.
STEVEN EPSTEIN:
Thank you, Mr. Saffran.
I see that the coffee has kicked in and we have the makings of a
lively debate. With that, let me turn it over to Mr. Forger.
ALEXANDER D. FORGER:
My experience with legal services was basically with The Legal
Aid Society of New York, the oldest and largest provider of ser-
vice. From that vantage point, particularly during the 1970s, I was
exposed to the Legal Services Corporation and its directives and its
auditing and monitoring, and found it to be quite oppressive. But
then you realize that in the 1980s the people who populated it were
really folks who didn't care for the organization. It was founded in
the 1970s as an outgrowth, as you all know I'm sure, of the War on
Poverty and OEO,10 and it became a corporation in one of the last
acts of the Nixon Administration, in 1974 for the slated purpose of
removing the program from the political arena.
Among the congressional statements of purpose was that the
poor, or those who couldn't afford lawyers, should have the same
access to justice as those who have the financial means to do so,
and, moreover, that the lawyers representing those people should
have available to them the same privileges, rights, procedures,
methods of procedure that those who were paying for lawyers
could have.1 So its initial conception was that it was nonpartisan
and it was devoted to the cause of making justice available to all,
irrespective of financial resources.
10. OEO is an acronym for The Office of Economic Opportunity.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994).
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As I have spent some time in Washington, seeing the inscriptions
on buildings and listening to speeches and public declarations, the
one phrase that really stays with me is in the Preamble to the Con-
stitution, which states "We, the People of the United States, in Or-
der to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, ensure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense"' 2 and so
on. I think those words were chosen with great care and purpose,
particularly in the sequencing of the objectives to be achieved. The
Founding Fathers had lived through tyranny without benefit of the
rule of law and recognized that the firmest foundation of good gov-
ernment is justice and without it, domestic tranquility becomes
somewhat irrelevant. As they say in the current jargon, "no justice,
no peace." So that Was the cornerstone of the Legal Services
Corporation.
Another fact you should know is that when people ask, "Why
does the Legal Services Corporation initiate certain types of
cases?" the answer is that Legal Services Corporation, of course,
does not. It functions essentially as a block grant program. It is
funded by Congress and it oversees its grantees to ensure quality
and effective service, as well as compliance with the law and regu-
lations. The grantees are separate, independent corporations.
Each has its separate, locally organized board, hires its local attor-
neys, and sets its own community priorities. So it isn't bureaucrats
or ideologues in Washington who are telling the field the kinds of
cases that they should bring.
I went to Washington after forty years of practice holding the
belief that logic, reason, and analysis were relevant. Not true.
These lawyering tools have little to do with the legislative process.
In my lighter moments I referred to my three-plus-years sojourn
there as "Alex in Wonderland." You cannot fully understand the
process of government until you represent people who don't much
matter, who have no clout, no PACs and no influence over the re-
election of a member of Congress. Without that, you don't count
- except with those who place principle above politics. Most
members I have met seem more concerned with reelection than
anything else.
As to the legislative process itself, the first hearing I attended
was a rude awakening. The Chair, Mr. Gekas, said, "Mr. Forger,
do you think it is appropriate to spend federal taxpayers' money so
gays and lesbians can march in the St. Patrick's Day Parade?" I
12. U.S. CONST. preamble.
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said, "I'm sorry, I'm not familiar with that case and I can't com-
ment." Well, of course, that, like virtually every other case I heard
put to me in three years before Congress, had nothing to do with
the Legal Services Corporation or its grantees. But that doesn't
matter.
I have heard repeatedly that LSC persists on representing drug
dealers throughout America. But this is pure mythology, being re-
peated here in a sense today. It may well be that somewhere,
sometime, a drug dealer was represented by a federal program, but
that's not the stock in trade of the Legal Services Corporation.
And fueling the unwarranted criticism of LSC is the Christian
Coalition. They don't like us because we do divorces for poor wo-
men.' Why? They say it makes them dependent on welfare and
we're trying to free these women from dependence. Apparently it
is preferable that they should be battered and abused. Last year
LSC programs handled 59,000 cases of spousal abuse, 200,000 di-
vorces, most of them based in domestic violence and abandon-
ment. 13 And yet it makes no sense, to say, as these critics do,
"terminate the legal services program because it's anti-family."
But even were it inappropriate to represent any woman in a di-
vorce, why advocate killing off the entire program. Or, if more
needs to be done on drug dealers - and we think the restriction is
pretty tight - let's tighten it further. Don't advocate ending an
entire program.
Of the 1.6 million cases handled last year, ninety-eight percent
were routine, everyday problems such as helping families stay to-
gether - not on the street - keeping their jobs, enforcing child
support payments, and obtaining access to health care.'4
Yet we have been portrayed as representing rapists, prisoners
who seek to prevent prisons from segregating those with AIDS,
and those who seek sex change operations. After a while, these
stories take on their own lives. And sooner or later letters circulate
within the Congress, such as: "Dear Colleagues: Did you realize
the Legal Services Corporation represented people seeking sex
change operations? Isn't that outrageous?" Yes, it is outrageous
- the misrepresentation, that is. As I've said many times in testi-
mony, if I believed one-quarter of what I've heard anecdotally, I'd
be the first to seek to destroy this program.
13. See generally Mike Austin, LSC Chief Predicts Funding Cuts Are Over, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., June 12, 1996.
14. Mary Wisniewski Holden, Clipped Wings and Budget Cuts Tax Legal Aid, CHI.
LAWYER, Aug. 1997, P1.
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And then there is the Farm Bureau. What does the Farm Bureau
have against us? We represent migrant workers. What's wrong
with representing migrant workers? Well, they make trouble.
They want decent housing, a minimum wage, or freedom from pes-
ticides. The workers are among the most vulnerable in our popula-
tion and, of course, the least influential.
In the legislative process, I can assure you that I have been told
by one legislator, "I can't support you openly. This is an election
year. I receive support from the growers, so don't expect me to
stand up and say I support legal services." I've seen another legis-
lator who was contacted by a major contributor walk off the floor
rather than cast a vote that wasn't wanted. That's the way the sys-
tem works. It seems to run on influence, fueled by money. Elec-
tion finance reform is sorely needed but even that may not put us
all on a level playing field.
But since all politics is local, our best chance for gaining support
for legal services must be in the local community. Those who seek
reelection respond to the voters who matter to them in their
districts.
I agree with Dwight, one needs to go beyond the bar. The bar
isn't enough.
I need now refer to the case involving school uniforms. 5 As I
recall, the uniform case involved an issue of cost and embarrass-
ment to young people who could not afford the uniforms.16 It was
a matter of dignity and self-worth, not unimportant among the
disadvantaged.
Just like the current Texas election case, 7 where sixty-some-odd
Senators said, "LSC is trying to deprive the men defending our
borders from voting absentee." The reality was far different from
that. It was a case well brought, as is the circumstance with most
that have been brought.
But we can always find a disagreement with some cases, just as
we can find disagreements with what is done in any institution. But
the answer isn't to destroy the institution - otherwise, we'd have
no Congress, we'd have no church, we'd have no other institution
- if we all had to agree with every position that they take.
I'd be happy to engage in dialogue later.
15. See supra, pp. 47-49 (criticizing LSC's use of its limited resources on a school
uniform case).
16. See id.
17. Casarez v. ValVarde County, 957 F. Supp. 847 (W.D.Tex. 1997).
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STEVEN EPSTEIN:
Thank you, Mr. Forger.
Mr. Houseman?
ALAN W. HOUSEMAN:
Just a couple of quick points, including an update. There are two
people in this room that can get into the dialogue on drug cases far
better than I and I defer to them.
Nationally, we could only find about ten or twelve cases that al-
legedly involved drug dealers when we last tried to get a firm figure
on representation of drug dealers. These ten or twenty cases were
out of probably 50,000 public housing eviction cases in which legal
services was involved. So I don't really think representation of
drug dealers is a problem. This restriction of drug dealers legisla-
tion by anecdote, which is the way we seem to function in the
Congress.
The update is this. We are now hearing that the House leader-
ship and Congressman Rogers, the Chair of the Subcommittee in
the House that oversees LSC appropriations, have agreed to block
grant the program along the lines of the "Gekas" bill, which is a
block grant proposed by the House Judiciary Committee in 1995.
We don't know if this is true, if it is a tactical move, or if it is a
rumor that will never become true. Whatever it is, I think it em-
phasizes the fundamental point that Dwight made, which is that
this year again we face a struggle over the very survival of legal
services as an institution and as an effective program. Hopefully,
there will be some openings during the legislative process to reduce
some of the impact of the restrictions and increase funding. But it
may well be that this year we're back to the same kind of struggle
we had in the last two years: the openings will be few and far be-
tween and the ability to get at least significant increased funds or
some positive change in the restrictions is going to be very
diminished.
Now, the other two points that I want to make. There has been a
fairly substantial, significant effort around the survival of legal
services. I don't think it's coordinated as well as it should, but
some people are unaware of the national efforts.
e First, there has been substantial direct lobbying on the Hill
both by the Legal Services Corporation and by the advocates who
work on this at NLADA, 18 CLASP, 19 the ABA2" and others.
18. NALDA is an acronym for National Legal Aid and Defenders Association.
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* Second, within the legal service community there are two very
substantial networks that have coordinators in each state and in
each district. One is a network run by the American Bar Associa-
tion and the second is a network run by NLADA. The NLADA
network does not involve LSC-funded advocates, because of the
new restrictions. These are two separate networks. They have
been very effective in building grass-roots support at the local
level, along with the efforts of the Union and other allies at the
local level. I agree completely with Alex that this fight is, and can
only be, won at the local level.
* Finally, there has been consistent and continuing pressure from
the White House. There is support in the White House, but, as
with everything, the priorities of the President don't necessarily in-
clude our priorities all the time and in every situation. For exam-
ple, the Legal Services Corporation was not protected by the
Balanced Budget Amendment that was adopted by the Congress
last week.2' It was expressly not protected. There is a set of letters
going back and forth between Speaker Gingrich and the White
House that expressly took LSC out of any potential protection by
the Balanced Budget Amendment. Decisions on LSC will be left
up to the appropriation process, as it has been historically. As I
said earlier, the leadership, including Speaker Gingrich, has re-
cently indicated that their new strategy is to adopt a block grant
approach.
That does not mean that the White House will not support legal
services. I think it will. It does mean that pressure has to be con-
tinued on the White House. It is not a priority of this President, in
the sense of an overarching priority, but it remains true that the
First Lady and key members of the Administration, including the
Counsel to the President, the lobbyist arm of the White House,
OMB,2 z and the President himself, are very supportive. Frank
Raines, the head of OMB, used to be on my Board; he knows legal
services backwards and forwards, and I know he will come through
for us.
So I think there is White House support. The White House ef-
forts in April of 1996, again, have gone unstated, but were very
substantial in preserving the Cohen-Bumpers Amendment, the
19. CLASP is an acronym for Center for Law and Social Policy.
20. ABA is an acronym for American Bar Association.
21. Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997).
22. OMB is an acronym for Office of Management and Budget.
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separately funded migrant programs, and other key components of
the LSC funded system.
I think I'll stop there.
STEVEN EPSTEIN:
All right. Thank you.
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES PANEL
STACI ROSCHE:
We have a very distinguished panel with us here today. To my
far right is Shirley Traylor.' She is the Executive Director of Har-
lem Legal Services. She had been the General Counsel of the New
York City Department of Homeless Services and Director of Liti-
gation of the Community Service Society of New York.
Immediately to my right is Jill Boskey. She worked for ten years
for MFY Legal Services. She is now the Co-Executive Director of
CeDAR, the Center for Disability Advocacy Rights, which she co-
founded with Christopher Bowes in reaction to the LSC fund
restrictions.
To my left I have Valerie Bogart. She is a Senior Staff Attorney
for Legal Services for the Elderly. She previously spent six years
with The Legal Aid Society Office for the Aging, and perhaps is
most visible in the public interest community for her involvement
as the lead attorney in the Varshavsky case.
Finally, to my far left, is Lucy Billings, who is Director of Special
Litigation at Bronx Legal Services.2 She began with Legal Services
in 1973. I think she is widely recognized by many for her involve-
ment with the lead paint litigation, but she has also been involved
with class actions involving housing, environmental justice, health,
child welfare, and public Benefits.
Just as a point of background, each person is going to take about
ten minutes to describe how they have been directly affected in
implementing the restrictions that have been handed down and
how they have made their lives a little bit harder.
JILL ANN BOSKEY:
I cannot let pass that I am sitting to Staci's moderate right. I'm
use to being at the extreme left. I think I can survive for one day
sitting a little bit to the right.
I worked at MFY for ten years doing primarily SSI work. MIFY
Legal Service is an LSC-funded corporation. One of the interest-
ing things about the work that I did is that I was at no point funded
in any part - not even my little finger - by LSC funds. We were
funded by state and city funds, the DAP (Disability Advocacy Pro-
ject) contract, and by attorneys' fees. Who knows whether any
1. At the request of the speaker, her remarks have not been included below.
2. Lucy Billings is now a New York State Court judge.
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IOLA3 funds went to us, but I think not. We were funded com-
pletely by funds that were not restricted.
When it became clear that either the restrictions were going to
come down or the federal funding cuts were going to come down in
such a heavy way that it would seriously affect the work that I was
doing - or both, which is what in the end happened - I started
trying to figure out how to live with this situation.
The work that I did, and that Chris, who's working with me, did,
at Legal Services, that David did before me - David Udell had my
job before me - was a combination of direct services, administra-
tive advocacy, class actions, that fit well together and that func-
tioned well together. By seeing the individual clients, dealing with
their individual problems, you realized what was a problem that
needed to be addressed either with an individual impact case or
with a class action.
Getting attorneys' fees on cases maybe made the agency rethink
what it was doing. Sometimes I have my doubts. I like to believe it
does. At least it provided funding to allow us to continue to do the
work that needed to be done.
In the area of benefits, class actions have been a very important
and useful tool that legal services was able to use. So I started
looking around for a place to go, a way to continue doing what I
felt needed to be done. Both the funding cutbacks, which at MIFY
resulted in increasingly smaller numbers of offices in increasingly
fewer neighborhoods (and not only for MIFY; it seems like every-
body in the city is moving) and the inability to do restricted work
made it clear to me that I couldn't continue to do what I felt
needed to be done and what I wanted to do.
I was lucky to have the availability of some funds to go out and
start the Center for Disability Advocacy Rights to do exactly,
pretty much, the work that we did at MFY. For me, the restrictions
have been a nightmare. But they have also had a wonderful result
because I love CeDAR, I love doing the work, doing the work that
we wanted to do - assuming that we survive, and I have faith that
we'll survive, that the funds will drop from the sky and keep us
going.
We don't like being in a position of competing with legal services
offices for funds because the work that legal services offices do is
important, and it's unfortunate that we're in that position.
3. IOLA is an acronym for Interest on Lawyer Accounts.
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During the transition between my leaving MFY and my going to
CeDAR, I was doing what people, I think, are trying to do to live
within the restrictions, either by going part-time or by doing work,
figuring out whether I can do this work or not. It became crystal
clear - and this is the main thing that I want to talk about - that
it's impossible. It's impossible to do it humanly and it's impossible
to do it ethically. The chilling effect is horrendous.
If somebody came to me and said, "I went to an appointment for
welfare and they told me I had to work, and they didn't give me a
notice. They told me I had to work in words, but they never sent
me a notice, and now they've closed my case." And then, the next
day, somebody else comes and says the same thing. As a restricted
legal services attorney I could bring a fair hearing for each of them,
go to the fair hearing for each of them, et cetera. As a human
being, as an attorney, I think, "Gee, this is happening a lot. It
ought to be addressed in a massive way." And then, sitting in my
office at MFY, when I was working part-time at MFY, I would
think, "Oh, I'm not allowed to think that thought here. Let me go
out in the backyard and think that thought. Okay, I've decided I'm
not going to bring this as a class action, so I can go back inside and
think about it. Oh, but maybe I should call somebody high up in
welfare and see if I can solve this problem. Better go back out in
the backyard and think about it."
I don't know how people who are still in LSC-funded programs
deal with this nightmare. Maybe if you think about it, nobody
knows what you're thinking about. But suppose somebody calls
you up on the phone and says something, and you're not allowed to
use an LSC-funded phone to talk about administrative advocacy.
Do you say, "Excuse me, I have to go out to the corner public
phone and call you," and put in nickels every five minutes?
In terms of the lawsuit, the challenges to the restrictions, I am a
plaintiff. I think it was essential. This is one reason that I said I'm
usually on the far left. I worry about the places like Nebraska, that
don't have enough money, enough attorneys, to have an LSC-
funded program and a non-LSC-funded program. Even in New
York City, where we're probably in the best shape of anybody in
the country, there aren't enough attorneys to represent people
both restricted and unrestricted. In the places out there in the mid-
dle of the country where there aren't even two organizations, I
worry about what happens.
Part of me worries - this was talked about some in the earlier
panel - is the challenge going to make legal services go away?
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But the part of me that's way out there says, "If it does, then
maybe it shouldn't be there. If we in legal services are so limited in
what we can do that when a client comes in we have to say, 'I can't
represent you on this kind of matter. Even on the matters that I
can represent you, the tools that are available for other people are
not available for you if you come to me. And I know that you can't
go anywhere else because there's nobody out there that you can
pay.'"
Should we let Congress, should we let the President think that
he's actually supporting legal services for the poor when legal serv-
ices for the poor is legal services for the poor with one hand tied
behind your back? On my good days I think, "Let it come to a
crisis. Maybe there will be a revolution."
What I hope to see happen is that the restrictions will be lifted. I
started to read through the latest regulation that came out, which I
hadn't read before, and it still does the same thing. You can have
separate organizations and, if we decide after the fact that they're
separate enough, everything's going to be okay. But we're not go-
ing to tell you really exactly how separate you have to be to be
okay. And there you have the chilling effect again. You can't
know in advance whether you're going to be in violation. Even
stuff like you can't share a Xerox, you can't share a fax, you can't
share a receptionist. Which, I think, is still in the latest version of
the related organizations restriction, is ridiculous, unless maybe
these related organization restrictions are set up to support IBM,
META, the people who make the faxes and make the Xerox ma-
chines and the phone systems, so that everybody will have to buy
two if they want to do both kinds of work.
The way legal services has worked, and the way it has worked
well, and the thing that I love about it, is the interaction of direct
service and impact litigation and legislative and administrative ad-
vocacy growing out of that. The effect of these restrictions is to
absolutely do what Congress says they don't want us to do: to have
people over here who don't see clients deciding what we should do
in administrative advocacy and class actions, and the people over
here who do see clients not allowed to bring those actions.
Now, of course, we do talk. We have to be careful what we say
over which phones, but I think that even restricted people are al-
lowed to talk to non-restricted people about the issues that they're
seeing. The process is crazy. I think I'm talking to the converted.
The process is crazy, and particularly crazy in my area of law, pub-
lic benefits, SSI, in the context of welfare reform. Welfare reform
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is the thing that has come down and the thing that needs prompt
and massive response. To try to fight welfare reform in individual
cases where you can't raise constitutional issues is crazy. It's an-
other reason why I had to get out.
There is one more thing I want to say about being in legal serv-
ices. Although my work was benefits work, being part of that big-
ger community is incredibly important. I don't do housing, but the
stuff that I learned from the housing attorneys in my office when I
was at MIFY is really important, the interaction of people. What
they're trying to do is separate us out so that we can't interact. It
hurts us, it hurts our clients, it hurts the community we try to serve.
I have a lot of respect for those of you who have managed to
survive and are continuing to survive and struggle inside the re-
strictions. I couldn't do it.
VALERIE J. BOGART:
I am an attorney with Legal Services for the Elderly in New
York City. I specialize in elder law. It has been very hard to do my
job. As a specialist in elder law, I agree with a lot of what Jill said.
The problems I deal with are, again, the state, the city government,
the federal government. When I read through the list of activities
that is in one of the handouts that we're still allowed to do, a lot of
them are very important. I still go to fair hearings, I still bring
court cases, but the last time I called up a government policy per-
son and asked them to please change their policy - because I'm
allowed to do that - I can't remember when I did that. Maybe I
had a fantasy dream about doing it. But, as we all know, it doesn't
work. These are not well-meaning bureaucrats who just make mis-
takes and are waiting for a legal services lawyer to call them up and
say, "Whoops! I think that regulation has an 'and' and I think you
really meant an 'or,"' and they change it, thanking you for pointing
that out. We know that's not what's going on, especially with the
Welfare Reform Act.4
I deal with issues that have nothing to do with the Welfare Re-
form Act, but I feel that it is a war. In the last two years, the issues
I deal with, getting long-term care for elderly and disabled people,
have simply become more and more of a war. The state and local
governments are only looking to cut back funding, and they will
use any tactic they can. We have to use any tactic we can to repre-
sent our clients.
4. See 42 U.S.C §§ 601-618 (1996).
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Class actions are, of course, an absolutely essential part of that
tactic. I have personally been fortunate, partly because of my own
actions, in bringing the motion in Varshavsky,5 that for this transi-
tion period, the first year of the restrictions, I have been able to
continue doing my work. Although, for what is now approaching a
year, I have been feeling the effect of the restrictions more and
more in my work.
I am class counsel in the Varshavksy case.6 There will be people
in the courtroom who will disagree why I continue to be allowed to
be class counsel. One reason is that a court decided that the re-
strictions were unconstitutional when I made a motion to withdraw
as counsel and requested that the court find that the law was un-
constitutional. My employer, LSNY, and LSC, say that's not the
reason I'm still allowed to be counsel. The only reason I'm allowed
to be counsel is that it happens that the case is currently in a non-
adversarial posture. We don't have any motions pending.
So even though I have quite a compelling court order, which is
available for you to read, I live in dread of the day that this class
action turns adversarial, as it nearly has a few times in the last few
months, but we've been able to hold it at bay. When it does, we'll
be back with a big turmoil with LSNY, and with LSC probably,
about whether I'm allowed to continue as class counsel. We'll face
the same dilemmas I faced last August about, "do I withdraw, do I
take a part-time cut in my pay so I can go work out of my home a
few days of the week without pay, but continue working on the
case?" Why would I do that? Because these are my clients.
That's the reason I made the motion last summer., I believe I
took an oath to represent these clients, and I'do not relish the idea.
of abandoning them. We had, as I'm sure lawyers in all the other
class actions have, contacted other attorneys, contacted some pri-
vate law firms, to take over the case. When they heard about the
three file cabinets of materials, the weekly monitoring that I'm do-
ing from hundreds of cases that come into the office that I monitor,
the law firms said, "Gee, we thought maybe we could help out at
trial. We thought maybe we could do a little discovery. We didn't
really have that in mind." They don't do this kind of litigation and
they really couldn't be taking over this case. It's a huge job. So I
don't really imagine someone else taking over the case who's not in
legal services.
5. See Varshavsky v. Perales, 608 N.Y.S.2d 18,4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
6. Id.
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There are a few other cases I've been allowed to work on just by
the fortuity that a judge denied class certification. And, of course,
we still have the leverage to litigate the case because we brought
the case as a class action, and moved for class certification. The
defendants know we're serious. We still have the leverage and the
forum to litigate class-wide policy and practice claims. With new
cases now, since I can't now bring a class action, I won't have that
leverage power.
Jill is asking, "Gee, how are people doing it?" Just two weeks
ago, my colleague, Nina Keilin, and I filed a case to see how this
works. How does it work to file a policy and practice case and not
make it a class action?
We filed a case in state court. It looks like a class action chal-
lenging policies and practices, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. Since it doesn't have the words "class action," we're not rep-
resenting anyone besides our named plaintiff. When the time
comes to start discovery, we'll be limited. And when the time
comes to start defending motions to dismiss, when the City tries to
moot out our client, we're not going to have much of a way to keep
the case alive. And we can't get broad relief for others similarly
situated.
I have another client just like this client: same situation, same
legal claims, same need for assistance, but she happens to live in
Nassau County. I can't intervene her in this case if I don't bring it
as a class action because there's no venue in a New York City state
court for her claim. If I could move for class certification, then I
could make it statewide and anyone in the state could join in. But
in"New York County bringing in a Nassau County plaintiff is not
going to work. So I have spent the last few days on the phone
calling every private attorney I know and every legal services office
in Nassau County and Long Island, begging them to please take
this case and represent this woman. She needs help. She has
Alzheimer's Disease. She needs home care.
While the transition has not been so bad so far, as time goes on,
what will gradually squeeze the blood from us is the attorneys' fees
provision.7 Attorneys' fees operate on a backlog - you bring
these cases, and then twelve years later you get your attorneys' fees
- so our office should have those coming in for a while. And,
fortunately, for cases that I'm still litigating, like Varshavsky, I'll be
able to collect fees in 2020 or so. But, of course, no new cases can
7. See 45 C.F.R. § 1642.3 (1998).
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be brought requesting fees.8 That pays a substantial part of our
budget, and eventually that will cause a real drain on our office.
Eventually, I don't think I could work under the restrictions.
I've been able to make it work so far, and I think that can continue
for a while. But I absolutely agree with Jill. I think no lawyer who
does this work could say, "I'm only an impact litigation litigator, I
only represent people in individual cases." If you're looking at
these issues, if you're looking at these clients, and looking at the
most efficient way to represent them, you can't divide your work
up into these neat categories. You have to use every one of these
kinds of strategies and tools. Not to use any one of them would be
doing your clients a tremendous, tremendous disservice. Eventu-
ally I won't be able to do that. Eventually, I hope, the restrictions
will not be in effect anymore.
LUCY BILLINGS:
I am probably going to echo a lot of what Jill and Valerie have
said. Probably all your stomachs are growling, so I'll try to be rela-
tively brief.
Like Jill, my work at Bronx Legal Services over the last eight
years has been funded totally by non-LSC funds. My primary re-
sponsibilities have been to reach out to and maintain communica-
tion with client groups, to determine critical problems where
intensified advocacy is needed, and to work with other attorney
supervisors in the program to identify issues that affect substantial
numbers of our clients, very low-income persons in our community,
which is primarily the South Bronx, and then to undertake affirma-
tive, complex, and often class action litigation in these identified
priority areas for the program, and also to coordinate related rep-
resentation in legislative and rule-making forums. So you can see,
just from that brief description of my responsibilities, that they are
dramatically curtailed by the LSC restrictions.
One of the things you do when you work with community groups
is you reach out to them, you meet with them, you advise them of
their rights in certain areas of the law, and in the exchange you
determine that they are in situations where those rights are being
threatened. In the past, we could advise those clients or potential
clients that Bronx Legal Services was available to represent them
in those situations. The LSC restrictions curtail us from doing that.
8. See 45 C.F.R. § 1609.3.
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Many of you know that class actions are not just a way of repre-
senting large groups of persons similarly situated at one time, but
they are also a powerful tool even for the named plaintiffs to ob-
tain quick and effective relief for them by simply initiating a class
action. But beyond that, of course, class actions provide proce-
dural mechanisms through notice to the class, for example, and dis-
covery, as Valerie referred to, to find out about and make contact
with others whose rights are being threatened who would not
otherwise be protected.
When the restrictions came down last August, I was centrally in-
volved in at least four class actions that I had to find alternative
resources for and would not have been able to dispose of if IOLA
funds had not been available. I simply was not able to find any
other attorneys in the City to take the cases.
One of the cases had been going on since 1985, where I was rep-
resenting an organizational plaintiff in addition to the class of indi-
viduals, meeting with that group since 1983. We ultimately brought
the class action in 1985. In three of those four cases I was repre-
senting a class of children throughout New York City under seven
years old: tenants in privately owned housing, tenants in public
housing, tenants in federally subsidized housing, and children in
day care, preschools, and kindergartens, regarding enforcement of
New York City's very protective statutes against lead paint poison-
ing.9 Of course, all of these children under age seven were also
drug dealers. In the fourth case I was representing African-Ameri-
can and Latino tenants who claimed that the City housing agency's
lax enforcement of housing maintenance laws discriminated against
those groups. 10 Bronx Legal Services had to dispose of not only
those four cases, but also many others in which I and various other
attorneys in the program were involved.
The restriction against attorneys' fees is perhaps the most oner-
ous restriction. Even though it seemed in the beginning that, "Oh,
my gosh, I have to dispose of these class actions," and that restric-
tion had the most dramatic impact on our practice, now, in looking
to take on new cases, I have realized that in almost every case we
9. See German v. Federal Loan Home Mortgage Corp., 885 F. Supp. 537
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); N.Y.C. Coalition to End Lead Poisoning, - A.D. 2d -, 668 N.Y.S.
2d 1 (1st Dep't 1997); Santiago v. N.Y.C. Board of Health, N.Y. L.J., May 8, 1997, at
28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)
10. See 3004 Albany Crescent Tenants' Ass'n v. City of N.Y., N.Y. L.J., May 8,
1997, at 1 (S.D.N.Y.)
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bring in legal services there is a potential for attorneys' fees recov-
ery based on various federal and state statutes.
Forget about whether we ever recover those fees, forget about
the additional resources those fees bring to legal services programs;
these claims increase our clients' bargaining power and, hence,
their ability to settle favorably. And, as Jill alluded to, they are a
powerful incentive for our clients' adversaries to discontinue their
illegal conduct in the future.
And, of course, a necessary concomitant of both successful and
unsuccessful litigation is legislative and rule-making advocacy. 'If
litigation is successful in striking down a statute as unconstitu-
tional, then you have to become a player on behalf of your clients
in the legislative process that will amend the statute to make it con-
stitutional. If the court finds that a statute or a regulation does not
mandate relief in particular situations, does not have specific
enough provisions to protect your clients in particular situations,
then the full pursuit of your clients' claims means engaging in the
legislative or the rule-making process to try to amend the statute or
regulation to provide those protections.
Just to try to give you a sense of what I have been doing since the
restrictions were imposed, because of the ethical implications of
the attorneys' fees restriction and the other restrictions, I mainly
have been concentrating on bringing to disposition the other com-
plex matters I was handling that were not class actions, and I have
taken over some of the other more complex litigation in the pro-
gram - employment discrimination cases, for example - and
some of the appeals. I have spent quite a bit of time trying to re-
cover attorneys' fees in cases we brought before the restrictions
were imposed where we still are permitted to collect attorneys'
fees.
But I have heard some of us still in legal services try to rational-
ize the situation a bit. The restrictions have given us an incentive
to find ever more creative ways of representing our clients. Being
that our clients always have had two strikes against them, it always,
in my twenty-four years in legal services, has spurred us on to ever
more creative lawyering, which is one of the reasons we legal serv-
ices lawyers are so terrific. We now have found more and better
ways to represent our clients, once again, a testimony to how good
we are. But in many situations it is really just a second-best substi-
tute, as in the situation Valerie described. In that kind of situation
it is simply unacceptable.
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Like Jill and Valerie, I am a plaintiff in the New York-based liti-
gation challenging the legal services restrictions. As you know, we
have been subjected to a lot of criticism by persons who believed
the litigation would backfire and be the death knell of the legal
services program entirely. The bottom line for me in becoming in-
volved in that litigation is the ethical implications these restrictions
have on our practice, in not being able to use every applicable law,
every available legal procedure, and every available legal means of
advocacy for our clients, and the implications such limitations have
for the profession as a whole, that some lawyers who represent
some kinds of clients are being told they cannot use all the avail-
able legal means to represent them. For that reason I believed this
litigation simply had to be brought.
AS
ADDRESS: THE FUTURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES
ALEXANDER D. FORGER:
Your distinguished Dean, John Feerick, is role model enough for
more than one law school. I'm happy to be here. My friend Alan
Houseman I've called "the George Washington of legal services,"
but he rejects that title. But he certainly is the archivist and the
author and founder and guider of so much of legal services that it's
always really an honor to be involved with Alan. From time to
time, he is described as a "legal services lawyer," and I'm sure he's
proud of that mis-identification because he is, indeed, a legal serv-
ices lawyer.
I guess it was Bill Dean who said that I came on like gangbusters
in my ten minutes, and I'm sorry about that. But I've been under
wraps for three years in Washington, where you appear before con-
gressional committees for so-called hearings, but they're really lis-
tenings. You're there to be pounded on by the committee. But
there is always the need when you are representing a program for
great deference and restraint. While you might wish to throttle
most of those engaged in the hearing, that isn't acceptable conduct.
Now I'm going through the bends, having been free for three
months, and the wounds are beginning to heal.
I'm sorry the title of these remarks is called, "The Future of
Legal Services." That's why I came today, to learn the answer, and
I think each of you who has spoken today has made a contribution
to that issue.
When I went down to Washington at the end of 1993, it seemed
like the Golden Era was dawning for legal services. For the first
time in twelve years, everything seemed then to be lined up, the
stars, the moon. We had a friendly Administration that was sup-
portive, we had a supportive Board, as well as a supportive Con-
gress, so it looked as if there would be an opportunity for this
program to expand and to experiment with innovative ways of pro-
viding legal services for the disadvantaged in our country.
The first jolt I remember receiving was early in 1995 at the Sen-
ate Appropriations Committee. Senators Gramm and Hollings
teamed up on we unsuspecting witnesses. The senators had just
learned of a lawsuit brought in New Jersey by a legal services pro-
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
gram questioning New Jersey's new welfare reform legislation.'
That was sort of the opening round of many to come.
Even Senator Hollings, who had been a strong supporter of legal
services, joined in Senator Gramm's commentary which sounded
something like this: There are too many people riding in the wagon
and not enough pulling the wagon. Welfare as we know it must be
reformed, so too must the legal services program. It must be
brought back to where it was when Louis Powell was advocating on
behalf of lawyers for legal services. You folks have lost your way.
Class actions have run amok, and what you're doing is engaging in
political activity under the guise of assisting poor people. The fact
is that what you are seeking to do is to oppose that which we, the
legislators, have been elected to do. What you are doing is thwart-
ing the will of the country when you bring cases like that.
This senatorial upset led to the floor debate a few months later
of the Gramm/Hollings-sponsored bill to prevent legal services-
funded programs from representing people in litigating welfare re-
form. That seemed rather shocking to us in the bar and in legal
services programs. As the debate on the floor went forward, the
questions were put, I think by Senator Wellstone and others, to
Gramm and Hollings, such as: "But suppose the reform, so-called,
is patently unconstitutional, and suppose it states that only blue-
eyed people, and not green-eyed people, can have welfare?" The
answer was: "Somebody else can contest it. If that's unconstitu-
tional, so be it. But you're not going to frustrate the mandate of
the legislators with federal money." The proposed restriction was
narrowly defeated, but alas, not for long.
Then came the 104th Congress, where life really changed totally.
You have heard the various stories that went on, which I told you
of in my first appearance. In that same hearing, a freshman said to
me - again astounding, I thought - "what distinguishes the pro-
gram you represent from all these others requiring tough funding
choices, Small Business Administration, tree planting, all of these
other issues that are very important to our constituents. And how
can you conceivably distinguish yours?"
Fortunately, I recalled there was a Constitution. I didn't see any-
thing there about tree planting or small business, but there was
something about justice in the Constitution, and particularly in its
Preamble. I offered that up as a sufficiently distinguishing factor.
1. See C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995).
1998] ADDRESS: THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 335
The amount of funding was less of an issue than that of the class
actions. As I went from one member of Congress to another to
plead for the program, this type of litigation became the focal point
of criticism. There was a sense that the program was founded for
the purpose of handling the routine, day-to-day problems of poor
people and that what had evolved was major impact litigation,
which had politicized the entire program. While I tried to remind
folks of the original concept of the Legal Services Corporation, its
ability to serve the poor in the same manner as those who can pay
and have all of the tools and options available, that original pur-
pose was lost. Also, you will recall the other piece of the Legal
Services Corporation mandate was to seek to improve opportuni-
ties of poor people. Today that is now anathema, being viewed as
political and foreign to day-to-day legal work.
The class action then continued as the major factor. I had the
impression that many in Congress literally believed that a class ac-
tion meant "the lower classes against the upper classes." There re-
ally was a lack of awareness on the part of most of what a class
action was all about, except it was bad. Like obscenity, they could
sense it when they saw it.
And even our great staunch friend, Senator Domenici, said,
"You have to eliminate class actions if you expect the Senate to be
supportive of this program. I have to be able to stand up on the
floor and say 'no more class actions."' "Although," he said, "I
could live with only a partial restriction on class actions, I think I
have to give assurance that there are to be no more class actions
permitted." And so came the demise of the class actions.
A word about the Legal Services Corporation itself:
* It is a not-for-profit corporation directed by a bipartisan
Board, nominated by the President and approved by the Senate.2
We now have a former Congressman on the Board who is known
to many in Congress. But that, in itself, doesn't seem to make a lot
of difference.
e We have a new President who is a Republican, and I don't
think that makes a big difference. It would if he were a "liberal
Democrat," I'm sure.
* And then, there is the staff - hard-working, dedicated - who
know the program in and out, and they are caught right here in the
middle. Their friends say, "How could you possibly be promoting
these restrictions, much less enforcing them?" But, that is their
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1996b-c (1998).
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job, and they do it well. They are great folks. So they're really in a
bind.
* Then we have a union - Dwight, where are you? We do have
a Union. Of course, when I was Chair of Legal Services of New
York, Legal Aid Society, I was exposed to the Union which pick-
eted my office and urged Chase Bank to discharge my law firm
because it alleged that I was racist and had contempt for poor peo-
ple. But that was just union work putting pressure on the bargain-
ing process; I realize that.
When I spoke to the Union, as Dwight said, as I walked around
later on and spoke with some of the members, they said, "How can
you square the notion of technology with competence? Don't you
care about competence?" That certainly aroused my thought
processes. I recognize that the Union's role has been very support-
ive in getting us access. The UAW can open doors in Congress I
cannot. We just represent people who don't matter.
But there are points of difference. The Union is interested in job
security. Technology is a threat to job security, as is competition. I
think one of the bright spots of all the restrictions is the require-
ment of competition, although people thought it undesirable - be-
cause it would require representation to be offered at the cheapest
rate - that is not the case. Technology plays an important role
there.
Competition was a strong issue with Chairman Harold Rogers,
who has a large measure of control over our fate. He believed that
programs were able to do what they wanted and never suffered any
sanctions: "How many programs have you de-funded? Have you
ever de-funded a program?" During the 1980s, when we had a hos-
tile Board, but a supportive Congress, the legislation assured the
programs due process rights to protect them against funding cuts
simply because the Board didn't care for the kinds of cases they
were bringing. So there was a mistaken view that Legal Services
itself never policed these programs that were alleged to be violat-
ing restrictions with the inability to de-fund.
So along came competition, which we now have. It isn't all that
Congress thought it would be, but there is the opportunity through
competition to introduce some new programs and new faces and
new ways of delivering legal services, certainly through centralized
intake and the use of technology for research and for completion of
forms and the like. So we have the Union.
* And then, we have something that is a unique animal, called
the Inspector General. It's like having the Secret Service living in
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your organization. The Inspector General is directed to check on
fraud, waste, and abuse; that's his mandate. But there isn't any-
thing in this world that you can't embrace under that umbrella at
some time. As I used to say to him, "You could come in here and
tell me that I'm being wasteful in the way I'm using pencils and
paper. There's nothing outside your jurisdiction." And he searches
out your imperfections and freely reports the same to Congress,
whether it be the use of frequent flyer miles, credit card charges, or
the use of a parking space. Our detractors delight in hearing of our
perceived human frailties. You haven't lived until you've had an
Inspector General in your household.
But back to predicting the future of legal services. That's really
anybody's guess. The Corporation itself is one discrete piece.
Prior to 1974, legal services to the indigent was a matter of private
charity. OEO was there for a bit, but before that it was basically
lawyers volunteering to help those in need of access. So the LSC
history is relatively recent.
I did refer to the notion of a civil Gideon.3 Some of the purists
say: if LSC is terminated, we'll have instanter a civil Gideon - and
one could hope for that. The rationale of the real Gideon of 1963, I
think, is every bit as persuasive today in respect of the civil matters
as it was in 1963 on criminal matters.
There are many people who would believe that the loss of free-
dom would be no less traumatic than the other dangers and vulner-
abilities they may face in daily life. For the family out on the street
with no housing, or for the spouse who is being battered and
abused, or for the person deprived of needed health care, these
matters can be every bit as vital as those that affect people who are
faced with incarceration. Although some of the states themselves
may be willing to accept this reality, I doubt the federal govern-
ment will likely assume the burden, or that the Supreme Court will
soon find a constitutional requirement that it do so.
So, absent that, where do we go with the Corporation? The Cor-
poration is in trouble. I think as I said earlier, the moderates man-
aged to hold the line against the "Cats" (the Conservative Action
Team) by saying "we're reforming and we're taking care of the
abuses and the excesses." And the definition of what constitutes
abuses and excesses seems to be whatever is controversial. When
there is a plaintiff and a defendant, there is naturally a difference of
3. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amend-
ment is applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment and indigent defend-
ant in a criminal prosecution has the right to have counsel appointed for him).
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opinion, a controversy. Under the guise of eliminating contro-
versy, what is being eliminated is that sort of activity which most
offends influential constituents.
I have become very cynical, as you know, on this process. But
seeing it close at hand is something totally different than one would
see from the vantage point of a law firm in New York City when
dealing with Congress on matters of banking or tax. When you're
there representing people who lack influence or clout, the door is
generally closed.
Indeed, the more popular side of justice is the enforcement side.
It's most distressing to see in the budgetary process that the De-
partment of Justice frequently receives more money than it re-
quests, and it gets that money because the promise of more border
guards, more prisons, and more FBI agents pleases the voters back
home. It is difficult to digest the usual statement in the appropria-
tion process that "We all have to tighten our belts." When it comes
to funding for justice, you know, one side is bulging and the other
is really starving. The provision of legal services to the poor has
never been a money issue.
Before I left, I spoke with Congressman Rogers, on our Appro-
priations Subcommittee. He believed that the conservatives were
angry this year because they felt cheated last year. There appar-
ently was an agreement that LSC would get $141 million last year,
and indeed that is what came out of the Committee. But then the
moderates rebelled and that didn't happen. I think what they had
in prospect was $141 million last year and zero this year. The con-
servatives had the protection of a parliamentary rule of procedure
through the Rules Committee which it is said we will not have this
year. And at the recent hearing before Rogers' committee, the
chair wanted to know how much money it would cost to phase out
the program - not an encouraging sign.
Congressman Rogers professes to be a supporter, and I believe
he is, but he is subject to the influences of all of the hierarchy. If
you are a Subcommittee Chair and you do not have a prospect of
running for the Senate, you want to do well in the House, so you
do not readily disappoint the Chair of the Appropriations or the
Chair of the Budget or the Chair of Rules or the Speaker of the
House. This party discipline can be very effective.
I think what is likely to occur in the House is some effort to
change the LSC structure. McCollum and Stenholm had their dif-
ferences a year or two ago when we were in reauthorization hear-
ings. Stenholm, a Democrat, supporter of legal services, wanted to
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put the program under the Department of Justice. But McCollum,
who was our adversary in an earlier age and who is now our ally,
held out and prevailed.
In the reauthorization process, the Judicial Subcommittee chair,
George Gekas, is masquerading as a supporter of legal services.
His grievance is only, as he will say, against the bureaucratic struc-
ture in Washington called the LSC. So what he proposes is to elim-
inate the Corporation and put the program in the Department of
Justice, which in turn would make grants to entities created in each
state, which in turn would make grants to programs. As I pointed
out, it seemed to be adding another element of bureaucracy there.
He also said it would only have a five percent overhead charge per
year. Legal Services Corporation has been at about three percent.
I pointed that out, but that didn't seem to register.
And then, he has proposed eliminating the controversial and
political cases. The program would be limited to twelve kinds of
cases. As I recall, two of the kinds of cases might support his ob-
jective but not do much for poor people. One was probate, and, as
you all know, poor people are waiting to probate their wills and
manage their estates every day. Another was quiet title, and, of
course, poor people are always seeking to clear up title to their
homes and country estates.
There is so much smoke blown in the legislative process, to-
gether with the anecdotal rhetoric, that you reach the point where
you can't really believe. Do not ever breathe in what's out there,
and you shouldn't believe what you see.
In the floor debates, the end justifies the means. If you're
against legal services, you say whatever you want; that's okay. You
can even make up quotes, as was done by Representative Dornan
of California in declaring, on national television no less, that "the
President of Legal Services is particularly arrogant. Let me tell
you what he said: 'Congress can't tell us what cases we can take."'
A pure, absolute fabrication. I brought that to his attention.
Makes no difference. There is no accountability. You say what
you want to say - black is white or red - and you pass around all
of the long ago discredited stories. That is why I objected when my
colleague on this morning's panel seemed to be using one question-
able case as if representative of all LSC does. But that's the mood.
Most of Congress doesn't really know much about legal services,
what it does, or the importance of its work, and they take direction
from the detractors.
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The Farm Bureau is by far the most powerful influence. I think,
if Congress dared to do so, they would eliminate permitted repre-
sentations of migrant workers. The Farm Bureau, in its zeal to dis-
credit LSC, alleges lawyer misconduct such as extortion, blackmail,
and the like. It does so because LSC is extremely unpopular in its
efforts to enforce employment, housing, and environmental re-
quirements to which the growers are subject.
The next adversary, and to me the worst, because of its nomen-
clature, is the so-called Christian Coalition. There is little Christian
about this group and little that is religious. It's basically political.
It has an agenda that doesn't stand any test of reason. They have
now changed their nomenclature. Instead of calling for the elimi-
nation of Legal Services Corporation, they call for its privatization,
which of course means the elimination of Legal Services Corpora-
tion. But they're learning to use the language.
I think that the House is likely to come out with some element of
restructuring. It may go to the Department of Justice. If it does,
that really would be a fatal blow to the Legal Services Corporation.
The Senate, at least for now, I think will help sustain us. We likely
will get through the next year or two, but if you heed the words of
McCollum, we need to prepare for the day when there is no federal
legal services funding.
While major metropolitan areas will be better able to survive,
there are many jurisdictions in which federal funding represents
ninety-seven to ninety-eight percent of the money expended on
legal services. It is those areas that have no alternative. Obviously,
from their point of view, it is better to have some life than none.
And they do not share the view expressed by the some who re-
cently contested the latest restrictions that it may be more valiant
to end federal funding than letting it acquiesce in burdensome
restrictions.
On the executive side of government, the Administration has
been a disappointment in its advocacy for the program. We had to
struggle with OMB to get them to ask for $340 million this year
instead of $305 million, as they originally proposed.4 And while
the White House has been visible and vocal in support of NEA
(also on the Congressional hit list), including the President's re-
4. The final apprropriation to LSC for the fiscal year 1997 was $283,000,000.
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009 (Sept. 1996).
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marks in his State of the Union Address, 5 little has been said about
legal services for poor people. I think the White House could save
us, if we were a major priority. And it may yet do so if LSC actu-
ally faces extinction.
You know, I'm sympathetic to all of the stories we heard about
the class actions. These and the other restrictions are in most in-
stances inappropriate and unduly burdensome. But Congress can
give and Congress can take away. As I said earlier, it wasn't that
we sat down to bargain, because we never know what's coming out
until it's printed.
Maybe Congress could dream up a few more restrictions (I
don't know what would be left). Perhaps no litigation. Maybe no
migrants. Certainly the lawsuit in Texas,6 questioning absentee
voters, may prompt a prohibition on civil rights. There are not too
many items left in that restrictive category.
So I think we may squeeze through for another year or two. Per-
haps, if the political climate changes, that will help.
What can we do there? What we're trying to do is broaden the
base of support for legal services. Like Tip O'Neill says, "all poli-
tics is local." I can walk through the halls of Congress reciting the
Preamble to the Constitution, and that doesn't even attract the
floor sweeper. It makes no difference. What matters is what hap-
pens in the local congressional office.
The lawyers alone are suspect. Charles Taylor advocates the end
of LSC and federal funding of legal services because it's the law-
yers' responsibility and they can provide all of the service that may
be necessary. Indeed, the more they cut the program and the more
poor people continue to be served, it's self-proving, because there
will always be some poor person who is being served. The notion
of mobilizing the bar in support of legal services is important, but
we are suspect because Congress says we are merely trying to shift
our burden under Model Rule 6.17 to somebody else.
One bright spot on the horizon is the Interfaith Alliance, which
is a broad-based, religious consortium with chapters throughout, I
think, forty states now. Walter Cronkite has recently taken a pub-
lic position in support of the work of the Alliance and his opposi-
tion to the Christian Coalition. This group will be in close touch
with the members of Congress in their local communities.
5. Presidents Clinton's Message to Congress on the State of the Union, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997 at A20.
6. Casarez v. ValVerde County, 957 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Tex. 1997).
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.6 (1997).
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We were talking about asking the law school communities to
adopt a Congressman and let the member of Congress know how
many constituents are being served or how many were referred by
his or her office to a legal services program.
I tried to interest the business community in the issue of justice.
One CEO said that if I could interest twelve other CEOs of the
Fortune 500 that he would go forward and do ads and the like. I
could not get another CEO to sign on. There's nothing in it for
business. Shareholders, I guess, aren't going to be terribly
interested.
But what is the view of the public at large? One clue was in a
poll taken just before the 1996 election. This was taken in Stark
County, Ohio, which is said to be a bellwether community. 8 It is
conservative in political composition. A series of questions was
asked in the poll, one about welfare. Yes, people ought to get off
welfare and go to work, et cetera. One question was "do you think
they should cut funding for legal services to poor people?" and by
two-to-one the answer was "No." I think people in the community
understand it's an issue of fairness. And your neighbor should
have a chance to obtain legal help when necessary.
Apart from the Legal Services Corporation, we see many other
components of the delivery system that will affect the future of
legal services. Of course there will always be legal services provid-
ers. The many programs like Legal Aid that now exist outside of
the federal system are very important, as well as the entire private
bar doing its pro bono and volunteering. As to financial support -
I think the states and local governments are now becoming in-
volved in enacting filing fees, lawyer registration fees, expanding
ILOTA, and enacting general appropriations both at the state and
the local level. One good result out of our current siege has been a
mobilization of the states. They recognize that it is important for
their well-being to provide this. We are experimenting in the do-
mestic violence area with the use of technology in courtrooms and
victim centers enabling an individual client to print out court pa-
pers and other documentation, thus facilitating access.
And then, there is also the simplification of law and the use of
paralegals, all of which I think will be greatly expanded as time
goes on because of the force of circumstances. But the critical im-
portance in the Legal Services Corporation in this respect is the
structure that it provides. We found that the presence of a perma-
8. See generally Michael Winerip, An American Place - Shifting Allegiances;
Backers of Bush in '92 Are Turning to Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1996, at A10.
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nent office is essential in providing structure for the volunteer ef-
fort. The staff provided training, case assignment, support, and
oversight. This is particularly important to those volunteers who
may be unfamiliar with the legal issues requiring resolution. There
are some 130,000 or 140,000 volunteer lawyers now engaged in this
program.
Query: what is the future of legal services? I am confident that
there will always be the ability to provide legal services for many of
those in need. We are never going to reach all eligible clients or
resolve all their problems. But it is essential to keep pressure on
the federal government to play its essential role. How can it walk
away from all of the mandates in our fundamental documents and
leave it to charity to assume access to justice?
So while we're all talking to the converted - save one, perhaps
- it is an important program that Fordham sponsors. It's vitally
important for people to start discussing not only the problems that
we have, but how we're going to solve them.
For me, as I've said on many occasions, my three years in Wash-
ington was the best job a lawyer could have. There could be no
more nobler cause with which to be associated, and no more dedi-
cated and heroic figures to work with than those engaged day to
day in the front line of service. It is particularly encouraging to see
so many young people and law students interested in public ser-
vice. That's one of the more encouraging aspects of the view from
the Washington scene. There isn't too much there yet to be excited
about, but we've lasted 200 years. We'll probably go on for a little
while longer. Thank you.
-Tf9mg
A 41
As
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES PANEL
MATTHEW DILLER:
There have been three lawsuits brought that deal with these con-
stitutional issues, two challenges to the Regulations and one oppo-
sition to a motion to withdraw, which was the VarshavskyI case that
Valerie Bogart talked about. The decision in the Varshavsky case is
outside. There is also a preliminary injunction decision from the
case brought in Hawaii, 2 of which Steve Shapiro is one of the coun-
sel, and that decision is outside. And then, still pending is a deci-
sion on a preliminary injunction motion in a case called Velasquez,3
which was brought in the Eastern District of New York.
Here to address these issues we have three distinguished experts
on constitutional law. I'll introduce them in turn before they
speak. Going first will be, to my right, Eric Freedman, who is an
Associate Professor of Law at Hofstra University School of Law.
He is an expert in constitutional law with a special interest in,
among other things, the First Amendment. He is also Chairman of
the Civil Rights Committee of the Bar Association of the City of
New York. The Civil Rights Committee is currently working on a
report on the LSC restrictions. He is also a graduate of Yale Law
School, where he was an Editor of the Yale Law Journal. I'll turn it
over to you, Eric.
ERIC M. FREEDMAN:
Thank you.
It's true that the Civil Rights Committee of the New York City
Bar Association, which I preside over largely by the device of en-
couraging everybody else to do work for which I can take credit, is
working on a report on the subject of these restrictions. The peo-
ple who are actually doing the work are Professor Steven Loffredo,
who teaches poverty law at CUNY, and Emily Sack, whom you'll
be seeing on the next panel. All of you are encouraged to improve
our work by providing them with material, thoughts, ideas, and
data. But, of course, I speak here only for myself.
1. See Varshavsky v. Perales, 608 N.Y.S.2d 184, 202 A.D.2d 155 (1st Dept. 1994).
2. See Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Serv. Corp., 961 F.Supp 1402 (D. Haw.
1997).
3. See Velasquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22,
1997).
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I'm glad to go first on this panel, both because I need to be less
clever in what I say to distinguish myself from what already has
been said, and also because a couple of later speakers - who, as
you will hear, have somewhat more credentials in litigation and in
constitutional theory - can correct me where I go wrong. And,
perhaps not coincidentally, after I say a few brief words about legal
theory and the litigation outlook, my conclusion is going to be that
neither of those subjects is really where the focus probably ought
to be in the larger picture.
Now, the reason I can be fairly brief about the legal theory and
the litigation outlook is that, as the litigations to date have shown
and as I suspect this panel will demonstrate, as the issues have been
framed in court to date, the range of disagreements is actually
quite narrow.
To quote Burt Neuborne in his latest brief in the Velazquez liti-
gation in the Eastern District (a brief that I recommend to all of
you, by the way, because it contains the fullest available constitu-
tional attack on the LSC Regs): "The issue has essentially nar-
rowed to the question whether the LSC's new Regulations provide
a meaningful opportunity for LSC recipients to engage in restricted
activities using non-LSC funds." In short, the parties are con-
testing the "affiliated entity" issue. And that issue has to date
largely been fought out on the terrain of the First Amendment,
with a polite bow to a few other theories, like equal protection and
access to the justice system, that nobody has devoted very much
attention to.
The reason that the issue has narrowed that way is that, unlike
some Congressmen, the lawyers on both sides have been quite real-
istic in their reading of the existing case law. Everybody has done
a very moderate, sensible, professional job. And specifically, the
plaintiffs have not yet seriously challenged the restrictions on the
use of federal funds. The reason is straightforward: the test that
emerges from Rust v. Sullivan,4 a case in which Steve was involved,
is that where the government subsidizes an activity it can impose
restraints reasonably designed to make sure that only that activity
is being subsidized. So, to use Justice Rehnquist's example from
Rust, the National Endowment for Democracy can impose restric-
tions to make sure that it's not subsidizing Communism or Fascism.
And, as everyone implicitly recognizes, this is an objective, not a
subjective, determination.
4. 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
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To take a slightly different example, I'm sure some of you re-
member United States v. O'Brien,5 the draft card burning case.
Now, the subjective intent of the legislators in banning destruction
of draft cards was to crack down on hippie, war protester, draft
card burners. But objectively, a prohibition on the destruction of
draft cards could certainly be held to be reasonably related to the
administration of the draft, and so it was upheld.6
Similarly here, restrictions on representing prisoners, let us say,
will in all likelihood be upheld as a decision that other groups are
more urgent recipients of subsidized legal services, even though
subjectively all the legislators hate prisoners. After all, govern-
ment subsidies almost always go to favored groups and away from
disfavored groups. So the plaintiffs have not really spent a lot of
energy - and it is probably a wise use of resources - in attacking
restrictions on the use of federal money.
It is possible, of course, to think of extreme circumstances where
there's no way that the restriction furthers the objective of the ac-
tivity at hand. So, for instance, the recent Eleventh Circuit case,'
another ACLU case, invalidating a state statute that gave money to
all university student groups except the gay group, is an example
where there's no possible explanation that the restriction is
designed to further the purposes of the program. But, with regard
to the restrictions we're talking about, both sides seem to think
we're not in that area.
Specifically, the LSC, perhaps a bit belatedly, after losing both in
the New York Supreme Court in the Varshavsky8 case and in the
District of Hawaii in The Legal Aid Society of Hawaii9 case, now
recognizes - implicitly if not quite explicitly, because it sometimes
likes to keep throwing in these meaningless rhetorical flourishes,
like "money is fungible" (a proposition that does not decide any
case)- the core rule. The LSC basically argues that, with respect
to non-federal money, the government has no business imposing
any restraints broader than those needed to make sure that there is
the required separation between activities that can and cannot be
done with federal funds. And the only legitimate purpose of the
affiliate rules is to insure that.
5. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
6. See id.
7. See Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1997).
8. 608 N.Y.S.2d 184, 202 A.D.2d 155 (1st Dept. 1994).
9. 961 F. Supp 1402 (D. Haw. 1997).
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In an effort to come up with valid regulations to this effect after
the loss in the Hawaii case, the LSC promulgated regulations that
were modeled on the ones in Rust v. Sullivan."° So, as Alan House-
man suggested this morning, the issue between the parties, and the
one to which Burt's latest brief is addressed, narrows to the re-
straints on non-federal funds and to whether (a) these regulations
are in fact the same as those in Rust," and (b) if so, whether that is
good enough in this context.
On that second point especially, I rather think that Burt
Neuborne has the better of it. There is a key distinction between
two types of cases. On the one hand, you have the type of case like
Rust where the government is the speaker and the recipient of the
subsidy, the doctor, is just a conduit for the speech of the govern-
ment.12 On the other hand, you have the type of case like Rosen-
berger v. Rector,'3 which involved funding of student activities at
the University of Virginia, and FCC v. League of Women Voters, 4
which involved a ban on editorializing by stations that received any
amount of money from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,
cases where the recipients are speakers on their own behalf who
also happen to be receiving subsidies. And this case is of the sec-
ond type.
However, having said all that, one would also have to say that if
this case were to go to the Supreme Court, it's at best questionable
how it would come out. Leaving politics entirely aside, one reason
for this, which I'm sure Professor Mc Ginnis is going to enjoy com-
menting on, is Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,'"
arising here in all its ironic glory to absolutely persuade anybody
who wasn't already persuaded what a fantasy-land Washington is.
The LSC, as was correctly said this morning, has written regula-
tions to make the statute as defensible as possible, even though
there's very good ground to question whether those regulations are
in accord with Congressional intent. A good ground to question it
is, first of all, all the fantastic set of quotes that are lovingly
paraded in the Varshavsky16 opinion (which makes great reading)
about how we are going to de-fund the Left and how we are going
to make sure that these organizations which get any part of our
10. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
14. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
15. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
16. 608 N.Y.S.2d.184, 202 A.D.2d 155 (1st Dept. 1994).
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money don't get to do all these horrible things that we don't want
them to do.
And second, and perhaps more directly to the point, is the very
hostile reaction that the LSC representatives got when they last
showed up in Congress and were viciously attacked by Congress-
men for promulgating regulations that undermined the intent of
the statute. And that's entirely true; the regulations did undermine
the intent of the statute in an effort to defend the constitutionality
of the statute in litigation.
But, having done that, under Chevron,17 the courts are going to
defer to the interpretation of the statute given by the agency and,
as a result, it's perfectly possible that the statute may be upheld on
the basis that these implementing regulations make it constitu-
tional. In short, it is at least possible that because the LSC staff of
talented legal professionals has so successfully succeeded in under-
mining the congressional intent as to make the statute constitu-
tional under Rust v. Sullivan. 8
However, enjoyable as all that may be, in the end one has to say
that it is really all aimed directly at the capillaries. The truth is
that, no matter how idealistic or cynical you are about legal doc-
trine, at the very best, First Amendment doctrine only provides
breathing space before the majority works its will. That's what it's
designed to do, and, when it's functioning at its best, that's what it
will do.
So whether or not you think these litigations should have been
brought, they constitute a holding action at most, and the ultimate
answers here, as we just heard from Alex Forger, are going to be
legislative. I think it would be simply short-sighted to ignore that
and to fail to seize every opportunity for building coalitions, for
seeking to appeal to mainstream, centrist, fairness ideas in order to
do everything possible to win in the legislative arena. I think we
here, sitting on a constitutional panel, have to recognize that, with
the possible exception of a few relatively marginal issues, ordinary
politics is going to determine how this is resolved, and the outcome
of these issues will depend on nothing more or less than the pas-
sion with which people mobilize votes. That, after all, is what got
us to where we now are, and if we are to get to somewhere else,
that is what's going to do it.
Thank you.
17. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
18. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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MATTHEW DILLER:
To the extent that Eric has identified the constitutional issue as
kind of a Rust v. Sullivan II, we are very fortunate in having as our
other panelists two experts on constitutional law who are both in-
volved in different ways in the Rust litigation.
First, we have John Mc Ginnis, 19 who is a Professor of Law at
Cardozo School of Law, where he teaches courses in constitutional
law, international trade, law and economics, law and biology, and
so forth. He is a graduate of Harvard College and Oxford and
Harvard Law School. He also served as Deputy Assistant Attor-
ney General in the Office of Legal Counsel in the administrations
of Presidents Reagan and Bush. He writes extensively on constitu-
tional issues, and the First Amendment in particular. He is also the
1997 recipient of the Federalist Society's Paul M. Battor Award
given to an outstanding scholar under the age of forty.
Our next speaker is Steven Shapiro. He's the National Legal
Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, the nation's oldest
and largest civil liberties organization. As Legal Director, he su-
pervises a staff of nearly fifty lawyers that are involved in hundreds
of civil liberties cases throughout the country. Among other du-
ties, Mr. Shapiro directly supervises the extensive litigation activi-
ties of the ACLU before the U.S. Supreme Court. The ACLU
routinely participates in more Supreme Court cases each year than
any other private organization. Mr. Shapiro is a graduate of
Harvard Law School. Steve.
STEVEN R. SHAPIRO:
Thank you, Matt. I must say I disagree strenuously with Profes-
sor Mc Ginnis's view of the Legal Services Corporation, and also
with his view of what legal services lawyers do and ought to be
doing.
Legal services lawyers do not go into court and win cases be-
cause they make policy arguments that judges accept. They go into
court and win cases - and they win a lot of cases - because they can
convince the courts that the government is acting unlawfully: either
that it is disregarding the statutes that it has passed, or that the
statutes that the government has passed are inconsistent with over-
riding constitutional law. When legal services lawyers do that,
when they insist that the government comply with the law, it seems
to me that they are not advancing a radical welfare state agenda.
19. At the request of the speaker, his remarks have not been included below.
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Rather, they are performing the quintessential conservative task -
one that I would expect conservatives to applaud - and that is to
insist that the government comply with its own law, both statutory
and constitutional.
Having said that, let me bring people up to date on where the
litigation actually stands. In the Hawaii case, we obtained a pre-
liminary injunction that barred LSC from enforcing many of the
restrictions (although, regrettably, not all of the restrictions) in-
cluded in the prior regulations.2" The Justice Department did not
intervene to defend the prior regulations. However, it has now in-
tervened to defend the new-regulations. Both sides have filed mo-
tions for summary judgment, which are scheduled for argument in
the District Court on July 28th. I fully suspect that we will have a
decision by Labor Day.2'
As Matt said, the Velasquez case is still sitting in the Eastern
District awaiting decision on plaintiff's preliminary injunction mo-
tion. The papers in that case focused on the prior regulations. In-
evitably, however, the final decision will have to address the
constitutionality of the new regulations, which were not promul-
gated until last week.22
I also want to address, at the outset, Eric's assertion that the
decision to focus only on the restrictions on the use of non-LSC
funds somehow reflected a consensus that restrictions on the use of
LSC's own funds were beyond constitutional challenge. As a fac-
tual matter, it is true that the Hawaii case only challenges restric-
tions on the use of non-LSC funds.23 It is not true that the New
York case is so limited. The New York case includes a challenge to
some of the restrictions on the use of LSC funds, although the pre-
liminary injunction motion was limited to the restriction on the use
of non-LSC funds. The decision not to challenge any of the restric-
tions on the use of LSC funds in Hawaii was primarily a strategic
decision and, most definitely, did not reflect a legal judgment that
those restrictions were constitutionally proper.
20. Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Srv. Corp.,961 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Haw. 1997).
21. On August 1, 1997, the district court in Hawaii granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment and upheld LSC's revised regulations. See Legal Aid Soc'y of
Haw. v. Legal Serv. Corp., 981 F. Supp. 1288 (D. Haw. 1997). The case is now pend-
ing before the Ninth Circuit.
22. On December 22, 1997, the district court in Brooklyn denied plaintiffs' motion
for preliminary injunction and also upheld LSC's revised restrictions. See Velasquez
v. Legal Serv. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1997). That case is now
pending before the Second Circuit.
23. See Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw., 981 F. Supp. at 1288.
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Indeed, my own view is that the real nub of the legal dispute
becomes clearer if you focus for a moment on the restriction on the
use of LSC's own funding. We talk about the restrictions - and
there has been a lot of talk about the restrictions this morning - as
though all the restrictions were created equal. I do not believe that
is true. There are different kinds of restrictions. I think they have
different legal validity. I think some would be harder to challenge;
others would be easier to challenge.
But I feel very, very strongly that it is unconstitutional for the
government to say, even with its own money: "We will pay legal
services lawyers to represent welfare clients. They can go into
court and they can claim that a welfare statute does not apply to
their client, but they may not, as long as we are paying them, chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the underlying statute." I think that
is a due process violation, and I don't think that the government
can do that, even with its own money, any more than I think the
government could say to a public defender: "We are paying you to
represent this indigent criminal defendant, but because we are pay-
ing you, we will not permit you to file a suppression motion." I
think it would be unconstitutional if the government said that to a
public defender, and I think it's unconstitutional for the govern-
ment to tell a legal services lawyer: "You can undertake this repre-
sentation, but you can't with our money make the arguments that
you believe are in your clients' best interests." I think, likewise,
there are very, very serious equal protection arguments that can,
and ultimately will be, raised when the government says to one
group of people: "You may not have access and utilize the proce-
dural devices that are otherwise available to all other plaintiffs
within the legal system."
Those are not issues that are the forefront of these litigations at
this moment in time, but we can't lose the forest for the trees. As
much as we talk about unconstitutional conditions, and that is the
legal ground on which these issues are being fought out, what is
offensive about what the Congress has done in this case is the at-
tack on equal justice for poor people. That is fundamentally a due
process and an equal protection issue, and I think that there is
something to be gained by continuing to think of it in those terms.
Having said that, let me just come back to the unconstitutional
conditions issue for a moment. As we saw in the Hawaii case, the
restrictions imposed by Congress, at least as initially interpreted
and implemented by the Legal Services Corporation, were consti-
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tutionally indefensible.24 I think Judge Kay was correct about
that. I think he was incorrect in not striking them all down. I think
they should have all been struck down. But I think there can be no
serious dispute, under current constitutional doctrine, that the gov-
ernment may not use its own funds as a lever to require individuals
to forfeit the exercise of privately funded constitutional rights.
That's what the statute and the Regulations were designed to do,
and I think they were properly enjoined.
The case has become more complicated in the last week. The
new Regulations are going to be more difficult to challenge. They
do very closely track Rust v. Sullivan.2 5 They do not precisely track
Rust v. Sullivan. There are some differences between even the new
Regulations and the Rust Regulations, and I think the differences
between them are significant and revealing. But I also think
they're very different in context, and in that regard I agree more
with Eric than with John.
It seems to me the government has every right to say: "We are
paying you money to perform a job, and with our money you can
only do the job that we are paying you to do." Two principles flow
from that proposition. First, the government has the right to en-
sure that its money is being used for the purposes it intends, and
not for other purposes. Second, it has the right - or at least the
Supreme Court said in Rust v. Sullivan it has the right - to ensure
that the consumers of those services are not getting a mixed
message, and are not confusing what it is the government is saying
and providing with what it is that private funders are saying and
providing.26
In both of those ways, the legal services context is fundamentally
different than the Title X family planning context that was at issue
in Rust. For example, there is absolutely no need for the physical
separation requirements and the separate personnel requirements
imposed by LSC. The Legal Services Corporation has for many
years conducted audits of legal services programs (which for many
years have operated both with LSC funds and with non-LSC funds)
to ensure that the LSC funds were being properly spent and only
spent for their intended purposes. LSC has cited no empirical evi-
dence in the Hawaii case to support the claim that legal services
programs have been using federal money improperly. Lawyers are
accustomed to keeping time records that segregate how they spend
24. Id.
25. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
26. Id.
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their time. It is not a big deal, and I don't think these regulations
ever had anything seriously to do with the improper diversion of
federal funds into impermissible activities.
Likewise, the risk that somehow legal services clients walking
into a legal services office will be confused about what the govern-
ment's message is and what the government's message is not has
very little relevance in a legal services context. What the Supreme
Court said in Rust v. Sullivan, at least as amplified by its later deci-
sion in Rosenberger, was that Title X is a government program in
which the government is delivering its own message about how
best to achieve family planning.27 When the government pays for
legal services it is not delivering a message. Those lawyers are not
the mouthpiece of the government, they are in many instances the
adversary of the government, which is precisely what the Supreme
Court held when it ruled that public defenders could not be
deemed state actors for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.28
So I do not think that there is any legitimate need whatsoever to
impose anything more than a stringent bookkeeping requirement
on legal services programs, and to the extent that even the new
Regulations go beyond that, they ought to be found unconstitu-
tional. Now, whether the lower courts are going to be willing to
say that is another question. LSC's latest briefs have a superficial
appeal. When you line up the new LSC regulations in one column
and the Rust v. Sullivan regulations in the other column, they look
very much alike. However, it is an argument that ultimately ele-
vates form over substance. If one analyzes the regulations care-
fully and in context, the resemblance fades. In the end, the
differences are more important than the similarities. Nevertheless,
in some ways I am more confident if and when this case gets to the
Supreme Court than I am at the lower court level.
Let me just say one last thing and then I'll stop, because I would
like to open this up for questions. Just as I don't believe this case
and these regulations or the underlying congressional enterprise
ever had anything really to do with protecting the federal fisc, I
don't think this dispute has anything at all to do with economic
theories like cross-subsidization. I take a much more basic and
cynical view about all of this. I think what Congress was intending
to do was to make it extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, for
legal services lawyers to bring cases that Congress disfavored for
27. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Vinitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819,
832-37 (1995).
28. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
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ideological reasons. Unfortunately, they have now largely
succeeded.
If we wind up with the Rust v. Sullivan rules, we will be in a
better shape than if we had wound up with the rules that LSC ini-
tially adopted when the statute was first passed. But, the situation
will still be dire. As Congress understood perfectly well, it will not
be easy for legal services programs around the country to comply
with these regulations. There is simply not enough money out
there to create dual programs. And if there is enough money out
there, we ought not to be spending it to create dual programs. We
ought to be spending it to provide legal services for poor people
who already have too little of it in this country in the first place. So
I think it is very unfortunate at many, many levels that we have
come to this pass. We are now on a two-track process in Congress
and in the courts. Like Alex Forger, I have no better crystal ball
than anybody else to know where it is all heading.
Still, having been involved in numerous conversations about
these lawsuits for many months, I feel two impulses with equal fer-
vor. Sometimes I think they are complementary and sometimes I
think they are not, which is what has made this so difficult. On the
one hand, I feel very strongly that we have to do virtually anything
we can do to help legal services survive. It has been an immensely
valuable force in this society for the last twenty-five years. On the
other hand, I feel that we can't survive and lose our soul: that
somehow we have to protect our right to represent our clients fully
and not allow ourselves to-be put in the position where we're giv-
ing our clients second-hand legal representation that no wealthy
person in this country would accept for five minutes.
And so, we will see where it all heads.
MATTHEW DILLER:
Thank you.
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RUSSELL G. PEARCE:
Good afternoon. My name is Russ Pearce. I teach here at Ford-
ham and I am Associate Director of the Stein Center for Ethics
and Public Interest Law.
Let me talk a bit about the agenda of this panel, which is focus-
ing on the ethical issues relating to the restrictions. We on the
panel had spoken before and had talked about two particular ques-
tions: (1) whether the ABA Ethics Opinion1 on the restrictions is
correct - and I believe there are copies of that opinion outside, if
you're not familiar with it; and (2) how should the bar and individ-
ual lawyers respond to the ethical issues raised by the restrictions?
To that general question I would like to add one specific ques-
tion that was discussed earlier today, not addressed by the ABA
Ethics Opinion, and I would just sort of leave it for the panelists to
deal with it or not. That relates to the restriction on seeking attor-
neys' fees. As was suggested earlier, attorneys' fees can be a signif-
icant weapon to use in litigation. So the question comes up: in a
situation where attorneys' fees are available under statute and a
lawyer is barred by the restrictions from seeking attorneys' fees,
are there any ethical difficulties for the legal services lawyer; and, if
so, how should the lawyer address those difficulties?
Before we begin, I'm going to quickly introduce the panelists,
just very brief introductions, given the time of the day.
Our first speaker will be Helaine Barnett, the Attorney-in-
Charge of the Civil Division of The Legal Aid Society. I should
also add that Helaine is a former Chair of the ABA Ethics Com-
mittee and is currently a member of the ABA Board of Governors.
The next speaker will be Emily Sack, Coordinator of Legal Pol-
icy for the Center for Court Innovation. Emily wanted me to make
sure to remind people that the Center for Court Innovation and
the Center for the Community Interest, of which Dennis Saffran is
the Regional Director, are two very different entities. Emily,
among many other distinguished features in her background, is
currently Chair of the Subcommittee of the City Bar Professional
Responsibility Committee, which is, I believe, in the process of pre-
paring a report on the legal services restrictions.
1. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-399
(1996) [hereinafter Formal Op. 96-399].
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Our next speaker will be Steve Ellmann, who is a Professor of
Law at New York Law School. He is a distinguished scholar and
teacher in the field of legal ethics and runs a clinical theory work-
shop at New York Law School for faculty throughout the area.
The last speaker is Stephen Gillers, Professor of Law at New
York University School of Law. He suggested to me a line I could
use for the panel as a whole but I'll use for him. He needs no
introduction, but of course everyone is familiar with Professor Gil-
lers as a leading authority in the field of legal ethics.
The way we're going to proceed is we're going to start with He-
laine, who is going to summarize the ABA Opinion, and then we
will go through the rest of the panelists and hear their comments
and responses.
HELAINE BARNETT:
My purpose is to summarize the highlights of ABA Opinion 96-
399 (issued January 18, 1996), entitled Ethical Obligations of Law-
yers Whose Employers Receive Funds from the Legal Services
Corporation to Their Existing and Future Clients When Such
Funding is Reduced and When Remaining Funding is Subject to
Restrictive Conditions.2 Let me just say at the outset that I was not
a member of the ABA Ethics Committee when this Opinion was
issued, and the ABA opinions do not go before the Board of Gov-
ernors for approval. With that, let me proceed to highlight and in
some minor way critique or analyze some of the provisions that my
fellow panelists will deal with in more depth.
In setting the stage for a discussion of this Ethics Opinion, it is.
important to remember the context in which this Opinion was is-
sued and understand the circumstances which prompted the issu-
ance of the Opinion. As we heard this morning, changes in the
composition and leadership of Congress following the November
1994 election, with its focus on the "Contract with America," stim-
ulated efforts to revisit the federal commitment to funding civil
legal services for low-income people. In July of 1995, the House of
Representatives had already passed an appropriation bill in which
it severely curtailed the funding for the Legal Services Corporation
for 1996. 3 Congress was considering legislation fundamentally al-
tering the relationship between federally-funded legal services at-
torneys and their clients. The intended changes governing the use
2. Id.
3. See H.R. 2076, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 1221, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
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of LSC funds were anticipated to take place no later than January
1, 1996. The LSC had announced that competitive bidding re-
quests were due in November of 1995.
The ABA Ethics Committee explained at the outset of its Opin-
ion, which was issued on January 18, 1996, that the inevitability that
"new LSC funding legislation will include significant funding re-
ductions and some, if not all, of the practice restrictions contained
in the proposed legislation" has "prompted members of the legal
services community to request that the Committee provide gui-
dance regarding legal service lawyers' obligations under the new
funding regime."4 The Opinion goes on to explain that, "[b]ecause
of the great likelihood that the proposed changes will be enacted,
because the legislation is drafted to be effective upon enactment,
and perhaps to have retroactive effect, and because we have been
requested to do so, we take the unusual step of opining upon the
effect of legislation which is not yet enacted."'5 In fact, the ABA
Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants had
urgently requested guidance and pressed the Committee for speed
in issuing an Opinion even before the legislation became final so
that it could distribute it to constituent groups at the ABA Mid-
Year Meeting, which took place at the end of January 1996.
It is important to understand that the Committee proceeded with
the assumption that the restrictions would be in place and the
Opinion should give guidance as to how to deal with them. The
inquiry the Committee received indicated that legal services attor-
neys would have to abide by the restrictions since the alternative
would be no funding at all. In asking for guidance from the ABA
Ethics Committee, there was, however, no consensus within the en-
tire legal services community as to the best options to pursue.
Nonetheless, the Committee took on the task with the intention
neither to challenge nor to legitimate the restrictions, and pro-
ceeded to address what effect pending legislation in Congress
would have on the responsibilities and obligations of attorneys who
receive LSC funding. The Committee based its Opinion on the
"worst-case" scenario in order to provide the most complete gui-
dance that was possible at that stage.
Turning to the Opinion itself, it begins with a summary of the
proposed legislation. In addition to severely curtailing the amount
of money, the proposed legislation restricted the representation of
certain classes of clients, certain specific subject matters of repre-
4. Formal Op. 96-399, supra note 1, at 20.
5. Id.
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sentation, and certain methods or strategies that may be used in
pursuing the representation.6 While recognizing that it is unusual
to opine on the effect of legislation not yet enacted, there is prece-
dent for an ABA Ethics Opinion dealing with proposed congres-
sional legislation affecting legal services. In Formal Opinion 347
the ABA Ethics Committee dealt with pending federal legislation
in 1981 that was expected to reduce or eliminate legal services
funding at that time and addressed ethical obligations of legal serv-
ices lawyers to their clients in the face of drastically reduced
funding.7
However, proceeding in this way was not without pitfalls, since
the legislation was a moving target. In formulating this Opinion
the Committee assumed that the funding reductions that programs
would face would require them to severely reduce services to ex-
isting clients; prospective restrictive conditions would severely im-
pede competent and high-quality representation of a significant
number of existing and future clients; and both the funding reduc-
tions and restrictions would require withdrawal from ongoing rep-
resentation in large numbers of cases.
These assumptions may have been reasonable in the Fall of 1995,
but since the issuance of the ABA Opinion the final legislation that
was enacted did not include all of the restrictions originally antici-
pated. Indeed, in a number of important ways they differ from
what was anticipated at the time the Ethics Opinion was drafted.
As a result of focusing on pending legislation the Opinion inad-
vertently makes reference to provisions not in fact contained in the
final legislation, addresses issues that ended up not in dispute, and
suggests solutions to problems which may not exist or are over-
stated. So I might add to the list of questions to be addressed by
our panel, not only whether the Opinion is correct, but what is the
relevance of the Opinion today?
It is worth noting that, while LSC programs have at a number of
different points in time had some restrictions placed on the type of
clients that could be represented, or even on the type of actions
that could be brought, what had never been done before was to
impose restrictions on the legal arsenal of tools available to a client
once a person was determined eligible and the case involved an
acceptable subject matter. A restriction on how to proceed with
that case, and limitations on the kind of advocacy to pursue, had
never before been imposed.
6. Id.
7. ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, Formal Op. 347 (1981).
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It is also worth noting, and I think we will hear more from our
panelists, that this ABA Opinion makes no mention of Model Rule
5.4, which deals with the professional independence of a lawyer.
Section c of that provision states, "A lawyer shall not permit a per-
son who ... pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to
direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering
such legal services."9 Understanding the background of the spe-
cific request made to the Ethics Committee and the limits placed
upon it may provide some explanation of the total absence of refer-
ence to this Model Rule by the drafters.
The bulk of the Opinion discusses the ethical issues regarding
existing clients.' ° The Committee found three categories of obliga-
tions to existing clients arising out of the proposed LSC legislation:
the duty to prepare and plan for the reduction of services, the duty
to provide for clients whose current representation will be prohib-
ited, and the duty to ensure legal service lawyers fulfill ethical obli-
gations to remaining clients.
In detailing the obligation to prepare and plan, the Committee,
relying on the former 1981 ABA Opinion, said that three steps
were required with respect to the duty to prepare for a likely
change in the scope and the level of legal services: (1) notify clients
of impending changes; (2) set up priorities to determine which ex-
isting clients to retain and which new ones to accept; and (3) obtain
alternative funding or substitute representation for clients when
the lawyer must withdraw."
With respect to the notice provision to clients of impending
changes, the Opinion states that the Model Rules require "a legal
services lawyer to give all clients adequate notice of the impending
changes.., and how they may affect the clients' representations...
whether the lawyer anticipates being able to continue the represen-
tation, . . .to limit the scope of the representation, to refer the
matter to alternate counsel, or to withdraw' 12. Although Model
Rules 1.4(a) and (b), which deal with communications with clients,
require that a client be "reasonably informed about the status of a
matter ... to the extent reasonably necessary to enable the client
to make informed decisions regarding the representation,' 1 3 Model
8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 5.4. (1997)
9. Id. at Rule 5.4(c).
10. See, e.g., Formal Op. 96-399, supra note 1.
11. Id. at 21.
12. Id. (emphasis added).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.4 (1997).
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Rule 1.4 does not appear to require notice to clients who would not
be affected at all by the funding reductions or by the potential re-
strictions on the scope of practice. The notice provisions in the
Opinion thus appear overbroad, since many existing clients were
unaffected by the restrictions. A more realistic practice would
have been to give notice to clients who would be affected by the
funding restrictions.
Interestingly, in determining priorities, the Opinion states that
"legal services lawyers should consider the availability of alterna-
tive representation, any material adversity that will befall particu-
lar clients who are not served, and the particular problems faced by
indigent people generally in each locality. ' 14 The Opinion does go
on to sound a cautionary note that "[c]onflict with the proposed
funding restrictions ... is not sufficient justification for abandoning
existing clients."' 5 In obtaining alternative funding or representa-
tion, if an LSC attorney decides that withdrawal is necessary to
preserve funding to serve other existing clients, the lawyer must do
all the lawyer can to mitigate any material adverse effect on the
client. Of course, finding competent alternative counsel is the most
appealing way, but is not always workable. The Opinion did recog-
nize that "[a] particularly difficult situation arises in the context of
existing class actions, in which class certification is based in part
upon evidence that counsel for the class will fairly and adequately
represent the class."' 6
The Opinion expresses no opinion on what happens if leave to
withdraw is sought and not granted, but states that "legal services
lawyers have an ethical obligation to explore the boundaries of
continuing representation of existing clients under the new funding
scheme."' 7 The Opinion goes on to indicate that there may be an
ethical obligation "to determine whether there is a basis for secur-
ing a different interpretation of restrictive legislative language"
when seeking to withdraw before a court. 8
What is the duty to assist clients whose representations are pro-
hibited by the acceptance of LSC funding? The first consideration
is the effect of staff reductions, and there you have to determine if
the additional workload of the remaining lawyers affects their duty
to provide competent representation. "Some legal services organi-
14. Formal Op. 96-399, supra note 1, at 22.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id.
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zations," the Opinion goes on to say, "will be able to decline LSC
funding, some will set up a separate organization, and alternative
funding may be found." 19 Thus, the Opinion states again that "it
would be incorrect to conclude that discontinuing representation of
current clients is the only solution to these restrictions in every
case.
2o
But what happens where, despite every effort to obtain substi-
tute representation, a legal services attorney is presented with
high-priority cases that violate funding restrictions? The legal serv-
ices lawyer must balance obligations between existing clients who
were formerly eligible with obligations to existing clients who will
be hurt if the funding is lost. The Opinion states that "where the
LSC is the sole source of funds, the choice is clear: in such a cir-
cumstance, the lawyer's withdrawal from ineligible matters would
be mandatory, since it would otherwise be impossible for the law-
yer to fulfill her obligations to any clients,"' 21 thus violating the
Model Rule regarding competence.
Where the legal services office relies on a variety of sources, in-
cluding LSC funding, the decision is more difficult. Although the
Opinion does acknowledge that the Model Rules provide little gui-
dance when a lawyer must choose between two or more existing
representations,2 2 when choosing to represent a client who is ineli-
gible under the restrictions and the loss of LSC funds would not
require withdrawal from all pending matters or the closing of the
office, the decision remains with each LSC office to determine
"whether the greater good is served by forgoing LSC funding and
maintaining restricted representations - undoubtedly at the cost of
some services - or by withdrawing from prohibited matters and
preserving those aspects of the practice that comply with
restrictions. 23
The Opinion, however, makes no mention of the provision in
Model Rule 1.16 governing withdrawal that states withdrawal may
be mandatory when "required by law."' 24 The Opinion does not
discuss how the requirements imposed by federal law relate to the
Rules mandatory withdrawal provision when "required by law." If
continued representation in a case would require the attorney to
19. Id., at 24.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 25.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1997).
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violate the restrictions in federal legislation, could not the with-
drawal be said to be "required by law?"
What are the legal services lawyers' obligations to remaining cli-
ents once the decision has been made to accept LSC funding and
the accompanying practice restrictions? Again, the Opinion re-
quires notification about the new restrictions to each remaining cli-
ent, even if they do not seem to be an issue for that particular
client.25 The Opinion also requires legal service attorneys "to no-
tify clients that circumstances, such as incarceration or a change in
immigrant status, will likely make them ineligible for further legal
services. '26 This notice requirement does not appear to flow from
the text or commentary of Model Rule 1.4,27 and there is no men-
tion in the Opinion that it could have a potentially negative impact
on the attorney-client relationship.
The Opinion does recognize difficult ethical issues arise if an ex-
isting client's case may require future advisable or necessary ac-
tions that would violate the LSC practice restrictions and states
that a legal services lawyer who accepts LSC funding again should
inform all clients of the accompanying practice restrictions and ob-
tain their written agreement to abide by those' restrictions, even if
it does not appear likely that a particular representation will run
afoul of those restrictions.28
Model Rule 1.2, which permits limiting the scope of representa-
tion of a client if the client consents after consultation,29 does not
appear to suggest that the lawyers must give notice to obtain con-
sent from a client when there is no practical likelihood that the
restrictions on representation will affect that particular client. In
addition, in discussing client consent, the Opinion did not address,
with respect to current clients, whether it is realistic for a current
client to give consent without it being inherently coercive.
Moreover, are all lawyers required to inform potential clients at
the time of employment of all possible issues which might subse-
quently require the lawyer to withdraw? If not, should not legal
services lawyers be required to seek client consent to the restric-
tions only in circumstances when the restrictions may reasonably
be expected to affect their representation?
25. See Formal Op. 96-399, supra note 1, at 25.
26. Id. at 26.
27. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 1997).
28. See Formal Op. 96-399, supra note 1, at 27.
29. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1997).
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The Opinion then goes on in a very brief section to discuss the
ethical duties of legal services lawyers to future clients, recognizing
that attorneys have more flexibility in accepting new clients than
they do with existing ones, as far as placing limitations on the rep-
resentation.30 Although it is still necessary to secure client consent
after fully explaining the implications, the attorney may decline the
representation if the prospective client does not agree. If the law-
yer determines that forgoing specific legal options would seriously
compromise the duties to the client, the lawyer must decline
representation.31
What about limiting the scope of representation for future cli-
ents? Legal services programs have limited the scope of represen-
tation and entered into limited retainer agreements in a variety of
circumstances, for instance, in advice-only situations and in repre-
sentations at trial, when we do not agree to take an appeal should
we lose. However, with respect to new clients, could not new cli-
ents knowingly consent to a risk? Although the Opinion really fo-
cused on the requirement of withdrawal from present
representations, as more times goes by, clearly the larger concern
will be the impact of the restrictions prospectively.
The final section of the Opinion deals with mandated pre-litiga-
tion disclosures.32 As we learned this morning, since the federal
law that was enacted is quite different from the provisions ad-
dressed in this section of the Opinion. I am going to skip over that
section, only to state that the Opinion still has somewhat troubling
language regarding a possible waiver of the attorney-client
privilege.
I would like to conclude briefly by commenting that the Opinion
implies, and even specifies, an ethical obligation to non-clients. 33 I
think we may hear more about this by the other panelists. For ex-
ample, the Opinion discusses setting priorities for existing clients,
and then goes on to suggest that "there is an ethical obligation to
consider material adversity that will befall particular clients who
are not served and the particular problems faced by indigent peo-
ple generally in each locality. ' '34 The Opinion also suggests that in
deciding whether to continue to represent existing clients who be-
come ineligible once beginning representation, the lawyer should
30. See Formal Op. 96-399, supra note 1, at 27-29.
31. See id. at 29.
32. See id. at 29-30.
33. See id. at 22.
34. Id.
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take into account the interests of other clients who would go un-
represented if LSC funding is lost.35
While it may be appropriate for the ABA in issuing standards for
providers of civil legal services, or for the LSC in promulgating
Regulations, to suggest priority-setting processes used by legal ser-
vice programs to take into account the needs of future or potential
clients, is there an ethical responsibility to potential clients that re-
quires certain actions or procedures be undertaken by LSC recipi-
ents? Ethical responsibilities, with very few exceptions, flow
generally to existing clients.
The Committee concludes by urging great care and caution as
legal services attorneys "negotiate an ethical and legal mine
field."'36 While the Committee calls on the legal profession as a
whole, the Opinion points out that this crisis differs from past ones
since "the profession cannot absolve itself of responsibility simply
by writing a check to the local legal services office."37 The Com-
mittee urges the legal community to participate in the pro bono
representation of the indigent, to establish and support legal serv-
ices organizations independent of LSC funding, and for the courts
to ease the burden of appointing counsel. Finally the Opinion
states that "[i]n the end, the only real solution is for this country to
recognize the need to fully fund lawyers for the poor free from
restrictions that hamper their ability to serve their clients. '38
For your information, subsequent to its issuance, the Opinion
has been the subject of controversy within the legal services com-
munity itself and among some of its supporters. Requests to the
ABA Ethics Committee to modify the Opinion after the legislation
was passed have not been acted upon to date. There have been no
substantive scholarly critiques of the Opinion. There have been no
federal or state reported cases which cite to the Opinion. Only two
state ethics opinions have issued opinions which basically adhere to
the Opinion. They are Utah State Bar Committee Opinion 96-0731
and State Bar of Michigan, Committee on Professional and Judicial
Ethics Opinion R-1-252.4 °
Perhaps the concluding paragraph of the Opinion may turn out
to be the most valuable of all, for it raises the important institu-
35. See id. at 22.
36. See id. at 30.
37. See id. at 31.
38. Id.
39. See Utah State Bar Commission, Opinion 96-07 (1996).
40. See State Bar of Michigan, Commission on Professional and Judicial Ethics,
Opinion R-1-252 (1996).
366
ETHICAL ISSUES PANEL
tional questions and broader issues as to: what is the role of the
private bar in pro bono representation, recognizing that aspects of
poverty law are indeed a specialty, like antitrust law; what is the
role of the federal courts, state administrative law judges, and
housing court judges in the appointment of pro bono counsel; what
may be the role of bar associations and law school faculties; what
are the resources that are needed to ensure competence, con-
tinuity, and a permanent stream of funding so that there is access
to legal services programs; and who should be at the table in help-
ing to shape the response on an emergency basis and in developing
a long-term plan?
RUSSELL G. PEARCE:
Thank you, Helaine. Emily Sack.
EMILY J. SACK:
Thanks, Russ. I did want to mention that though I am on the
Committee on Professional Responsibility and, as Eric Freedman
mentioned at the last panel, I am working on a joint report with the
Civil Rights Committee on the implications of the legal services
restrictions, the views I am presenting today are my own.
In answer to Russ's question, I believe there has to be a response
to these restrictions. And, with due respect to the ABA Opinion -
and I recognize they may have been answering the question they
were asked - I think it is really necessary to take an approach that's
dramatically different than the ABA Opinion. The ABA Opinion
focuses on individual legal services lawyers and tries to guide them
in how to conform their conduct to live within the restrictions and
adhere to the ethical rules.
The problem with this approach, as I see it, is that it ignores two
very important contexts. First, it really doesn't address the larger
issue of the broader impact of these restrictions on attorneys. I
think that we need to focus not just on an individual attorney, but
to address the legislation for what it is and its impact on basic prin-
ciples of professional responsibility. As one of the panelists from
the legal services community mentioned at an earlier panel this
morning, this affects the profession as a whole. I don't think that
the burden should be on the individual legal services lawyer to be
faced with the individual ethical dilemma and have to make the
response by himself or herself.
I'm going to go through in a minute some of the very basic prin-
ciples of professional responsibility on which the restrictions have
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an impact. But I want to say that if we don't respond in an active
way, I think in some sense we are acquiescing to what is a genera-
lized attack on legal services. So I think that it has to be general
and it has to be by the community.
The second context which I think that the ABA Opinion basi-
cally - I was going to say ignores, but maybe just doesn't give
enough credence to - and I believe one of my co-panelists is going
to speak a little bit more about this - is the true availability of
lawyers to do this work. It assumes a perfect world in which if a
lawyer must make a choice to withdraw, there will always be an-
other lawyer available, one who is qualified to handle the case.
Again as the legal services panel spoke about earlier, in reality
that's simply not the case.
The ABA Opinion talks about "balancing," whether it is worse
to lose one client's representation or risk de-funding4' and what
impact that will have on the multitude of remaining clients, but
what that balancing really doesn't address is that either decision
would result in a loss of representation to some client or set of
clients. And if there is a withdrawal, the greatest likelihood is that
no substituting attorney would be available. So I think we really
need to look at these restrictions in the real world, where there is a
lack of adequate legal services available to the poor, both in the
pro bono community and among other public interest lawyers.
I will speak very briefly about some of the basic principles of
professional responsibility, which I assume are pretty familiar to
this audience. I will just state a couple that are really impacted by
the legislation. The first is the responsibility of competent repre-
sentation.4" The rule states that competent representation requires
the thoroughness reasonably necessary for the representation.
Comment 5 to Model Rule 1.1 states that competence includes
"the use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of com-
petent practitioners. ' 43 Where the standards of competent practi-
tioners require that certain of these methods and procedures be
used, the restrictions conflict with this Rule.
The second is the scope of representation under Model Rule 1.2,
to which Helaine alluded, which delineates the right of the client to
consult about the means to be used in achieving the objectives of
the legal representation.44 Comments 4 and 5 to Model Rule 1.2
41. See Formal Op. 96-399, supra note 1, at 18.
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1997).
43. Id. at Rule 1.1 cmt.
44. Id. at Rule 1.2.
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state explicitly that while the scope of services provided by a law-
yer may be limited by agreement with the client, an agreement
concerning the scope of representation must accord with the Rules
of Professional Conduct and other law.45 Thus, the client may not
be asked to agree to representation so limited in scope as to violate
Rule 1.1. The statute, of course, explicitly limits legal services law-
yers' methods and objectives of representation.46 However, where
a particular method is necessary to competently represent a client,
under the Model Rules, a legal services attorney cannot ask a client
to forgo this method or objective, so that the statute places the
attorney in direct conflict with the Model Rules.
The third basic principle is zealous representation despite ob-
struction or opposition. Model Rule 1.3 states that "a lawyer shall
act with reasonable diligence in representing a client. ' 47 Comment
1 to the Rule explains this concept. It says:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite
opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer,
and may take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required
to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client
and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.48
Zealous representation is related to another fundamental con-
cept of professional responsibility which is affected by the legisla-
tion: the independence of professional judgment and the rejection
of third-party interference. Canon 5, first of all, states "a lawyer
should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a
client. '49 This principle is articulated also in Model Rule 2.1: "In
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent profes-
sional judgment and render candid advice."50 In addition, Model
Rule 5.4(c) states:
A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs,
or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct
or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such
legal services. 51
45. Id. at Rule 1.2 cmt. 4 & 5.
46. See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 1602 - 1642 (1998).
47. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1997).
48. Id. at Rule 1.3 cmt. 1.
49. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 5 (1970).
50. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1997).
51. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-21 (1995).
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Section 5 of the Code's Ethical Considerations expands on the
lawyer's duties in the face of potential interference by third parties.
E.C. 5-21 states that:
The obligation of a lawyer to exercise professional judgment
solely on behalf of his client requires that he disregard the
desires of others that might impair his free judgment. The
desires of a third person will seldom adversely affect a lawyer
unless that person is in a position to exert strong economic,
political, or social pressures upon the lawyer.52
The legislation does subject the legal services lawyer to this kind of
pressure.
There are other principles, but I think I'll stop there. I just want
to raise two other points. One is that, also within the Model Rules,
there is a broad principle of commitment of the profession to legal
access for the poor. In the Preamble to the Model Rules, it states;
The lawyer is a public citizen having special responsibility for the
quality of justice, who should employ her knowledge in reform of
the law.53 The Model Rules state that "a lawyer should be mindful
of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that
the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford
adequate legal assistance, and should therefore devote professional
time and civic influence in their behalf 54 A lawyer should aid the
legal profession in pursuing these objectives. ' ' 5
The other point I want to make, because I'm not sure it was
mentioned at any point today, is that, when it established the Legal
Services Corporation, Congress explicitly intended for its lawyers
to be bound by professional responsibility obligations. 6 Within
the statute is a reference to the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
I just want to conclude by saying that, again, I believe we have to
respond to the statute by looking at the broad view rather than at
the individual attorneys' dilemma. That is not the spirit in which
the restrictions were enacted, and it is not a statute that has an-
other purpose with just an incidental impact on the individual law-
yer. It's a purposeful attempt to limit the activities of a whole
segment of the bar, and I think it deserves a broad response. We
need to challenge the statute's validity. It is not just the individual
52. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 5.4(c) (1997).
53. Id. at pmbl.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994).
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legal services attorneys' job, though they certainly have a right, and
perhaps an obligation, to do so. But beyond that, we need to speak
as a policy matter against these restrictions. The organized bar
needs to make a policy response to these restrictions.
RUSSELL G. PEARCE:
Thank you, Emily. Steve Ellmann.
STEPHEN ELLMANN: 57
Both of the people who have spoken so far have mentioned
Model Rule 5.4(c). I would like to belabor this point. The 5.4(c)
issue - whether the Legal Services Corporation restrictions consti-
tute an unacceptable interference in lawyer-client relationships by
a third-party footing the bill for the representation - goes unad-
dressed in the ABA's Formal Opinion 96-399.58 That opinion re-
sponds to the LSC restrictions not by determining whether these
restrictions themselves are unacceptable but rather by examining
how lawyers can comply with these restrictions without violating
other ethical commands. The Formal Opinion's focus is important,
but we should not assume that the LSC's restrictions are compati-
ble with lawyers' professional duties.
As you've all heard, Rule 5.4(c) says that "[a] lawyer shall not
permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to
render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's
professional judgment in rendering such legal services."59 There is
also another provision analogous to this one, Model Rule 1.8(f),
which says that another person can compensate a lawyer for repre-
senting a client only if "(1) the client consents after consultation;
[and] (2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship. "60
These ideas are not new. On the contrary, Rule 5.4(c) is almost
identical to DR 5-107(B) of the Model Code.61 Canon 35 of the
57. Professor of Law, New York Law School. I thank the Editors for the
opportunity and time to revise these remarks, Nicole Krug for valuable research
assistance, and Alan Houseman for the extensive information he provided on the LSC
rules and the ABA's ethics opinion regarding them.
58. See Formal Op. 96-399, supra note 1.
59. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 5.4(c) (1997).
60. Id. at Rule 1.8(f)(1)-(2). In addition, client confidentiality must be preserved.
See id. at Rule 1.8(f)(3).
61. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(B) (1983).
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ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, the predecessor to the Model
Code, was to quite similar effect.62
Several older cases confirm the importance attached to the pro-
hibition on interference with professional judgment. The establish-
ment of public interest and legal services groups has not always
met with universal acclaim, and in a number of cases state courts
were called upon to hold that these entities were in fact unlawful.
One theory advanced to demonstrate their unlawfulness was that
these bodies, which were organized as not-for-profit corporations,
were in breach of laws prohibiting the practice of law by corpora-
tions. The answer given in some of these cases was roughly this:
that these groups were not in breach of these laws provided that
they did not constrain the independent professional judgment of
the individual lawyer on behalf of his or her clients.63
This logic suggests that if those corporations had been con-
straining their lawyers' professional judgment, then they would
have been in breach of prohibitions on corporate practice of law -
and they would have had to go out of existence. Similarly, if a legal
services organization complies with the new federal restrictions,
and if in doing so it interferes with its lawyers' professional judg-
ment, then the organization itself may be jeopardizing its right to
exist in any state where such prohibitions still exist. 64 More impor-
tant, these cases underline the importance of the principle that law-
62. The first paragraph of Canon 35 of the ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETH-
ICs (as amended through 1970) reads:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited
by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client
and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He
should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in
the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be
personal,. and the responsibility should be direct to the client. Charitable so-
cieties rendering aid to the indigents are not deemed such intermediaries.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 35 (1970).
63. See Azzarello v. Legal Aid Society, 185 N.E.2d 566, 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962);
Touchy v. Houston Legal Foundation, 432 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex. 1968). Cf. Applica-
tion of Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., 274 N.Y.S.2d 779, 787 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1st Dept. 1966) (refusing to approve incorporation certificates for proposed legal
services groups in part because "the lawyer operations would be subject ultimately to
lay control"). Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court has twice found that corpora-
tions delivering legal services were engaged in the practice of law, but allowed them
to continue doing so in part because the lawyers in these organizations were exercis-
ing unfettered professional judgment. In re 1115 Legal Service Care, 541 A.2d 673
(N.J. 1988) (involving prepaid legal services); In the Matter of Education Law Center,
Inc., 429 A.2d 1051 (N.J. 1981) (involving public interest law).
64. New York, as it happens, no longer has such a prohibition on the corporate
practice of law, and in an era of "professional corporations" probably few states do.
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yers' judgment must not be constrained by third parties, even those
who pay the bills.
Despite the existence of these cases, and despite the firm lan-
guage of the ethics codes, it is not self-evident that they actually
apply to the problem we are discussing today, and so I want to
spend a little time examining whether, and why, Model Rule 5.4(c)
(and DR 5-107(B)) do actually bear on this situation.
Model Rule 5.4(c) says, again, that "[a] lawyer shall not permit a
person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render
legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's profes-
sional judgment in rendering such legal services."65 This command
clearly does not mean that if you are hired by lawyer X as her
subordinate lawyer, lawyer X cannot tell you what to do in a case.
Lawyer X can do this; subordinates not only should follow their
lawyer-supervisors' directions, but they are even absolved of ethi-
cal violation where they "act[ ] in accordance with a supervisory
lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of profes-
sional duty. '66
Now it might be said that all the limits that the individual legal
services lawyer is under are imposed by that lawyer's supervisors
- other lawyers - and so it might be argued that no non-lawyer is
regulating anybody's professional judgment. But this argument
blinks reality. The supervisory lawyer in a legal services office is
not the "employer or payer." Instead, that supervisor is also an
employee of the entity, the not-for-profit corporation organized to
provide legal services through these various employees, and the su-
pervisor enforces the Legal Services Corporation restrictions be-
cause the entity decides that it will adhere to them. Of course this
corporation is not a natural person, but it seems to me no stretch at
all to understand the word "person" in Rule 5.4(c) to include artifi-
cial persons, such as legal services corporations. When the board
of a legal services entity votes to continue to receive Legal Service
Corporation funds and to adhere to the Legal Service Corpora-
tion's limits, then if those limits constitute restrictions on the law-
yers' professional judgment on behalf of clients, the entity must be
seen as the "person" that imposed them.67
65. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(c) (1997).
66. Id. at Rule 5.2(b).
67. It might be argued that as long as the entity's decisions about legal services are
made by lawyers - for example, as the members of the organization's governing
board - these decisions do not constitute third-party non-lawyer intervention into
attorney-client relationships. Some courts have insisted that all decisions about which
cases to accept and how to handle them "must be made by lawyers, either employed
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So are the LSC limits actually restrictions on a lawyer's profes-
sional judgment on behalf of clients? My answer is that some are
not, but some are. As I understood Steven Shapiro did earlier to-
day, I would differentiate between classes of restrictions. In partic-
ular, it seems to me that it is not a restriction on a lawyer's
professional judgment in serving a client to restrict his or her
choice of which clients to serve. The 5.4(c) problems only become
acute when the restrictions deal not with who can be taken as a
client, but what can be done on the client's behalf. When, how-
ever, the lawyer is told by the person who pays or employs her that
she cannot use her independent professional judgment on a case
that she is now handling, then 5.4(c) has been breached. More-
over, I would argue that the constraint on the lawyer's judgment
need not be so intense as to make her work incompetent and a
violation of Rule 1.1.68 The lawyer may be doing the best she can,
and her best may be competent - but if she has been forbidden to
consider possibilities that she otherwise might have chosen, in the
exercise of her independent professional judgment, then Rule
5.4(c), read according to its terms, has been violated. And surely it
is clear that where a lawyer cannot challenge welfare reform policy,
or cannot bring a class action, or cannot initiate legislative advo-
cacy, or cannot seek attorneys' fees, her independent professional
judgment has indeed been regulated.69
by the organization or members of its board, who are fully cognizant of governing
professional standards and who are responsible to this Court for maintenance of those
standards." In the Matter of Education Law Center, Inc., 429 A.2d 1051, 1058 (N.J.
1981); see also Application of Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., 274
N.Y.S.2d 779, 787 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1966) (requiring that "the executive staff,
and those with the responsibility to hire and discharge staff from the top to the lowest
lay echelon must be lawyers"). But even if this logic supports characterizing the legal
services agency boards' decisions as supervisory-lawyer decisions rather than third-
party-payer interventions, the Rule 5.4(c) problem might not go away. We would
then have to recognize that the Legal Services Corporation, or ultimately the United
States government, are akin to third-party-payor "persons" who are intervening in the
decisions of the legal services agency boards, as well as ultimately in the decisions of
individual legal services lawyers.
68. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1997) ("A Lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation."). For a discussion of the circumstances in which limits on the law-
yer's exercise of judgment would breach Rule 1.1, see infra note 91 and accompanying
text.
69. Each of the limitations referred to in the text has in fact been imposed, albeit
often with some qualifications. Alan Houseman details the restrictions imposed on
lawyers who receive LSC funding in an extremely helpful article. See Alan W. House-
man, Legal Representation and Advocacy Under the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 932 (1997). He
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If this reading of Rule 5.4(c) is correct, what follows is that the
lawyers who endure such restrictions are in breach of 5.4(c). So,
presumably, one would have to say that lawyers at entities that are
imposing such restrictions on the lawyers had better leave those
entities, because as long as they stay, they would appear to be in
breach of 5.4(c).
Now, one could respond here, "Well, can't these unfortunate
lawyers avoid being in breach of 5.4(c) by simply not taking any of
the cases where their professional judgment might wind up getting
restricted?" Through this strategy, the lawyers could avoid having
restrictions on their handling of cases imposed on them by narrow-
ing their caseload to those cases in which their employers have no
intention of imposing any restrictions. I have to acknowledge that
it is probably possible to view every restriction on what you can do
for a client as simply a restriction on which clients you can take.
That is, you can only take "clients for whom you won't do X, Y,
and Z."
But I would resist the argument that lawyers can escape the
5.4(c) problem in this fashion. I do so for two reasons. First, and
most fundamentally, lawyers can't altogether predict which cases
will later call for them to exercise professional judgment that
they're not allowed to exercise. As a result, it seems inevitable that
they will sometimes find themselves actually representing clients
for whom, absent the legal services funding rules, they might want
to consider and then might choose to adopt one or more of the
strategies that they .are obliged not to choose.
Second, the range of cases in which these strategies might be
worth professional consideration seems wide enough that lawyers
who actually excluded all of them in advance would likely fall into
other breaches of professional duty.7° While these breaches might
writes that "[r]ecipients of LSC funds may not initiate legal representation or chal-
lenge laws.., enacted as part of a reform of a federal or state welfare system," id. at
940, although this prohibition does not bar all challenges to welfare policies or pre-
vent advocacy for individual claimants affected by welfare reform law provided the
representation does not "challenge existing statutory law." Id. at 941. He also ex-
plains that "LSC-fund recipients may not initiate or participate in class action litiga-
tion." Id. at 942. There are also sharp, though not total, restrictions on legislative
advocacy. See id. at 943-47. Finally, in many, though not all, cases "LSC-fund recipi-
ents may not claim or collect and retain attorney fees." Id. at 943 n.49. For the statu-
tory basis of the new restrictions, see Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and
Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-134, § 504, 110 Stat. 1321; Omnibus Consoli-
dated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. 104-208, § 502, 110 Stat. 3009.
70. It is somewhat unclear just how great the impact of these restrictions will be.
The plaintiffs in a case challenging the restrictions have contended that "Legal Serv-
ices lawyers representing indigent clients in over 600 class actions nationwide have
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not themselves be potential grounds for discipline, they would be
improper nonetheless, and the prospect of such problems weighs
against accepting any "solution" to the 5.4(c) problem that gener-
ates these other difficulties. One such breach of duty would be a
violation of the lawyers', or more precisely their employers', statu-
tory obligation to work out priorities for service that respond to
client need.71 In addition, I think that lawyers who so circum-
scribed their practice would be violating - or at least they would
be in tension with - their and our duty under Rule 6.1 to make
legal services available to those who really need them.72 Rule 6.1,
to be sure, is not an enforceable command, but it remains a part of
professional obligation.73
been forced to resign as class counsel, or have been forced to assume 'non-adversary'
monitoring status." Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary In-
junction at 7, Velazquez v. Legal Services Corporation, No. 97 Civ. 00182 (FB)
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1997). In contrast, Alan Houseman believes that "over 90 percent
of the work done in legal services in 1995 could continue, and over 95 percent of the
cases brought to court in 1995 could be brought." Houseman, supra note 69, at 939
n.27. Houseman is an experienced observer, and his estimates may well be correct.
The remaining 5 to 10 percent, however, contain some very important work, as the
Velazquez plaintiffs argue and as Houseman himself recognizes, Houseman, supra
note 69, at 939 n.27. Moreover, although the new rules extensively restrict what LSC
fund recipients can do even with non-LSC funds, there have been restrictions on the
use of LSC funds for many years. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996f(a)(5), 2996f(b) (1997) (con-
taining restrictions as amended in 1977). As a result, the baseline against which
Houseman measures the impact of the new rules may itself be tainted by the impact
of third-party-payor restrictions that might not stand scrutiny under Rule 5.4(c). Fi-
nally, once we recognize that Rule 5.4(c) is violated not only when lawyers are unable
to undertake a particular course of action but also when they are precluded by a third-
party payor from considering it in a case where such consideration would be appropri-
ate, I suspect the percentage of affected cases will expand.
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(C) (1997). The United States Code requires the
Legal Services Corporation to:
insure that ... recipients ... adopt procedures for determining and imple-
menting priorities for the provision of such assistance, taking into account
the relative needs of eligible clients for such assistance ... , including partic-
ularly the needs for service on the part of significant segments of the popula-
tion of eligible clients with special difficulties of access to legal services or
special legal problems (including elderly and handicapped individuals).
Id.
72. "Because the provision of pro bono services is a professional responsibility, it
is the individual ethical commitment of each lawyer." MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 cmt. (1997).
73. Rule 6.1 urges lawyers to "aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono
publico legal services per year" and to "voluntarily contribute financial support for
organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means." Id. at Rule 6.1.
The final section of the commentary accompanying Rule 6.1, however, tells us that
"[t]he responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be enforced through disci-
plinary process." Id. at Rule 6.1 cmt.
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So I would reject the idea that one could get out of the 5.4(c) box
by ruthlessly limiting one's case load. If what I have argued so far
is right, then 5.4(c) and its counterpart provision in the Model
Code are breached by the Legal Services Corporation restrictions
and lawyers at entities that are applying those restrictions are in
breach of these rules.
Moreover, it is a particularly striking feature of Rule 5.4(c) and
DR 5-107(B) that neither of them contains language permitting a
client to consent to a departure from its provisions. Clients, in
other words, are not permitted to allow third parties to regulate
their lawyer's professional judgment. Using the language of con-
flicts discussions, we might say that the Rules and Code view this
kind of conflict as "unconsentable."
In his presentation, however, Professor Stephen Gillers rightly
pointed out an important qualification of this proposition.
Although clients cannot consent to third-party limitations on their
lawyers once the representation is underway, they apparently can
agree to such limitations at the onset of the matter.74 In particular,
the comment to Model Rule 1.2 declares that "[r]epresentation
provided through a legal aid agency may be subject to limitations
on the types of cases the agency handles. When a lawyer has been
retained by an insurer to represent an insured, the representation
may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage.17 As-
suming that clients may also agree, under Rule 1.2, to limitations
on the means their lawyers will use - as the comment, though not
the Rule, declares 76 - they presumably could agree at the onset to
the kinds of limits required by the LSC, unless those limits are for
some othei reason not in "accord with the Rules of Professional
Conduci and other law."'77
74. See infra pp. 388-92 (remarks of Stephen Gillers).
75. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.2 cmt. (1997).
76. The Rule says that "[a] lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if
the client consents after consultation." Id. at Rule 1.2(c). The relevant section of the
Comment, however, is entitled "Services Limited in Objectives or Means." Perhaps
this apparent inconsistency reflects the Rules' recognition that "[a] clear distinction
between objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn," id. at Rule 1.2 cmt., as
well as a sense that limitations on objectives are actually greater potential intrusions
on client choice than limitations on means.
77. The comment to Rule 1.2 directs that "[a]n agreement concerning the scope of
representation must accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law."
Id.
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Before we explore whether these limits are somehow beyond the
scope of what clients could agree to under Rule 1.2 at the onset,78
we must recognize that this solution does not offer an easy out for
lawyers who now must limit the means they will utilize on cases
that are already ongoing.79 For these lawyers and clients, Rule 1.2
offers no solace unless, as Professor Gillers suggested, they can re-
start their attorney-client relationships, include the new restrictions
in the terms of the newly-begun relationships, and thus avoid ever
having to impose these restrictions in an ongoing relationship.
While this may well be the least untenable course of action avail-
able to lawyers in this difficult position, as Professor Gillers sug-
gests, its fictional character seems clear. The relationship is
ongoing, in all but name, and if Rule 5.4(c) really prohibits third-
party intrusions on ongoing attorney-client relationships then we
ought not to allow it to be circumvented in this way.
At least for the many current cases in which lawyers might have
given real consideration to any of the steps now precluded by the
LSC rules, accordingly, Rule 5.4(c) appears to constitute an un-
waivable problem. The upshot of this analysis would be that law-
yers complying with the LSC restrictions would be obliged to
withdraw not only from those cases in which they would have had
to use the now-barred approaches in order to provide competent
representation, but also wherever they would have otherwise con-
sidered these approaches as among the options to be weighed and
adopted, or rejected, in the exercise of independent professional
judgment.8 °
All of this, however, has assumed that the words of Rule 5.4(c)
and DR 5-107(B) are as unqualified as they appear. In fact, how-
ever, it is clear that in at least three contexts third parties do exer-
cise significant control over the steps that lawyers take on their
78. See infra text accompanying notes 89-100 (discussing the permissibility of the
LSC restrictions under the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers) and infra note
91 (analyzing the application of Rule 1.2).
79. Scott Rosenberg of the Legal Aid Society of New York pointed out this prob-
lem in a question he posed during the panel discussion.
80. If Rule 5.4(c) is an absolute prohibition on third-party control of the lawyer's
independent judgment, then the lawyer would be obliged to withdraw whenever such
control would otherwise be felt, since withdrawal is ordinarily mandatory when "the
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(1) (1997). Withdrawing from an
ongoing case because of a third-party-payor's insistence, however, might itself consti-
tute an impermissible acceptance of third-party control over the lawyer's rendition of
legal services-so even withdrawal might not solve the 5.4(c) problem.
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clients' behalf.81 The first of these is public interest litigation, in
which, as is well known, advocacy organizations frequently deter-
mine that they will only press cases if the clients agree to seek par-
ticular objectives.82 The second is insurance defense. Here, by
virtue of the insurance contract between the insurer and the in-
sured, the insurer usually has the duty to provide a defense and at
least considerable power to control it. The exact dimensions of this
insurer power can be debated, but there seems to be no doubt that
insurers routinely regulate at least some aspects of the decision-
making of their insured's counsel.83 The third, the most directly
relevant here, is poverty law practice, in which budget limitations
have generated caseloads that must require lawyers to make care-
ful choices about what resources to expend on which cases.84
Given these realities, it is difficult to read the words of Rule
5.4(c) and DR 5-107(B) as meaning exactly what they say. Such
realities appear to have contributed to the decision of the drafters
of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers to make some
inroads into what the Rules and Code seem to declare without
qualification. In language not yet approved by the full American
81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 215 cmt. &
reporter's note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 Mar. 29, 1996) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
82. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419-21 (1963).
83. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES
§ 9.1(b) at 988 (Student Ed. 1988); Robert E. O'Malley, Ethics Principles for the In-
surer, the Insured, and Defense Counsel: The Eternal Triangle Reformed, 66 TUL. L.
REV. 511, 520-21 (1991); Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent
the Company or the Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1583, 1594-95 (1994).
One important limit on insurer control may arise where the insurer disputes
whether the underlying lawsuit falls within the scope of the insurance policy. Keeton
and Widiss comment:
Although this issue has not been considered by the courts of most states, the
judicial decisions in several states (including California, Illinois, and New
York) provide unqualified holdings on this question. The conclusion of the
Illinois Supreme Court is very representative of these opinions: absent the
acceptance by the insured of the defense rendered by insurer after a full
disclosure of a conflict of interest or the waiver of the defense by the insurer,
an insured "has the right to be defended in the personal injury case by an
attorney of his own choice who shall have the right to control the conduct of
the case."
KEETON & WIDISS, supra, § 7.6 at 853-55 (footnote omitted) (quoting Maryland Cas-
ualty v. Peppers, 355 N.E.2d 24, 31 (1976)).
84. Paul Tremblay has insightfully discussed this aspect of legal services work in
Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community - Based Ethics for Legal Services Practice, 37
UCLA L. REV. 1101 (1990).
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Law Institute, section 215(2) of the 1996 Proposed Final Draft pro-
vides that:
A lawyer's professional conduct on behalf of a client may be
directed by someone other than the client when:
(a) the direction is reasonable in scope and character, such as
by reflecting obligations borne by the person directing the law-
yer; and
(b) the client consents to the direction under the limitations
and conditions provided in § 202 [which deals with consent to
conflicts of interest]. 85
85. RESTATEMENT, supra note 81, at § 215(2). This section of the Restatement has
proved quite controversial, primarily, it seems, because of its bearing on insurance
defense. See Nancy J. Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflices, 10 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 541, 568-68 (1997); Thomas D. Morgan, Conflicts of Interest in the
Restatement: Comments on Professor Moore's Paper, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 575,
577-78 (1997). As a result, section 215, although part of the 1996 "Proposed Final
Draft No. 1," has not yet been approved by the ALI. Professor Morgan writes that:
[w]hen the Reporters submitted a revision of section 215 that had been
worked out in discussions with the critics, the process had become so con-
fused that the whole question was sent back for further review and consulta-
tion with the Projects Advisers and others.
Id. at 578. For further detail on this controversy, see David R. Anderson, Ten Years
Later, the Restatement's Attempt to Define Defense Counsel's Role in the Tripartite
Relationship Is Still a Work in Progress, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: INS, Oct. 15, 1996,
available in LEXIS.
The American Law Institute has just published a revised version of Section 215 and
its accompanying commentary. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 215 (Proposed Final Draft No. 2 Apr. 6, 1998) (1 am grateful to John
Leubsdorf for providing me with a copy.). The revised draft does not change the text
of Section 215 itself, but dues extensively revise the accompanying commentary. Not
surprisingly, most of the proposed changes appear to respond to the special problems
posed by insurance defense. In aggregate, these changes may somewhat enhance the
authority of insurers vis-A-vis their insureds, but this modification does not seem
meant to apply generally in all third-party-payor contexts. Instead, the commentary
now declares at one point:
Certain practices of designated insurance defense counsel have become cus-
tomary and, in any event, involve primarily standardized protection afforded
by a regulated entity in recurring situations. Thus a particular practice per-
missible for counsel representing an insured may not be permissible under
this Section in non-insurance arrangements with significantly different
characteristics.
Id., cmt. f.
In one respect, however, the revisions are more directly relevant to the issue I am
exploring here. The commentary to section 215 now speaks more extensively to is-
sues of legal services practice that it did before. At one point the commentary ob-
serves that "other law [besides the law of lawyering] may govern" attorney-client
relationships in this context, id., cmt. a - and thus may permit what the law of lawy-
ering would forbid. A new, final comment, however, describes a range of "legal ser-
vice and similarly funded representation[s]," and ends with the observation that:
Regardless of the method of appointment, the form of compensation or the
nature of the paying organization (for example, whether governmental or
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It could certainly be argued that under section 215(2) the entire
third-party control problem disappears. The directions imposed by
the legal services agencies could be defended as "reasonable in
scope and character" in light of the obligations imposed on the
agencies by Congress itself. Moreover, clients surely would con-
sent, since they have little alternative, and such constrained choice
might be acceptable. Section 202 of the Restatement, which de-
fines the conditions for consent, requires that the consent be in-
formed, and this means "that the client... [must] have reasonably
adequate information about the material risks,"86 but this require-
ment could be satisfied through careful counseling. Once this re-
quirement is met, any conflict can be consented to unless the
representation is prohibited by law, or would involve clients of the
same lawyer making claims against each other in the same case, or
where "in the circumstances, it is not reasonably likely that the
lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or
more of the clients."' 87 Finally, the Restatement would allow such
consent to be given even after the lawyer-client relationship has
begun, although it treats mid-stream adjustments more cautiously
than agreements made at the start of the relationship.88
The Restatement is not law, but it is certainly influential. More-
over, as I've already indicated, the Restatement's denial of the ab-
solute character of the prohibition on third-party interference with
professional judgment is actually correct. This prohibition, though
phrased in Rule 5.4(c) and DR 5-107(B) as if it were absolute, is
already not so in fact. But if it is not absolute, that doesn't mean
that it is completely subject to invasion. Frankly, I am concerned
that the Restatement's authorization of third-party interference
that is "reasonable in scope and character" may unwisely broaden
the current departures from the rule prohibiting such interference
into what would be, essentially, the elimination of the rule itself.
But whether or not that is so, even the Restatement by no means
authorizes any and all third-party control.
private or whether non-profit or for-profit), the lawyer's representation of
and relationship with the individual client must proceed as provided for in
this Section [215].
Id., cmt. g. This declaration strongly supports the conclusion that the LSC restric-
tions, if they are inconsistent with Section 215, are inconsistent with the law of lawyer-
ing, and can be validated, if at all, only by reference to other law that displaces the
rules of the Restatement.
86. Id. at § 202(1).
87. Id. at § 202(2).
88. See id. at § 29A & cmt. e.
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On the contrary, it seems to me that it is quite appropriate to
maintain that the third-party limits created by the LSC restrictions
are not "reasonable in scope and character. ' 89 First, restrictions in
other contexts, such as insurance defense or budget-conscious legal
services practice, are at least to some extent arrived at on a case-
by-case basis, reflecting professional judgment and sometimes cli-
ent input in the particular case.90 Here, by contrast, the restrictions
imposed are uniform and across-the-board, and hence less likely to
be reasonable in the circumstances of individual cases. Moreover,
these restrictions block lawyers from even considering the prohib-
ited steps in particular cases, and this across-the-board restriction
on professional judgment undercuts lawyer representation in any
case where competent practice would require consideration of
these steps.91
89. It may be that much of the original force behind the organized bar's opposi-
tion to third-party regulation came from lawyers' self-interested resistance to discount
legal services that might have been made possible through such mechanisms as legal
services insurance. This might go far to explain why Canon 35 of the old Canons of
Professional Ethics, quoted in note 62, supra, explicitly exempts "[c]haritable societies
rendering aid to the indigents" from its prohibition on third-party "intermediaries."
The resistance to discount legal services has now largely been overridden, and in my
opinion rightly so. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S.
217 (1967). Nevertheless, as I seek to show in the text, there remain cogent reasons
for taking the limit on third-party intervention seriously.
90. So, for example, the RESTATEMENT offers the example of an insurance lawyer
who:
believes that doubling the number of depositions taken, at a cost of $5,000,
would somewhat increase Policyholder's chances of prevailing and Lawyer
so informs Insurer and Policyholder. If the insurance contract confers au-
thority on Insurer to make such decisions about expense of defense, and
Lawyer reasonably believes that the additional depositions can be foregone
without violating the standard of care owed by Lawyer to Policyholder...,
Lawyer may comply with Insurer's direction that taking depositions would
not be worth the cost.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 81, at § 215 cmt. f.
91. "Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis
of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures
meeting the standards of competent practitioners." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.1 cmt. (1997). Thus restrictions preventing lawyers from making a
proper analysis of a case and the options for pursuing it at least jeopardize compe-
tence even where the result of such an analysis might be to reject the very steps the
lawyer is now prohibited from considering. Under Rule 1.2, therefore, it would ap-
pear that a lawyer should not be able to ask a client to agree in advance to the law-
yer's not even considering an approach to the case unless a competent lawyer would
not feel such consideration was called for. There may be many cases where options
can be so confidently ruled out at the start, but there are likely to be others where
they cannot be-and in these cases, as well as in those where analysis would ulti-
mately indicate that the excluded options actually should be utilized, Rule 1.2 agree-
ments to limit representation would seem to be questionable.
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Second, what appear to be the paradigm cases of acceptable
third-party intervention today all embody at least a substantial
commonality of interest between the third party and the lawyer's
actual client. The insurer and insured have contracted together,
and typically share an interest in winning the case - and where
their interests diverge, as in cases where the insurer maintains that
the claim doesn't fall within the policy coverage, additional safe-
guards may be imposed to protect the insured.92 Similarly, the
legal services agency ordinarily can be expected to desire the same
success that the legal services client seeks. 93 So, too, in public in-
terest law practice, where the advocacy organization funding the
case undoubtedly does have a political agenda, the client may well
share it.94 Even so, there surely are examples, in each of these con-
texts, where client and third-party interests diverge, and it is be-
cause of this potential that there is reason for concern about third-
party control even in these settings.
But the restrictions imposed now on LSC grant recipients are
being imposed by the federal government, and the United States is
likely to be the adversary in many of the cases whose handling it is
now regulating, and the funder and ally of the adversaries (state
and local governments) in many others.95 Efforts by the United
States to free its own attorneys of ordinarily-applicable ethical re-
strictions are currently controversial.96 Surely it is at least as prob-
92. See supra note 83.
93. As in the insurance context, however, this identity of interest is not absolute.
Paul 'Temblay discusses the problem of "reconciling the interests, needs, and desires
of individuals with those of the community of clients that the organization serves."
See Tremblay, supra note 84, at 1124-29.
94. For the Supreme Court's perception of identity of interests between the
NAACP and black litigants challenging school segregation, see NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 443 (1963); for a much more skeptical appraisal, see Derrick Bell, Serv-
ing Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litiga-
tion, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
95. In particular, in the words of the Velazquez plaintiffs:
To make matters worse, these restrictions were enacted by the same Con-
gress that engineered the most fundamental restructuring of welfare in its
60-year history, leaving 50 states to overhaul their welfare programs in the
coming months, without the input of Legal Services lawyers representing in-
digent clients, leaving many poor people at the mercy of potentially uncon-
stitutional, illegal and unwise regulations.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 8, Velaz-
quez v. Legal Services Corporation, No. 97 Civ. 00182 (FB) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1997).
96. See Mark Curriden, Is DOJ Above the Rules? The Department's Bid to Exempt
Lawyers from Contact Rule Is Blasted by States' Chief Justices, ABA J., Nov. 1997, at
26.
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lematic for the government to impose new restrictions on the
practice of the attorneys for its opponents.
No doubt some defenders of these rules would maintain that
they are being instituted in order to protect legal services clients
from the interfering political agendas of their lawyers and those
lawyers' employers. Clearly, one client's (or politician's) interfer-
ence may be another's vindication. Moreover, there is no doubt
that the poverty and disadvantage that legal services clients endure
can make them more vulnerable to lawyers' expolitation. But I
find it implausible to think that legal services lawyers, bound by
professional duty and likely political orientation to serve poor cli-
ents, would be more likely to distort their clients' needs than would
legislators who have no ethical obligation to put these citizens (and
non-citizens) first - to say nothing of those legislators' politics.97
Moreover, and more fundamentally, it seems to me that the
preservation of an independent bar is threatened when the profes-
sional judgment of particular groups of unpopular lawyers - such
as those representing the poor - is subjected to restrictions im-
posed as a result of political decisions by the state. It is especially
troubling to see such restrictions imposed in the face of the long-
standing, and far from adequately implemented, duty of all lawyers
to ensure that even those without funds still have access to the
legal system.98 And it is difficult indeed to see the current restric-
tions as protecting the interests of legal services clients as those
clients would define them, since one effect of these restrictions is to
block lawyers from challenging policies that many or most of these
clients surely see as harmful to them. 99
Even if these restrictions were "reasonable in scope and charac-
ter," they would not be valid under the Restatement unless they
were also validly consented to. The Restatement commentary indi-
cates that valid consent must also be voluntary consent. In
particular,
the lawyer must show that the client was not pressured to accede
in order to avoid the problems of changing counsel, alienating
97. For examples of the explicitly political flavor of congressional opposition to
the work of the Legal Services Corporation, see Varshavsky v. Perales, No. 40767/91,
slip op. at 15 & n.2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 1996). Among the comments quoted here
is the observation by Representative Dornan that "[i]t's time to defund the left. .. .,"
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1997, 142 CONG. REC. H8149-04, at *185 (1997).
98. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1997); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1983).
99. See supra notes 69, 94.
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the lawyer, missing a deadline or losing a significant opportunity
in the matter, or because a new lawyer would have to repeat
significant work for which the client owed or had paid the first
lawyer. 00
While this observation addresses mid-stream agreements, and does
not focus on the situation of legal services clients who face the
prospect of having no lawyer at all, rather than just of having
problems in finding another, there is very good reason to question
the voluntariness of the consent that legal services clients would
give. These clients, or would-be clients, not only have little hope of
finding other counsel, but they also frequently have acute legal
needs. When the only possible source of aid in dealing with those
needs comes complete with burdensome restrictions, consent to
those restrictions hardly seems fully voluntary.
I've arrived at the conclusions that at least a substantial number
of legal services lawyers are in breach of their ethical obligations by
virtue of staying at jobs with LSC-funded entities, and that perhaps
a number of those entities are in breach of their statutory program
obligations as well - none of which is any good for the clients of
legal services at all. It is not my object to close down legal services
offices, or to force the employees of those offices to abandon their
valuable work or face bar discipline.'
What I do hope is that this set of propositions is of value in the
effort to overturn these restrictions. The demonstration that a
longstanding, and still important, principle of legal ethics is being
breached or at least compromised may help to persuade
100. RESTATEMENT, supra note 81, at § 29A cmt. e.
101. Professor Vanessa Merton asked during the panel discussion whether my argu-
ments would oblige other lawyers to report their legal services colleagues to the bar
for violation of the ethics codes. My answer then, and now, is "no": however persua-
sive the arguments I advance here, I do not think lawyers could currently be said to
"know" that practice under the LSC restrictions constitutes a violation of the rules.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1997) (imposing report-
ing obligation on lawyers "having knowledge" of certain violations); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmLT DR 1-103(A) (1995) (imposing reporting obligation
on lawyers "possessing unprivileged knowledge" of violations). Nor do I believe that
such violations, if we "knew" of them, would "raise[ ] a substantial question as to [the
violating] lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects," as
Rule 8.3(a) also requires. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 8.3(a)
(1997). Finally, I should add that since the meaning of Rule 5.4(c) is surely "argua-
ble," legal services lawyers who carry on their work "in accordance with a supervisory
lawyer's reasonable resolution" of the Rule 5.4(c) problem would be protected from
discipline under Rule 5.2(b), id. at Rule 5.2(b) - even if the supervisors are ulti-
mately mistaken in denying that they, and their subordinates, are being subjected to a
5.4(c) violation.
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lawmakers, including those who rule on issues of ethics as well as
those who draft statutes, to reject these restrictions. This recogni-
tion may also help to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of these
restrictions, by buttressing the proposition that the LSC require-
ments undercut fundamental aspects of the notion of access to law.
Finally, these propositions may help to increase the force of argu-
ments, based on legal ethics, that aim to persuade the rest of the
bar and the judiciary to shoulder an obligation to establish settings
within which lawyers for the poor can practice as they should.102
Finally, I cannot resist making an argument derived from what I
have learned in another part of my academic life, in studying South
African law and especially South African law of the days of
apartheid. Sadly, this experience is not irrelevant to thinking
about ways of challenging and limiting unjust laws in this country.
One of the leading anti-apartheid legal scholars of the 1980s, the
late Etienne Mureinik, articulated the idea that legislators should
be held to their stated promises.10 3 They should be imputed with,
and bound by, an interpretive presumption of integrity. Interest-
ingly, even the massively unjust legislation of the old South Africa
did not rule out discerning certain benign legislative promises by
which to temper injustice. In the United States, happily, our stat-
utes probably contain many more such affirmations.
As Emily Sack indicated, one such promise - a promise re-
peated in numerous places in the Legal Services statutes - is that
there shall be no interference with independent professional judg-
ment on the part of legal services lawyers.1"4 If that language is
held to mean what it says, as a matter of integrity, and if these
restrictions read without qualification constitute such interference
for the reasons I've argued, then it would follow that the statutory
provisions imposing these restrictions have to be quite brutally re-
102. The ABA Commission on Ethics and Professional Responsibility declared in
Formal Op. 96-399, supra note 1, that:
Legal services organizations not funded by the Legal Services Corporation
must be supported where they exist, and established where they do not. Our
courts must stand ready to assign substitute counsel to the thousands of indi-
gent clients who may find themselves without a lawyer. And lawyers
throughout the nation must be prepared to give meaning to the principles of
Model Rule 6.1 and perform extraordinary pro bono service ....
103. As he wrote, "if there is a discrepancy between our protestations and our ac-
tions, others have a right to bridge the discrepancy and hold us to what we affirm."
Etienne Mureinik, Pursuing Principle: The Appellate Division and Review Under the
State of Emergency, 5 S. AFR. J. HuM. RTs. 60, 67 (1989).
104. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996(5), 2996(6), 2996e(b)(3), 2996f(a)(1) & 2996f(a)(10)
(1997).
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interpreted so as to make an exception for those instances of con-
duct otherwise violating the statute which are necessitated by
fidelity to the lawyers' ethical obligations. Much as a prominent
South African statute ousting the courts' jurisdiction to review de-
tentions without trial was interpreted to oust the courts' authority
only when the detentions in fact complied with the statute, °5 so we
might call for reading the Legal Services Corporation restrictions
to constrain lawyers' judgment only in those cases where obedience
to those restrictions does not actually constrain the professional as-
sessments and decisions which they would otherwise make. I can-
not say I am optimistic that this argument will be accepted, but I
can say that if accepted it would vindicate the principle of equal
access to justice, and free lawyers of restraints in the practice of
poverty law that compromise principles long embodied in the
codes of legal ethics.
RUSSELL G. PEARCE:
I will take thirty seconds on the remedies issues, because Steve
Ellmann's talk suggested it, and some of you may not be familiar
with the disciplinary system and what would happen, for example,
if the ABA Ethics Opinion had said that it would be unethical for
lawyers to work for entities that accepted the restrictions and what
would happen if a disciplinary committee accepted that under-
standing of the law.
The remedy, if the restrictions are "unethical," is to censure, sus-
pend, or disbar lawyers who work for legal services offices that
take funds under those circumstances. I mention that, in part, be-
cause I understand that the question of remedy influenced the
ABA in drafting its Opinion, correctly or not, and also just to un-
derscore what Steve Ellmann said on the issue of there's another
remedy, something I certainly had not thought of, that there's also
the question, under Rule 5.4 and the related issue of unauthorized
practice, whether legal services offices themselves are engaged in
unauthorized practice, and would then have to be disbanded or
would then be acting unlawfully, if we accepted this interpretation.
Let me turn to Steve Gillers. I already see hands. We'll open it
to comments from the floor as soon as we finish the panel.
105. Minister of Law and Order and Others v. Hurley and Another, 1986 (3) SA
549 (A). I discuss this case in STEPHEN ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW AND
LIBERTY IN SouT AFRICA'S STATE OF EMERGENCY 28-29, 53-56 (1992).
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STEPHEN GILLERS:
Well, everyone is now on notice that unless they send in their
resignation from their job by 5:00 p.m., they're disbarred.
I'm sitting here thinking this can't be so. I read Rules 5.4 and
1.8, a copy of which Helaine has brought, and indeed there is no
consent or waiver aspect to either Rule. But, nevertheless, it can't
be so. I think it can't be so for this reason: what those Rules pro-
hibit is interference with the lawyer's independence of professional
judgment once the case is underway. I don't think they prevent a
lawyer and a client from agreeing to a particular scope for their
representation at the outset. Scope can be referenced by both
objectives and means. And, indeed, Rule 1.2 plus its Comment do
envision allowing clients and lawyers to agree at the outset to limit
the objectives or means of the representation. 10 6
Once that representation is undertaken within the constrained
objectives or means, the lawyer's independent judgment may not
be compromised or limited. If the person paying the fee does not
do so, Rules 1.8 and 5.4 are satisfied.
That doesn't mean the Opinion is fine, however. I have a lot of
trouble with the Opinion. I suppose my main objection is that it is
essentially managerial. That is, it purports to tell legal services of-
fices, in a kind of preachy way, about how they should behave in
anticipation of the legislation, which did not come to pass as
anticipated.
I think I am going to substitute for the word "managerial,"
micro-managerial, because I think that's really what it does. It in-
trudes excessively on the operation of a law office, and it does that
with caveats and dictums that really cannot be anchored in the
Model Rules or actually contradict the Model Rules. I'll mention
one or two in a second.
But, first, let me suggest a kind of mind game with which to ap-
proach these questions. We have to do this because we cannot pos-
sibly describe, in any sensible way, all the multiple categories of
representations that all the many kinds of legal services lawyers
may undertake in a particular office and all of the multiple ways in
which, at the outset or during the course of the representation, a
particular congressional limitation could affect that representation.
Let me just talk about three categories in which the lawyer rec-
ognizes at the outset with a fair degree of confidence that the con-
gressional limitations are going to pose no restriction on how he or
106. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt (1997).
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she behaves in a matter, or virtually no restriction, and the lawyer
knows this by virtue of the experience the lawyer has had in that
area of practice. Then, we can envision a middle category where
the lawyer recognizes that there are things she will not be able to
do that she might like to do, but she can still render a competent
service to the client, limiting its objectives and means by agree-
ment. And then there is a third category where the lawyer looks at
what is excluded from her armory of strategies, goals, and legal
services and says, "no competent lawyer with these restrictions
could possibly accept your case, and I therefore can't, given what
Congress has said to me." I realize there are many gradations be-
tween these three categories, but for ease let's think of those three.
The Opinion does something very interesting. It says in two
places that it's the lawyer's job when this legislation is passed to tell
every client about the restrictions imposed by the legislation -
"must communicate the new restrictions to every client" - and
then it bemoans the fact that this may take up a lot of telephone
time; but, so be it, there's nothing that can be done.1"7
It also says that "as regards future clients, the lawyer must in-
form all clients of the practice restrictions and obtain their written
agreement to abide by those restrictions."'01 8 A little later it says
that "such an agreement must be signed by each new client, even if
the possibility of the statutory violation seems remote at best."'10 9
So now, going back to our three categories, the Opinion says
even as to clients whose matters the restrictions will not, at a prac-
tical level, affect at all (which the lawyer as a professional knows
because she has done this work for years) a current client has to get
a call or (preferably) a letter saying, "I want you to know here is
how Congress decided I will be restrained in my representation of
you." And every new client, even one whose matter the restriction
will not realistically affect, has to sign an agreement acknowledging
the restriction.
I consider this to be, at best, ironic - and, at worst, I'll bleep it
out - because many of us who labor in these vineyards had long
urged the ABA to require various kinds of writings to commemo-
rate agreements between lawyers and clients, but without success.
Most prominently, when a client hires a lawyer in the first instance
on a non-emergency basis, for a non-contingency matter, we have
107. Formal Op. 96-399, supra note 1, at 25.
108. Id. at 27.
109. Id.
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urged that those retainers be reduced to writing. The ABA Model
Rule does not do that.
Consider any other lawyer, a non-legal services lawyer, who lim-
its the scope or objective of a representation, who can foresee a
likely situation in which a means or an objective will become signif-
icant to the representation but who chooses to exclude it from the
retainer, that lawyer does not have to use a writing at all. If the
same lawyer anticipates only a remote restriction on the scope of
work, he or she need not even talk to the client about it. But here
we have an obligation, drawn from no text, to counsel current and
prospective clients about restrictions that will not in the lawyer's
judgment impinge on their matters, and to do so with prospective
clients in writing - so doubly it seems to me to be a gratuitous
imposition on the work of a legal services office. I am sure the
Committee's motives were benign, that it was trying to help in a
very difficult situation, but I don't see the need or wisdom, as a
Committee issuing an Ethics Opinion, given the ways in which
these opinions can be used by adversaries, to offer this help.
Let me give you one other, somewhat ambiguous example. The
Committee opines that a lawyer can withdraw from representing a
client in a matter, when the work or its objectives are no longer
permissible, if continuing the work will hurt other current clients.
That seems to be the only basis the Committee gives for with-
drawal that it deems entirely legitimate.
I found this interesting because the Committee only glancingly
refers to the provision of the Model Rules that permits a lawyer to
withdraw if the representation will result in "an unreasonable fi-
nancial burden on the lawyer.""' The Committee writes that the
"loss of funding that would result from maintaining an ineligible
representation may permit withdrawal under 1.16(b)(5) .... ,,111 It
then notes that this withdrawal "is permissive, not mandatory" and
that "where loss of LSC funding would not result in the closing of
the office or the need to withdraw from all pending matters, each
legal services office will have to make its own determination as to
whether the greater good is served by foregoing LSC funding
.... 2 Apparently all that goes into the balance are the relative
interests of the clients who will or will not be served depending on
which choice an office with some independent funding elects.
Nothing is said about the interest of lawyers who will lose employ-
110. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(5) (1997).
111. Formal Op. 96-399, supra note 1, at 25.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
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ment. The withdrawal provision for lawyers in private practice,
Rule 1.16, is decidedly more solicitous of their interests.
There is one part of the decision that I found correct, and per-
haps obligatory, at least on the right facts, and that is the sugges-
tion that legal services lawyers must in certain circumstances
present to a court limitations that would, construed one way, re-
quire withdrawal, but construed another way, would not. The pur-
pose is to see if a narrow construction is possible so that
withdrawal would not be necessary.
Certainly, a judicial order or a judicial construction of a statute
that eliminates the need to withdraw, by narrowing the restriction,
would save the lawyer's and the client's situation. Similarly, if the
judge said, "I don't care what Congress said, you were in this case
before that law was passed, and Congress cannot tell me that I
have to let you out; I'm not letting you out, you must continue,"
the lawyer would have an obligation to continue unless and until a
higher court reversed that decision. So I do believe that zealous
representation, if the facts support the argument, will generally re-
quire a lawyer to seek the narrowing construction and the judge's
guidance. In any event, if a case is pending, the lawyer would have
to seek the judge's guidance anyway because in every jurisdiction,
one generally may not withdraw from a litigation without court
permission.
I want to say a word about the attorneys' fees provision. We've
been asked to talk about this because the statute eliminates the
right of legal services lawyers to seek attorneys' fees, even if they
are litigating under laws that provide for them. One way of look-
ing at this would be to conclude that Congress is saying, "Look,
we're providing a free lawyer to the client, so we can take away the
right to a legal fee that client would otherwise have enjoyed if he or
she prevailed. We're just substituting one compensatory system for
another." And indeed, courts have said that the fee in a fee-shift-
ing statute goes to the client; it's the client's right and, as courts
have also said, it's the client's bargaining chip. So it makes some
sense that Congress can withdraw it and in lieu thereof provide the
lawyer directly.
It is true, however, that this bargaining chip has certain potency
in negotiation because the ability to waive the attorneys' fee pro-
vides leverage for settlement. So the legal services lawyer who is
retained in a fee-shifting matter and who cannot seek a fee is un-
able to provide that leverage for his or her client. That is a restric-
tion that a non-legal services lawyer does not have to live with. Of
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course, the non-legal services lawyer may also want to get paid.
The shifted fee, unlike the compensation for legal services lawyers,
is his or her only source of payment.
Does the client have to be told about the loss of this bargaining
chip? I think that the answer to that question is discretionary, that
it's not wise to provide it ex ante in an Ethics Opinion. Legal serv-
ices lawyers, who see a real advantage for the client to get a private
lawyer on a pro bono basis, with the use of the fee-shifting provi-
sion as a bargaining chip, should tell a client about the restriction;
and if not, not. But I would not purport to say in an opinion how
lawyers must behave in every situation.
Last point: Russ asks, "What should we do now about this Opin-
ion?" Well, of course, this Opinion is advisory; it was issued before
the law was adopted in anticipation of what it would say; the law
does not say exactly what it anticipated; it also applies to the Model
Rules, which in their exact formulation, I think, are adopted in no
jurisdiction - there are changes everywhere, sometimes significant
changes.
So there are three things we could do: first, we could criticize the
Opinion vocally, as we have and should continue to do. Second,
we can urge the ABA to revisit the Opinion in the spirit of enlight-
enment. Third, we can, failing all that, ignore the parts of the
Opinion with which we disagree after study, which I think is a fine
reaction, because the Opinion's reasoning and basis make part of
it, at least, an unpersuasive authority. I would not hesitate, were I
in a job affected by this Opinion, to make my own decision after
consultation and careful consideration - even if that decision were
contrary to some of what the Opinion says.
RUSSELL G. PEARCE:
Thank you, Steve. I'd like to close by thanking the panel for a
very thoughtful and provocative presentation.
I'd like once again to thank Scott Rosenberg and April New-
bauer of The Legal Aid Society, my colleague, Matt Diller, most
important, the students who put this together - Steve Epstein,
Eric Fields, Jack Pace, Staci Rosche.
Last, I'd like to say that we hope to see you the evening of No-
vember 5th and the day of November 6th, when we hold our next
conference, which will focus on "Lawyering for the Poor in the
Twentieth Century."
Thank you all very much.
